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Abstract
The thesis consists of three independent chapters.
In Chapter 1 (page 7) - Counter-cyclical defaults in “costly state verification”
models - I argue that a pro-cyclical risk-free rate can solve the problem of pro-cyclical
defaults in “costly state verification” models. Using a partial equilibrium framework,
I compute numerically the coefficient of a Taylor rule that delivers pro-cyclical
output, pro-cyclical capital and counter-cyclical defaults. This parametrization is
consistent with the empirical evidence on Taylor rules.
In Chapter 2 (page 67) - Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Default - I use the
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model to study the effect of monetary pol-
icy on the probability that firms default on loans. I argue that a monetary expansion
affects defaults through two opposing partial equilibrium effects. It increases de-
faults because it leads firms to take on more debt and leverage up net worth, and it
decreases defaults because the cost of borrowing decreases and aggregate demand
shifts out, increasing firms’ profits and net worth. I argue that the leverage effect
could explain the empirical partial equilibrium finding by Jimenez et al. (2008) that
defaults on new loans increase after a monetary expansion. I then argue that this
effect does not hold in general equilibrium due to an increase in firms’ profits. In
the full model, defaults decrease after a monetary expansion, although the effect
equals only few basis points.
In Chapter 3 (page 131) - Monetary Policy and Defaults in the US - I study
empirically the effect of an unexpected monetary expansion on the delinquency rate
on US business loans, residential mortgages and consumer credit. I consider several
identification strategies and use Granger-causality tests to assess the exogeneity of
the time series of monetary shocks to the Fed’s forecast of defaults on loans. I
then compute impulse responses using a variant of the Local Projection method by
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Jorda (2005). I find that the delinquency rates do not respond to monetary shocks
in a statistically significant way. The paper suggests that the risk-taking incentives
analyzed in partial equilibrium by several existing contributions might not be strong
enough to prevail and increase aggregate defaults, although they could explain why
defaults do not significantly decrease.
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Abstract
This chapter argues that a pro-cyclical risk-free rate can solve the prob-
lem of pro-cyclical defaults in “costly state verification” models. Using a
partial equilibrium framework, the paper computes numerically the coeffi-
cient of a Taylor rule that delivers pro-cyclical output, pro-cyclical capital
and counter-cyclical defaults. This parametrization is consistent with the
empirical evidence on Taylor rules.
JEL Classification: E44, E52
Keywords: Financial accelerator, costly state verification, pro-cyclical de-
fault
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1 Introduction
Financial frictions are a key ingredient of several macroeconomic models. One of
the approaches used in the literature to model financial frictions follows the “costly
state verification” model by Townsend (1979) (as for instance in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999)). In the “costly state verification” model (CSV hereafter) credit markets
are affected by asymmetric information regarding the idiosyncratic shock that hits
the borrowers’ revenues. Borrowers observe the realization of the shock at no cost,
while lenders observe it only if they incur an auditing cost. In this framework,
agents could potentially sign a contract in which the borrowing rate is a function of
the realization of the shock. Such a contract, though, would generate moral hazard,
since the borrower has the incentive to under-report the shock in order to pay a
lower interest rate. The lender anticipates this incentive and designs a contract that
specifies a non-contingent borrowing rate which is paid by the borrower as long as
his ex-post revenues exceed the repayment obligation. If the idiosyncratic shock is
such that the repayment obligation cannot be met, the borrower defaults and the
lender recovers the entire revenues, net of auditing costs.
While the CSV approach has the interesting feature that endogenous dynamics
in firms’ net worth generate hump-shaped impulse responses for output, it has
the inconvenience that it delivers pro-cyclical defaults (Gomes, Yaron and Zhang
(2003), Covas and Den Haan (2012) and Quadrini (2011)). As explained by Covas
and Den Haan (2012), this is due to a “substitution effect” on the determination
of the default rate. In equilibrium, the borrower weights the benefit of borrowing
more to invest more against the cost of paying to the lender a higher share of
expected revenues. This higher share is necessary to convince the lender to issue
the additional credit, but it increases the borrower’s default probability because it
increases his debt burden. In the model, when aggregate productivity increases, the
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borrower has the incentive to shift from low investment and low default into high
repayment share and high default in order to enjoy the increase in productivity.
While the data display pro-cyclical investment and output, they do not display
pro-cyclical defaults (Vassalou and Xing (2004)).
The literature has followed two approaches to reconcile the CSV model with the
empirical evidence on default rates. The first approach identifies elements within
the CSV model which break down the substitution effect. Accordingly, Dorofeenko,
Lee and Salyer (2008) and Medina (2006) show respectively that either a decrease in
the uncertainty on the idiosyncratic shock or an increase in its expected value gen-
erates pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical defaults. The business cycle is hence
interpreted in terms of time-varying idiosyncratic uncertainty (in Dorofeenko, Lee
and Salyer (2008)) and in terms of time-varying expected idiosyncratic productivity
(in Medina (2006)), rather than in terms of standard aggregate productivity shocks.
The second approach, instead, seeks a solution outside the CSV model by nesting
the standard model in a more comprehensive environment. Accordingly, Covas and
Den Haan (2012) generate both pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical defaults by
adding an equity contract to the CSV model, as long as the cost of issuing equity
is sufficiently counter-cyclical.
This paper suggests an alternative solution. It argues that, although pro-cyclical
defaults are an intrinsic property of the partial equilibrium CSV setting, they could
disappear once the model is nested in a general equilibrium framework where the
opportunity cost of lending is an increasing function of aggregate productivity. The
intuition is simple. An increase in the risk-free rate generates an opposite substitu-
tion effect if compared to the one triggered by a positive productivity shock. This
is because the higher cost of borrowing decreases the incentive to invest more and
leads the borrower to substitute towards lower repayment share and lower default.
It follows that one could calibrate a positive response of the real interest rate to
14
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productivity in order to simultaneously generate counter-cyclical defaults and pro-
cyclical output. This approach seems encouraging, given that Taylor rules imply a
closely-related positive relationship between interest rates and the real activity.
Specifically, the paper computes numerically the simplified Taylor rule that
breaks down the positive correlation between output and defaults in the CSV model,
following an aggregate productivity shock. The analysis is unconventional if com-
pared to standard monetary models. For instance, the model is in real terms and
does not feature inflation. Additionally, given the absence of nominal rigidities, the
central bank directly controls the real interest rate, while the output gap is prox-
ied by the level of aggregate productivity. These shortcomings should be weighed
against the purpose of the numerical exercise proposed, which is to suggest a new
direction for solving the problem of pro-cyclical defaults in CSV models. A heuris-
tic assessment of the model shows that the computed parametrization of the Taylor
rule is not rejected at conventional type-one errors by the empirical estimates on
Taylor rules by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998 and 2000) and Orphanides (2001).
The model generates pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical defaults at the
apparent cost of generating counter-cyclical capital. As it will be shown, a very
small pro-cyclicality in the borrower’s net worth is enough to generate the correct
cyclicality also in capital. The increase in net worth is exogenous in the model,
but it can be realistically reconciled in terms of an evaluation effect that works
through asset prices. This effect would be in place in a proper general equilibrium
environment, which is left for future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the modeling environment. Section 4 illustrates the determinants
of the equilibrium and shows graphically how a pro-cyclical real interest rate si-
multaneously generates pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical defaults. Section 5
calibrates the non-linear version of the model and computes numerically the Tay-
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lor rule that delivers the desired outcome. Section 6 compares it to the empirical
evidence.
2 Related literature
The costly state verification approach was developed by Townsend (1979) to ratio-
nalize the existence of financial contracts in which the repayment rate is fixed, i.e.
not contingent on the realization of shocks. The key elements of the model are the
ex-post asymmetric information between the borrower and the lender concerning
the revenues from the borrower’s project and the presence of a dead-weight moni-
toring (or auditing) cost for the lender to observe the realization of the borrower’s
idiosyncratic shock. The model assumes risk neutrality of both the borrower and
the lender.
The asymmetric information concerning the idiosyncratic shock that hits the
borrower’s revenues implies that the debt repayment cannot be state-contingent
on the states of the world where monitoring does not occur. As mentioned in the
introduction, if this was the case, the borrower would have the incentive to exploit
his informational advantage by under-reporting the realization of the shock in order
to pay a lower interest rate. Townsend departs from the fact that feasibility requires
a non-contingent borrowing rate. He then shows that, when monitoring occurs,
optimality prescribes that the lender recovers the entire return on revenues net of
monitoring cost and leaves nothing to the borrower. This is what the literature
refers to as a simple debt contract.
Figure 1 helps develop the intuition of the result by Townsend (1979). Assume
that the borrower’s revenues are given by ωI, where ω is the privately observed
idiosyncratic shock and I is the level of investment. Suppose that the borrower
borrows the entire amount I at the fixed interest rate rb. The figure shows the re-
16
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Figure 1: Optimality of a simple debt contract
lationship between the realization of the shock ω (horizontal axis) and the debt re-
payment (vertical axis), interpreted as the interest rate and principle on the amount
borrowed ((1 + rb)I). The intuition builds on the fact that a) monitoring implies a
dead-weight loss, b) when monitoring occurs the lender could either keep the entire
revenues or leave part of it to the borrower, and c) the higher the repayment in
the states of no monitoring, the more likely it is that the borrower defaults and
forces the lender to pay the monitoring cost. Knowing this, the lender can poten-
tially obtain a certain expected return E on lending by either demanding a high
repayment A = (1 + rAb )I in the non-monitoring states and leaving some revenues
for the borrower in case monitoring occurs (i.e. if ω < ω¯A), or by demanding a
low repayment B = (1 + rBb )I in case no monitoring occurs and keeping the entire
revenues in case monitoring occurs (i.e. if ω < ω¯B). While yielding by construction
the same expected return E to the lender, these combinations are not equivalent for
the entrepreneur. In fact, the lower default probability attached to the repayment
scheme B implies that expected monitoring costs are lower under B, which leaves
more revenues to the borrower in expected value, if compared to repayment scheme
17
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A. As displayed by the dotted red line in figure 1, the optimal contract takes the
form of a simple debt contract because, by minimizing monitoring costs, it yields a
higher utility to the borrower and leaves the lender indifferent. Having established
that the optimal contract takes the form of a simple debt contract, it only remains
to compute the optimal level of borrowing I and the optimal non-monitoring repay-
ment B (or equivalently, the borrowing rate rBb ).
The costly state verification model has found extensive application in the macroe-
conomic literature. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) used it in a general equilibrium
framework to study the role of net worth in the dynamics of output. The authors
build a model in which entrepreneurs borrow from capital mutual funds to trans-
form consumption goods into capital goods using a technology that is subject to
idiosyncratic uncertainty. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) show that this setting gen-
erates hump-shaped response functions for output, because a positive productivity
shock increases asset prices and pushes up revenues for several quarters ahead. This
increases net worth both directly (because the entrepreneur has a higher wealth)
and indirectly (because he optimally reduces consumption). The generated hump-
shaped response of net worth leads entrepreneurs to delay part of the investments
to the peak of the hump when the higher net worth reduces agency costs. Such
a behaviour in investment generates a positive autocorrelation in output, a result
that is consistent with the data.
While offering a tractable microfoundation of a debt contract, the costly state
verification model has the inconvenience that defaults are pro-cyclical, because they
are increasing in the exogenous return of the borrower’s investment. This is due to a
substitution effect that leads the borrower to respond to an increase in productivity
by paying a higher share of expected revenues to the lender in order to convince
him to issue more credit. The model by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) inherits this
property from the baseline costly state verification contract used.
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Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2008) fix this problem in the Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) model by introducing time-varying uncertainty in the idiosyncratic shock
and by generating business cycles through a variation in this uncertainty, instead
of through a variation in the productivity parameter. Their paper shows that a
decrease in the idiosyncratic uncertainty increases output and reduces the default
rate, delivering counter-cyclical default. Medina (2006) takes a similar approach
and introduces time-varying expected idiosyncratic productivity. He shows that an
increase in the expected idiosyncratic shock increases capital supply more than in
the case in which a similar increase in productivity is generated by an aggregate
shock. This stronger increase in credit supply reduces the price of capital, the
default rate and the external finance premium.1
Covas and Den Haan (2012) do not depart from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
They take a different approach and introduce an equity contract and firms’ hetero-
geneity into the partial equilibrium model by Townsend (1979). They show that the
pro-cyclicality of default is reduced if both equity and debt contracts are in place.
They then show that if the cost of issuing equity is sufficiently counter-cyclical a)
the pro-cyclicality of defaults disappears for both small and large firms, b) equity is
pro-cyclical for the bottom 25% firms, in accordance with the empirical evidence on
all firms except the top 1% firms, and c) shocks are magnified instead of dampened
as in the standard the debt contract, at least with respect to small firms.
1Faia and Monacelli (2007) solve the closely-related problem of a pro-cyclical external finance
premium of the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) by letting the expected idiosyncratic productivity of
investment increase following a positive aggregate productivity shock. Their model still features
pro-cyclical default, but generates a counter-cyclical external premium because the endogenous
increase in the average idiosyncratic productivity increases the expected return to the lender,
and this leads the lender to accept a lower borrowing rate. The authors note that a pro-cyclical
expected idiosyncratic productivity magnifies the effect of a productivity shock if compared to the
case of constant average idiosyncratic productivity, although not if compared to the frictionless
case. This feature of the model is also discussed by Covas and Den Haan (2012).
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3 CSV model with a linear production function
The previous section has contextualized the costly state verification model in the
macroeconomic literature. In this section I lay down the standard model and com-
ment on its key properties.
3.1 Environment
The standard CSV environment features a risk neutral entrepreneur who has access
to a production function but has limited net worth to buy capital. The entrepreneur
borrows external finance from a risk neutral lender who faces an opportunity cost
of lending equal to an exogenous risk-free interest rate r.2 I follow Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) and assume that the loan market is competitive, in the sense that
lenders compete to provide loans to borrowers and design the debt contract to
maximize the expected utility of the borrower.3
The borrower has access to a production function that features idiosyncratic
uncertainty. The realization of the idiosyncratic shock is costlessly observed by
the entrepreneur, but it can be observed by the lender only if he pays an observa-
tion cost. This information asymmetry makes state-contingent contracts subject to
moral hazard because the borrower has the incentive to under-report the realiza-
tion of the shock in order to pay a lower interest rate. The lender anticipates the
entrepreneur’s incentive to misreport revenues and sets a non-contingent borrowing
rate that ensures truth-telling by the entrepreneur.
2Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2008), Medina (2006) and Faia
and Monacelli (2007) normalize the opportunity cost of lending to 1. As in Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999), I assume that monetary policy affects debt contracts by influencing the
opportunity cost of lending.
3Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) defend this assumption by considering it plausible that entry
into lending is more likely than entry into entrepreneurial activity. Note that, in this setting,
competition does not have the standard meaning of price taking behaviour because the borrowing
rate is set in the debt contract, together with the amount borrowed.
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Assume the following linear production function:
ωθk + (1− δ)k.
k stands for the level of capital,4 θ is an aggregate productivity parameter, ω is
the non-negative idiosyncratic shock with known cumulative density function Φ(ω)
and E(ω) = 1 and δ < 1 is the depreciation rate.5 The linearity assumption helps
develop the intuition and is abandoned in Section 5.
Assume that the cumulative distribution function of ω implies a hazard rate that
increases in ω, which holds true for conventional distribution functions. Formally,
assume that 6
d
dω
Φ′(ω)
1− Φ(ω) > 0. (Assumption 1)
The contract lasts one period. At the beginning of the period both agents observe
θ. The entrepreneur, who is endowed with net worth n, borrows k−n from the lender
at the non-contingent interest rate rb and invests k. At the end of the period ω is
realized. If ωθk+(1−δ)k ≥ (1+rb)(k−n) the entrepreneur pays back (1+rb)(k−n)
and keeps the remaining as profits. Instead, if ωθk + (1 − δ)k < (1 + rb)(k − n)
the entrepreneur defaults on the loan and the lender recovers ωθk + (1− δ)k net of
4Since the model is static, capital and investment coincide. The difference becomes important
only in Section 5, where the shock to net worth is computed so that the volatility of capital (instead
of investment) relative to output matches the data. This is because in this model the variation
in k is always smaller than the variation in E(y) following a productivity shock, making it more
convenient to interpret k as capital rather than investment.
5Part of the literature simplifies the maximization problem of the debt contract by assuming
that depreciation does not affect the production function of the borrower, but enters the produc-
tion function of an intermediate good producer who rents capital from borrowers on a competitive
market (Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Faia and Mona-
celli (2007)). This approach has the inconvenient feature that the idiosyncratic shock is not a
structural shock anymore. I comment on this point further in note 17.
6Equivalently, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) assume ddω
ωΦ′(ω)
1−Φ(ω) > 0. In their paper the
auditing cost is assumed proportional to the ex-post revenues rather than the expected revenues,
as instead is the case in Faia and Monacelli (2007), Covas and Den Haan (2012) and here.
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the observation cost µθk (with µ < 1). The fact that the idiosyncratic shock ω can
take values from 0 to ∞ implies the existence of a threshold value ω¯ for ω below
which the debt repayment cannot be met and the entrepreneur defaults.7 Agents
are assumed not to be allowed to renegotiate the contract after ω is realized.8
The assumption that θ is observed before the contact is signed strengthens the
pro-cyclicality of defaults featured by the contract because agents know that the
end-of-period productivity will be high and they want to benefit from it by investing
more at the beginning of the period. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) dampen
this effect by assuming that the debt contract is signed before aggregate productivity
is known, which implies that agents only behave in expectation of θ. In this paper
I assume that θ is known at the beginning of the period in order to strengthen
pro-cyclical defaults, since this is the problem addressed in the paper.
3.2 Maximization problem and equilibrium
The contract maximizes the expected utility of the borrower under the indifference
condition of the lender. The maximization problem is
max
{k,ω¯,rb}
∫ ∞
ω¯
[
ωθk + (1− δ)k − (1 + rb)(k − n)
]
dΦ(ω),
subject to
∫ ω¯
0
[
ωθk+(1−δ)k−µθk]dΦ(ω)+∫ ∞
ω¯
[
(1+rb)(k−n)
]
dΦ(ω) ≥ (1+r)(k−n), (1)
ω¯θk + (1− δ)k = (1 + rb)(k − n). (2)
7Covas and Den Haan (2012) note that the contract by Townsend (1987) is optimal only if µ
is interpreted as an observation cost rather than as a bankruptcy cost (i.e. a cost that includes
indirect effects like liquidation costs, lost sales, financial distress etc.). This point is articulated
further in the calibration.
8Default would not occur in equilibrium if one allows for ex-post renegotiation of the loan, as
for instance in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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Equation (1) guarantees that the lender covers the opportunity cost in expectation.
Equation (2) defines the threshold value ω¯ as a function of the borrowing rate rb
and capital k.
Define F (ω¯) and G(ω¯) the shares of expected revenues θk that go respectively to
the borrower and to the lender. These functions can be computed by substituting
equation (2) into the objective function and the lender’s participation constraint,
obtaining
F (ω¯) =
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωdΦ(ω)− [1− Φ(ω¯)]ω¯ ; G(ω¯) = 1− F (ω¯)− µΦ(ω¯). (3)
Simple algebra shows that F (ω¯) is a strictly decreasing function in the entire support
of ω¯. This happens because an increase in ω¯ coincides with an increase in the default
probability, and because it implies that the entrepreneur pays a higher borrowing
rate if he does not default (as follows from equation (2)). G(ω¯), instead, is not
monotone in ω¯. In fact, an increase in ω¯ increases the borrowing rate, but it also
decreases the probability that the lender receives it. Assumption 1 ensures that, in
the relevant part of the support of ω, the function G(ω¯) is increasing. If this was
not the case a reduction in ω¯ would increase the expected utility of both agents.
The positive relationship between G(ω¯) and ω¯ plays a crucial role in the model
and follows from the fact that promising a higher share of expected revenues to the
lender implies that it will be harder for the borrower to actually pay it.9
Simplify the maximization problem using constraint (2) to substitute rb out of
the objective function and out of constraint (1). The maximization problem then
becomes
9Assumption 1 ensures that the equilibrium level ω¯∗ satisfies G′(ω¯∗) ≥ 0. See Covas and Den
Haan (2012), Appendix C and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Appendix A.
23
Chapter 1
max
{k,ω¯}
F (ω¯)θk,
subject to G(ω¯)θk + (1− δ)k ≥ (1 + r)(k − n). (4)
The objective function is increasing in k and decreasing in ω¯. Intuitively, the
borrower would like to borrow an infinite amount and promise a zero share or
expected revenues to the lender. This, of course, violates the constraint.10
To see what pins down the equilibrium, rewrite equation (4) as
k ≤ 1 + r
δ + r −G(ω¯)θn ≡ kmax(n+, θ+, G(ω¯)+ , r−). (5)
Equation (5) shows that the debt amount kmax−n that the lender is willing to supply
to the borrower is an increasing function of n, θ and G(ω¯) and a decreasing function
of r. Other things equal, the lender is more willing to lend if the entrepreneurial
net worth is higher, if the loan is backed by a higher aggregate productivity, if the
borrower promises a higher share of expected revenues or if the opportunity cost of
lending is lower.
Reconsider the maximization problem in light of equation (5). We saw that the
entrepreneur would like to borrow an infinite amount and promise a zero share of
expected revenues. Constraint (5) shows that in order to invest more the borrower
must promise to the lender a higher share of expected revenues to convince him
to supply more credit. A trade-off emerges for the borrower: he either promises a
low share of expected revenues and attracts limited capital, or accepts to promise a
higher share of expected revenues, invests more and runs a higher default probability.
Assuming an interior solution, the equilibrium level of ω¯ is the one that ensures
10From equation (2), when ω¯ = 0, 1 + rb = (1− δ) kk−n , implying limk→∞1 + rb = 1− δ < 1 + r.
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that the marginal cost of a higher promised share of expected revenues equals the
marginal benefit of running a bigger-scale investment. Substitute equation (5) in
the objective function and derive the optimality condition (6):
− F ′(ω¯) = F (ω¯) G
′(ω¯)
δ+r
θ
−G(ω¯) . (6)
Equation (6) uniquely pins down the optimal default rate ω¯∗ as an increasing func-
tion of θ
δ+r
(see Covas and Den Haan (2012), Appendix C). Substitute ω¯∗ into the
constraint and get the equilibrium capital k∗. To close the model, solve for r∗b using
equation (2).
4 Generating counter-cyclical defaults
In this section I explain how a pro-cyclical real interest rate eliminates the pro-
cyclicality of defaults implicit in the CSV contract. I first give the key intuition
using the three equilibrium equations of the model. I then develop the argument by
studying the role of parameters θ and r in isolation and then together. In this section
the analysis is carried out graphically using the linear production function. In the
next section the analysis is replicated numerically using a non-linear production
function.
4.1 Key intuition of the exercise
The key intuition of the exercise can be gained in three steps after rewriting equi-
librium ω¯, k and y as 11
11By assuming sufficiently many agents we can interpret y as aggregate output instead of ex post
output. This is convenient in order to disregard the specific ex post realization of the idiosyncratic
shock from considerations on the cyclical behaviour of y.
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ω¯∗ = f
( θ
δ + r
)
, f ′(.) > 0, (7)
k∗ =
1 + 1−δ
δ+r
1−G(ω¯∗) θ
δ+r
n, (8)
y∗ = θk∗ =
1 + r
δ+r
θ
−G(ω¯∗)n. (9)
1. An increase in θ increases the default rate, capital and output;
2. If r increases in response to an increase in θ to keep the ratio θ
δ+r
constant,
defaults remain constant, capital decreases but output still increases;
3. By continuity, if r responds to an increase in θ by marginally decreasing θ
δ+r
,
the default rate decreases, capital decreases and output still increases.
In other words, if the real interest rate remains unchanged, a productivity shock
delivers pro-cyclical default. To reconcile the model with the data, it suffices to
move the real interest rate pro-cyclically, since an appropriate variation of r delivers
counter-cyclical defaults and pro-cyclical output.12 From equation (8) we see that
the right cyclicality of default and output comes at the apparent cost of generating
counter-cyclical capital. This problem disappears as soon as one also gives a very
small pro-cyclical shock to net worth n (more on this later).
4.2 The effect of an increase in productivity θ
The initial equilibrium is shown in figure 2, point A. The optimal combination of
{k, ω¯} is shown in the left panel, the corresponding expected output E(y) = θk in
the right panel. In the left panel, the dash-dotted lines show iso-profit curves, the
12The effect generated by an increase in r is qualitatively identical to the effect generated by
a negative productivity shock, but quantitatively different due the the depreciation parameter δ.
Appendix A discusses this point and shows that the result of the analysis does not rely on the
assumption of δ < 1.
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upward-sloping line shows constraint (4) and the vertical line gives the optimality
condition (6).13
Figure 2: Initial equilibrium
Figure 3 shows the effect of a positive productivity shock. When θ increases, the
constraint slacks and rotates upwards. If investment was artificially constant (say,
due to a fixed investment technology) the entrepreneur would reduce the share of
expected revenues G(ω¯) promised to the lender and the default probability would
decrease (point B). Since k is not fixed, the entrepreneur increases the level of
investment in order to benefit from the higher productivity. As implied by equation
(6), it is optimal for the entrepreneur to increase the promised share of expected
revenues in order to convince the lender to issue more credit up to point C. The
increase in ω¯ increases the probability that the entrepreneur goes bankrupt, gener-
ating pro-cyclical default. This effect occurs because the increase in θ moves the
entrepreneur from preferring relatively small levels of capital and default probabil-
ity to accepting a higher default probability in order to invest more. This is the
substitution effect mentioned in the introduction, which is captured graphically by
the change in the slope of the constraint.
13For simplicity, the constraint is graphed linearly in the space {k, ω¯}, although the true relation
from equation (4) is mildly convex.
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Figure 3: Positive productivity shock: θ ↑
Proposition 1: the CSV model predicts pro-cyclical output, pro-cyclical
capital and pro-cyclical defaults:
ρω¯,θ > 0 ; ρy,θ > 0 ; ρk,θ > 0 .
14
4.3 The effect of an increase in the risk-free interest rate r
When r increases, the constraint shifts downwards and becomes flatter. We saw
from equation (5) that, other things equal, credit supply decreases in r. If this
was the only effect in place, the equilibrium in figure 4 would move from point A
to point B. As implied by equation (6), when r decreases it is optimal for the
entrepreneur to reduce investment even further by decreasing the share of expected
revenues promised to the lender (point C). In fact, a higher risk-free rate decreases
the discounted productivity and generates an incentive for the entrepreneur to shift
from a high level of capital and a high default probability to a low level of capital
and a low default probability.
14ρ stands for correlation: ρY,Z = Corr(Y,Z).
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Figure 4: Increase in the real interest rate: r ↑
Proposition 2: the CSV model predicts that output, capital and default
decrease in the exogenous risk-free interest rate:
ρω¯,r < 0 ; ρy,r < 0 ; ρk,r < 0
4.4 Combining θ and r to generate counter-cyclical default
Assume now that the risk-free rate responds to the productivity shock. Formally,
define r˜ and θ˜ the initial values of r and θ and assume the following simplified Taylor
rule :
r = r˜ + γ
θ − θ˜
θ˜
. (10)
The parameter γ measures the sensitivity of the interest rate to the productivity
gap. A 1% deviation of aggregate productivity from its equilibrium level increases
r by γ ∗ 0.01, i.e. by γ ∗ 100 basis points.
The Taylor rule in equation (10) is very simple and replaces the responsiveness
of the interest rate to real activity with the responsiveness of the interest rate to
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aggregate productivity. Additionally, it does not feature inflation. These shortcom-
ing are considered unimportant for the numerical exercise proposed. Real activity
is arguably positively correlated with the productivity parameter, and the model
does not feature inflation, so cannot account for it in the Taylor rule.15
Consider the initial equilibrium in figure 5 (point A, top and bottom graph).
Following a positive productivity shock the constraint rotates upwards, leading the
entrepreneur to substitute towards a higher investment (point B, top and bottom
graph, equivalent to point C in figure 3). Under the Taylor rule from equation
(10), the increase in θ prescribes an increase in the risk-free rate, which rotates
the constraint backwards and shifts it downwards. The magnitude of this rotation
depends on the parameter γ.
As argued in Appendix A, there exists a level of γ = γL such that the interest
rate increases by just enough to restore the previous default rate and still increase
output (point C in figure 5, top graphs). If the risk-free rate increases even more
by a maximum level γ = γH , defaults decrease and output shrinks to the initial
equilibrium level (point D in figure 5, bottom graphs). This means that, by conti-
nuity, any level of γ strictly between γL and γH delivers a reduction in defaults and
an expansion in output, i.e. pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical default. This
result is synthesized in Proposition 3, which gives the key intuition of the paper:
Proposition 3: Given the stylized Taylor rule as in equation (10), there
exists a set Ωγ ≡ (γL, γH) of the parameter γ such that output is pro-
cyclical, the default rate is counter-cyclical and capital counter-cyclical.
ρω¯,θ < 0 ; ρy,θ > 0 ; ρk,θ < 0 .
The inconvenience of the result in Proposition 3 is that capital becomes counter-
15Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) use the level of output, which
is argued to improve the implementability of the rule by the central bank.
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Figure 5: Generating counter-cyclical default
cyclical. This problem is of first-order importance, considered that the goal of the
exercise is to improve the cyclical behaviour of the key variables of the costly state
verification model. I solve this problem numerically in the next section by assum-
ing that net worth marginally increases following a positive productivity shock.
This assumption is quite realistic, because in general equilibrium asset prices would
arguably increase following an increase in investment, and this would generate a pos-
itive evaluation effect on net worth. The exercise shows that a very small increase
in n is enough to fix the cyclicality of capital while keeping the correct cyclicality
of output and defaults.
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In the next section I calibrate the model and compute numerically the set Ωγ
from Proposition 3. Before doing so I introduce the version of the model with a
non-linear production function.
5 Numerical computation of Ωγ
The intuition of the exercise has been laid down using a linear version of the pro-
duction function of the borrower. Covas and Den Haan (2012) show that this as-
sumption does have important implications on defaults because it makes the default
rate independent on the borrower’s net worth. In this section I move to the version
of the model with a non-linear production function before doing the numerical ex-
ercise on the Taylor rule suggested above. The non-linearity assumption improves
considerably the ability of the model to replicate empirical moments with realistic
parameter values, while still modeling ω as a structural shock of the model.16
5.1 The CSV model with a non-linear production function
Assume that capital k yields revenues ωθkα, with α < 1. To improve further the
ability of the model to match the data, I follow Covas and Den Haan (2012) and
add two features to the model. First, I assume that the production function is
subject to a fixed cost η. Second I assume that depreciation is stochastic and
depends negatively on the ex-post realization of the idiosyncratic shock. These
two assumptions do not affect the result qualitatively, and help the model avoid
16Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) reconcile the linearity assumption of the production
function of the borrower with an aggregate standard Cobb-Doublas production function by assum-
ing that borrowers obtain returns on capital linearly by renting capital on competitive markets to
intermediate good producers. This assumption implies that the idiosyncratic shock that affects
the debt contract is no longer a structural shock of the model, but enters in a reduced form way
by affecting the market return to capital. While an idiosyncratic shock smaller than 1 can be
thought of as some unexpected operational cost incurred, it is hard to rationalize an idiosyncratic
shock above unity, since it would imply that the entrepreneur receives more than the agreed state-
contingent rental rate on the market of capital. I follow Covas and Den Haan (2012) and keep the
non-linearity in the production function of the borrower, which is then dealt with numerically.
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featuring unrealistically high values of the depreciation rate or unrealistically low
values of α.17 Under these assumptions the production function of the borrower is
ωθkα + (1− δ0eδ1ω)k − η, (11)
with δ0 > 0, δ1 < 0 and η > 0. δ0 captures the depreciation rate when the ex-
post realization of the idiosyncratic shock is exactly zero and δ1 detects how fast
depreciation falls in the realization of the shock. η is the fixed production costs.
Appendix C shows that with this production function the maximization problem
can be rewritten as
max
{k,ω¯}
F (ω¯)θkα −H(ω¯)δ0k,
subject to G(ω¯)θkα + (1− T (ω¯)δ0)k − η ≥ (1 + r)(k − n). (12)
Like in Section 3, F (ω¯) and G(ω¯) represent the share of expected revenues θkα
respectively to the borrower and to the lender.18 H(ω¯) and T (ω¯), instead, represent
the share of expected depreciation δ0
∫∞
0
eδ1ωdΦ(ω) that is subtracted respectively
to the borrower’s and to the lender’s expected return. These functions are computed
in Appendix C.
The above maximization yields the following optimality condition:
αθkα−1F (ω¯)−H(ω¯)δ0 = −F
′(ω¯)θkα −H(ω¯)δ0k
G′(ω¯)θkα − T (ω¯)δ0k
[
r+ T (ω¯)δ0− αθkα−1G(ω¯)
]
. (13)
As in the optimality condition (6) from Section 3, the left-hand side detects the
borrower’s marginal cost of running a higher default probability while the right-
17Ambler and Paquet (1994) show that stochastic depreciation improves the performance of a
standard real business cycle model by breaking down the counter-factual high correlation of the
model between labour productivity and hours worked, without deteriorating the predictions of the
model concerning other comovements. Without stochastic depreciation and fixed production cost
the model requires a depreciation close to 1 to match the desired moments.
18F (ω¯) and G(ω¯) represent the share of gross expected revenues θkα rather than of net expected
revenues θkα − η.
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hand side gives the marginal benefit of doing so, with F
′(ω¯)θkα−H(ω¯)δ0k
G′(ω¯)θkα−T (ω¯)δ0k the Lagrange
multiplier attached to constraint (12). Equations (12) and (13) nest equations (4)
and (6) as a special case for δ1 = 0 and η = 0. Propositions 1-3 discussed in Section
3 still hold in the case considered in this section, as will be shown numerically below.
The key difference between the linear and the non-linear model is that in the
non-linear version of the model the equilibrium threshold value of defaults ω¯ is not
uniquely pinned down by parameter values, but becomes a function of k. This
implies a system of 2 equations in two unknowns (equations (12) and (13) in ω¯ and
k) and makes equilibrium default a function of the borrower’s net worth.
5.2 Calibration
The time period of the model is a year. Parameters are calibrated to match the
empirical moments for the US of the default rate Φ(ω¯), the borrowing rate rb and
the leverage ratio k/n. I will compare the calibration used in this paper to the
calibration in Covas and Den Haan (2010 and 2012) (hereafter CDH), Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) (hereafter BGG) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
(hereafter CF). The calibration is shown in table 1. The idiosyncratic shock ω is
assumed to follow a log normal distribution with unitary expected value, like in the
above and other papers. The model pins down the endogenous variables {k, ω¯, rb}
as a function of parameters {α, θ, η, δ0, δ1, r, n, γ, θ˜}. The equilibrium equations of
the model are rewritten below for convenience.
αθkα−1F (ω¯)−H(ω¯)δ0 = −F
′(ω¯)θkα −H(ω¯)δ0k
G′(ω¯)θkα − T (ω¯)δ0k
[
r + T (ω¯)δ0 − αθkα−1G(ω¯)
]
,
(Optimality)
G(ω¯)θkα + (1− T (ω¯δ0)k − η ≥ (1 + r)(k − n), (Constraint)
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1 + rb =
ω¯θkα + (1− δ0eδ1ω¯)k − η
k − n , (Borrowing rate)
r = r˜ + γ
θ − θ˜
θ˜
, (Taylor rule)
The model presents strong non linearities. For this reason, I calibrate it using
a sequential approach instead of using an algorithm that jointly searches for the
combination of parameters that meets the restrictions of the model. I do so because
I found that the initial guess for the parameter values plays a strong role in deter-
mining whether the algorithm ultimately delivers the desired equilibrium, or if it
fails to meet the moment restrictions imposed to the calibration. Additionally, the
approach used in the paper facilitates the understanding of the trade-offs implicit in
the calibration of the model, and facilitates the understanding of which parameters
are more helpful to meet which moment conditions. The sequential approach used
is discussed extensively in Appendix D.
Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Calibration Source
Opportunity cost r 0.0204 literature FED
Marginal returns to k α 0.30 literature
Borrower’s net worth n 0.4762 literature
Bankruptcy cost µ 0.54 data
Variance of eω σ 1.1944 data
Depreciation parameters δ0 0.3995 data
δ1 -3.0180 data
Fixed cost of production η 0.1406 data
Aggregate productivity θ 0.8730 data
Moment Model Data Source
Default rate Φ(ω¯) 0.0227 0.0220 CDH (2010)
Leverage ratio k/n 2.1057 2.10 CDH (2010)
Borrowing rate rb 0.0473 0.0469 FED
Expected depreciation δ0
∫∞
0
eδ1ωdΦ(ω) 0.10 0.10
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Parameters calibrated from the literature
The exogenous interest rate r is set equal to the sample average of the real federal
funds rate. Being an interest rate on interbank lending, the fed funds rate is a valid
measure of the opportunity cost of lending. Information on the average default
rate will be taken from Covas and Den Haan (2010), who report it for the period
between 1986 and 2004. I use the same period to compute the sample average of
the fed funds rate, which is r = 0.0204 (see Appendix B). The value is relatively
small if compared to the literature. BGG, CF and other papers use an annual rate
of 0.0404. CDH use r = 0.022.
The parameter α is set at 0.30, which is slightly below the conventional value
of 0.33 from the literature. Covas and Den Haan (2012) argue that models without
labour (as the model used here) should use values as high as 0.7, in accordance with
the empirical evidence by Guffrey and Moore (1991). I do not follow CDH, given
that in this model a value of α above 0.30 implies a value of µ that is unrealistically
high. The trade-off between α and µ is investigated numerically in Appendix D.
The parameter n is normalized so that the equilibrium level of capital equals
approximately 1 when the target on the leverage ratio is met.
Parameters calibrated from the data
The remaining parameters are set to match the following three empirical moments.
The first moment is a default rate Φ(ω¯) equal to 0.022, which I take from Covas
and Den Haan (2010). The second moment is on the borrowing rate rb between the
borrower and the lender. Being a rate on a risky loan, I match its initial value with
the average real interest rate charged by US banks on loans, which equals 0.0469
in the period between 1986 and 2004 (see Appendix B). The third moment is the
initial leverage ratio k/n of 2.10, in line with the literature. The value is taken from
CDH (2010). BGG use 2.
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The parameter σ stands for the second moment of the normal random variable eω
and implies a variance of the idiosyncratic shock ω equal to 3.1651. On average the
depreciation rate equals the conventional value of 0.10 and it increases up to almost
δ0 = 0.40 when the realization of ω is 0. The aggregate productivity parameter
θ equals 0.8730, implying an equilibrium average productivity θk
α−η
k
of 0.7311 =
73.11%. This value is relatively high but still realistic.
A consensus is still missing in the literature regarding the estimate of the param-
eter µ. The disagreement hinges on whether µ should only include direct bankruptcy
costs or also indirect costs like foregone revenues and financial disruption.19 Existing
contributions use values that range from 0.12 to 0.36. I calibrate µ to the relatively
high value of 0.54 to avoid the parameter α falling below the standard value of
0.33 (see Appendix D). 0.54 could be potentially reconciled empirically only if one
interprets auditing costs by also including indirect costs, although this would make
the debt contract suboptimal (see note 8). CDH and BGG use values of µ of re-
spectively 0.15 and 0.12, which they obtain by calibrating the model to match the
moment on the default rate. CF use 0.25.
Table 2: Initial equilibrium
Value Variable
k∗ 1.0027 capital
k∗ − n 0.5265 borrowing
ω¯∗ 0.0449 default threshold
r∗b 0.0473 borrowing rate
k∗/n 2.1057 leverage ratio
Φ(ω¯∗) 0.0227 default probability
(1 + r)(k∗ − n) 0.5373 outside option of the lender
(1 + rb)(k
∗ − n) 0.5514 debt repayment
θk∗
α − η 0.7331 expected output
θk∗
α
0.8737 expected revenues
ω¯θk∗
α
0.0392 threshold value of revenues
The initial equilibrium is shown in table 2. The borrower borrows 0.5265 at an
19See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) for a discussion on this issue.
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interest rate of 4.73% and buys capital for 1.0027. The opportunity cost (1+r)(k−n)
for the lender equals 0.5373. The expected value of output E(y) = θkα − η equals
0.7331. The borrower defaults as soon as the realization of the shock leads revenues
below 0.0392, an event that happens with 2.27% probability.
The initial equilibrium is shown graphically in figure 6, which is the numerical
equivalent of figure 2 from Section 3. The left panel reads the equilibrium level of
k and ω¯ as the intersection of the optimality condition and the budget constraint
(downward sloping and upward sloping lines, respectively). The right panel reads
the equilibrium level of output as a function of equilibrium investment and is inter-
preted from the vertical axis to the horizontal axis.
Figure 6: Initial equilibrium
Having described the calibration and the initial equilibrium, I now replicate
numerically the analysis from Section 3 by studying separately the effect of a pro-
ductivity shock and of a variation in the risk-free interest rate. I then combine
the two effects and compute numerically the set Ωγ from Proposition 3. Tables
are provided with equilibrium values and percentage or basis point variations cor-
responding to figures 3 to 5 from Section 3. Figures 9 to 11 in the appendix show
the numerical equivalent of figures 3 to 5.
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5.3 The effect of an increase in productivity θ
Consider a 1 percent increase in aggregate productivity that leads θ from 0.8730 to
0.8817 (table 3). If r remains constant, capital and output increase by respectively
0.25% and 1.28% while defaults increase by 5 basis points (point C). Had capital
remained constant (point B), output would have increased by only 1.19% and default
would have decreased by 1 basis point. As shown in Section 3, it is optimal for
the entrepreneur to react to an increase in θ by expanding investment, increasing
borrowing and accepting an increase in the default probability of 5 basis points
(point C).
Table 3: Increase in productivity θ
(levels) θ ω¯ k E(y) Φ(ω¯) rb
point A 0.8730 0.0449 1.0027 0.7331 0.0227 0.0473
point B 0.8817 0.0447 1.0027 0.7418 0.0225 0.0476
point C 0.8817 0.0453 1.0052 0.7425 0.0231 0.0480
(variations) θ˙
θ
k˙
k
˙E(y)
E(y)
Φ(˙ω¯)
from A to B 1% 0 1.19% -0.0001
from A to C 1% 0.25% 1.28% 0.0005
5.4 The effect of an increase in the risk-free interest rate r
Consider now the case of an interest rate shock. Keep θ at the initial value and
assume that the real interest rate r increases by 1 percentage points from 0.0204 to
0.0304. As shown in table 4, capital and output decrease respectively by 2.78% and
1% while defaults decrease by 33 basis points (point C). Had the promised share
of revenues G(ω¯) remained constant (point B), output would have dropped by only
0.51% and defaults would have remained unchanged. As shown in Section 3, it is
optimal for the borrower to react to an increase in r by promising a lower share of
expected revenues to the lender in order to further decrease the level of capital, and
this decreases the default probability by 33 basis points.
39
Chapter 1
Table 4: Increase in the exogenous interest rate r
(levels) r ω¯ k E(y) Φ(ω¯) rb
point A 0.0204 0.0449 1.0027 0.7331 0.0227 0.0473
point B 0.0304 0.0449 0.9884 0.7293 0.0227 0.0581
point C 0.0304 0.0415 0.9748 0.7257 0.0193 0.0559
(variations) r˙ k˙
k
˙E(y)
E(y)
Φ(˙ω¯)
from A to B 0.01 -1.43% -0.51% 0
from A to C 0.01 -2.78% -1% -0.0033
5.5 Combining θ and r to generate counter-cyclical default
Consider again the productivity shock from table 3. It can be computed that to
avoid the 5 basis points increase in defaults that follows from a 1% increase in θ it
suffices for the interest rate r to increase by 14 basis points from 0.0204 to 0.0218
(table 5, top part). This implies a weaker increase in output, which now increases
by 1.13% . If the interest rate increases not only up to 0.0218 but up to 0.0331,
output goes back to the initial level but the default rate drops by 37 basis points
(table 5, bottom part). This means that, starting from a real interest rate of 0.0204,
the 1% increase in productivity does not increase defaults as long as the interest
rate increases by between 14 and 127 basis points, i.e. up to between 0.0218 and
0.0331. The implied parameter values for γ are Ωγ ≡ (γL, γH) = (0.1368, 1.2728)
(bold values in table 5). This range delivers pro-cyclical output, counter-cyclical
default and counter-cyclical capital, in accordance with Proposition 3 from Section
3. Depending on the specific parameter value of γ in the range Ωγ output increases
up to 1.13%, defaults decrease by a maximum of 37 basis points and capital decreases
by between 0.15% and 3.26%
5.6 Restoring the pro-cyclicality of capital
Table 5 shows that the pro-cyclicality of the real interest rate r fixes the cyclicality
of output and default at the apparent cost of losing the pro-cyclicality in capital.
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Table 5: Generating counter-cyclical defaults after θ˙
θ
= 0.01
TOP PART: Weak response of r to θ (γ = γL)
r ω¯ k E(y) Φ(ω¯) rb
point A 0.0204 0.0449 1.0027 0.7331 0.0227 0.0473
point B 0.0204 0.0453 1.0052 0.7425 0.0231 0.0480
point C 0.0218 0.0449 1.0012 0.7413 0.0227 0.0482
γ r˙ k˙
k
˙E(y)
E(y)
Φ(˙ω¯)
from A to B 1% 0.25% 1.28% 0.0005
from A to C 0.1368 0.0014 -0.15% 1.13% 0
BOTTOM PART: Strong response of r to θ (γ = γH)
r ω¯ k E(y) Φ(ω¯) rb
point A 0.0204 0.0449 1.0027 0.7331 0.0227 0.0473
point B 0.0204 0.0453 1.0052 0.7418 0.0225 0.0476
point D 0.0331 0.0411 0.9700 0.7331 0.0188 0.0583
γ r˙ k˙
k
˙E(y)
E(y)
Φ(˙ω¯)
from A to B 1% 0.25% 1.28% 0.0005
from A to D 1.2728 0.0127 -3.26% 0% -0.0037
It can be computed that this problem disappears if net worth n increases by as
little as 0.096637%. Of course a variation in net worth is purely exogenous in this
model and it is simply proposed as a numerical exercise to reconcile the dynamics
of capital with the rest of the analysis. Nevertheless, a pro-cyclical variation in net
worth does not seem unrealistic because an evaluation effect on n would be in place
in a general equilibrium extension of the model, following an increase in θ.
Table 6 computes new estimates of γ when aggregate productivity increases by
1% and when net worth n is hit by a positive shock (second column). We saw in
Section 5.5 that, given a constant net worth, defaults decrease as long as the interest
rate r increases by between 14 and 127 basis points (panel a in table 6). Assume
now that, following the same productivity shock, net worth increases by 0.003 =
0.3% (panel b). It can be shown that as long as r responds to the productivity
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Table 6: Restoring the pro-cyclicality of capital after θ˙
θ
= 0.01
n˙
n
new r γ k˙
k
˙E(y)
E(y)
Φ(˙ω¯) k˙/k˙E(y)/E(y)
Panel a 0 0.0204 0 0.2521 1.2828 0.0005
0.0213 0.0854 0 1.1918 0.0002
0.0218 0.1368 -0.1503 1.1375 0
0.0331 1.2728 -3.2624 0 -0.0037
Panel b 0.003 0.0204 0 0.6 1.4081 0.0003
0.0214 0.0958 0.3167 1.3061 0
0.0224 0.2042 0 1.1918 -0.0004
Panel c 0.005 0.0204 0 0.8319 1.4914 0.0002
0.0211 0.0691 0.6269 1.4177 0
0.0232 0.2840 0 1.1918 -0.0008
Panel d 0.008 0.0204 0 0.1797 1.6161 0.0001
0.0207 0.0289 1.0935 1.5852 0
0.0244 0.4044 0 1.1918 -0.0013
Panel e 0.0047 0.0204 0 0.7971 1.4789 0.0003
0.0211 0.0731 0.5802 1.4009 0 0.4142
0.0221 0.1726 0.2885 1.2959 -0.0004 0.2226
0.0231 0.2720 0 1.1918 -0.0007 0
Ωγ = (0.0731, 0.2720)
shock by between 9 and 20 basis points, the model delivers pro-cyclical output,
pro-cyclical capital and counter-cyclical default, which is the right cyclicality on
all three variables. The result is driven by the fact that an increase in net worth
increases capital without affecting defaults, as can be seen from equations (7) and
(8). To help develop the intuition, the same effect is computed for shocks to net
worth of different size (0.5% in panel c, 0.8% in panel d). We see that the higher the
pro-cyclical shock to n and the wider the range of r that deliver the right cyclicality
of k, E(y) and Φ(ω¯).
As made clear by table 6, the computation of the range of parameter values
for γ depends on the pro-cyclical shock given to n (Ωγ equals (0.0958, 0.2042) for
n˙/n = 0.003, (0.0691, 0.2840) for n˙/n = 0.005 and (0.0289, 0.4044) for n˙/n =
0.008). Given the need to compute one set of estimates for Ωγ to be compared with
the empirical estimates available in the literature, I choose the size of the shock to
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Figure 7: Comparing different values of γ under θ˙
θ
= 0.01
net worth so that it implies an average value of γ for which k is 0.2222 times as
volatile as output. This relative volatility between k and E(y) is taken from the
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real business cycle literature.20 When this criterion is applied, a 1% productivity
shock requires a 0.47% increase in n and an increase in r between 7 and 27 basis
points. This implies a set of acceptable values of γ of Ωγ =(0.0731, 0.2720) (panel
e from table 6), which are the values of Ωγ used in the rest of the paper.
The intuition from panel e of table 6 is represented graphically in figure 7, which
shows, for different values of γ, the variation in capital, expected output and defaults
following a 1% productivity shock and a 0.47% increase in net worth. The vertical
lines in all three graphs represent γL = 0.0731 and γH = 0.2720, i.e. the threshold
values computed above. We see that in the shaded yellow area the pro-cyclical real
interest rate r delivers pro-cyclical capital, pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical
default.
5.7 Robustness checks on the computation of Ωγ
The above section found that parameter values of γ in the range of (0.0731, 0.2720)
for the Taylor rule (10) in a standard costly state verification model deliver pro-
cyclical capital, pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical default. This section shows
that the computed range is robust to alternative values of the productivity shock
and of the auditing cost. Overall, the model performs well if γ does not exceed
approximately 0.25.
Table 9 computes Ωγ for different values of the productivity shock (first column).
As explained above, net worth is increased pro-cyclically in order to deliver a median
value of γ for which the volatility of capital relative to output matches the value
found empirically by the real business cycle literature. Stronger productivity shocks
slightly increase the range of γ within which capital, output and defaults behave
20Prescott (1986) and King and Rebelo (1999) find that capital is around one forth as volatile
as output, while investment is around three times as volatile as output. The model presented here
is static, implying that k is best interpreted as the capital stock rather than its variation from a
previous period.
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with the correct cyclical patterns.
Table 10 computes Ωγ when the auditing cost µ takes different values. It was
explained that the relatively high value of µ was required in order to match the em-
pirical moments, while still using a realistic value of α (see Section 5.2 and Appendix
D). The set Ωγ was computed again assuming a higher value of µ, recalibrating the
model and assuming an appropriately pro-cyclical net worth, as explained above.
The values of γ that give the right cyclicality for capital, output and default remain
in the range between approximately 0.07 and 0.25.
6 Comparing Ωγ with the empirical evidence
The exercise carried so far has shown that, in a standard costly state verification
model, if the risk free rate increases between approximately 7 and 27 basis points
following a 1% positive productivity shock, the right cyclicality of capital, output
and default is generated, as long as net worth marginally increases.
Comparing these estimates to the existing empirical evidence on Taylor rules
is not immediate. The proposed model, in fact, does not feature inflation and
hence can only host half of a standard Taylor rule. Additionally, by disregarding
nominal frictions that draw a wedge between actual and potential output, it can only
approximate the output gap with a percentage difference of aggregate productivity
from its calibrated equilibrium level. Nevertheless, a heuristic analysis can help to
understand if the model is at least moving in the right direction. A proper empirical
assessment of the performance of the model would require a general equilibrium
extension, which is left for future research.
The empirical literature debates on the identification approach to the estimation
of Taylor rules along three dimensions. First, if the policy rule should be estimated
considering lagged, contemporaneous or forward levels of output and inflation. Sec-
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Table 7: Empirical evidence on Taylor rules
ρ βpi βy p-value on at 5% at 1%
H0 : βy = 0.2720 one-sided one-sided
PART A: Clarida, Gal´ı, Gertler (1998)
1979:m3 - 1993:m12 Germany
0.91 1.31 0.25 0.2912 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.91 1.10 0.28 0.4207 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.91 1.29 0.28 0.3949 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.91 1.23 0.25 0.2912 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.91 1.37 0.35 0.0256 Reject Fail to reject
1979:m10 - 1994:m12 USA
0.92 1.79 0.007 0.0000 Reject Reject
0.94 2.20 0.14 0.0934 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.90 1.05 0.44 0.0082 Reject Reject
1982:m10 - 1994:m12 USA
0.97 1.83 0.56 0.0359 Reject Fail to reject
0.97 1.99 0.75 0.0279 Reject Fail to reject
0.96 1.26 0.52 0.0000 Reject Reject
PART B: Clarida, Gal´ı, Gertler (2000)
1979:q3 - 1996:q4 USA
0.93 2.15 0.93 0.0586 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.76 1.97 0.55 0.1770 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.73 2.01 0.56 0.2412 Fail to reject Fail to reject
0.78 2.62 0.83 0.0231 Reject Fail to reject
0.78 2.73 0.92 0.0183 Reject Fail to reject
PART C: Orphanides (2001)
1987:q1 - 1993:q4 USA
0.77 0.57 1.25 0.0300 Reject Fail to reject
0.77 0.62 1.33 0.0081 Reject Reject
0.72 1.18 1.15 0.0049 Reject Reject
0.66 1.64 0.97 0.0000 Reject Reject
ond, if the estimation should allow for a smooth variation of the interest rate or
not. Third, if the analysis should use revised or real-time data. With regard to
the first two points, I restrict the attention to empirical estimates that consider
forward looking feedback rules and which add a smoothing parameter. As for the
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third point, I use estimates on both revised and real-time data.
Table 7 displays the estimates computed by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998,
2000) and Orphanides (2001) for different time horizons, countries and identifica-
tion strategies. The table reports point estimates for the smoothing parameter, the
coefficient on inflation and the coefficient on the variable capturing economic ac-
tivity.21 Overall, the parameters range within the commonly accepted interval, i.e.
0.9 for the autoregressive component, above 1 for the coefficient on inflation and
between 0.5 and 1 for the coefficient on output (Rudebush (2001)). Note that these
estimates differ slightly from the values assumed by Taylor (1993), who imposes
zero persistence in the policy rate and uses 1.5 and 0.5 for inflation and output,
respectively.
I use the estimates from table 7 together with standard errors (unreported in
table 7) to test if the data reject the hypothesis that the true coefficient on output
differs from 0.2720. This is the highest value computed in the previous section which
reconciles the costly state verification model with the cyclicality of capital, output
and defaults. Failing to reject the null hypothesis suggests that the model yields a
21Formally, the model estimated takes the following form:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)
[
βpiEt(pit+k) + βyEt(yt+k)
]
+ vt,
where it is the nominal interest rate and Et(pit+k) and Et(yt+k) represent the expectation of k-
period-ahead inflation and economic activity. Due to the persistence in the nominal interest rate,
the coefficients βpi and βy represent the long run effect on the nominal interest rate of a permanent
increase in inflation and output and not the contemporaneous effect. Estimates from Clarida, Gal´ı
and Gertler (1998) measure output as contemporaneous output gap and 1 year-ahead inflation.
Lines 2, 7 and 10 add 12-month-lagged inflation as regressor, lines 3, 8 and 11 add money supply,
line 4 adds the federal funds rate and like 5 the real exchange rate. Estimates from Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (2000) measure output as output gap, excepted the 2nd and 3rd estimations
reported where detrended output and the unemployment rate are used, respectively. The first 3
estimates use 1 quarter-ahead inflation and 1 quarter-ahead output, the 4ht and 5th estimation
use 1 year-ahead inflation and, respectively, 1 and 2 quarter-ahead of output. Orphanides (2001)
uses real time data and, in order, 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarter-ahead inflation and output gap. Orphanides
estimates the equation using least squares, Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler use the Generalized Method
of Moments under the assumption that passed values of output and inflation matter for the policy
decision only to the extent that they contribute to form the expectation of future output and
inflation. In part A, the estimation for the USA uses 2 lagged values of the nominal interest rate
instead of 1. The parameter value reported is the sum of the 2 coefficients.
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numerical value for the Taylor rule that is consistent with the empirical evidence
from table 7. The p-value of the test is reported in the fourth column. Out of the
20 estimates considered, the data reject the hypothesis that the true value of βy is
0.2720 12 times at a 5% type-one error with a one-sided hypothesis and 6 times at
a 1% type-one error with a one-sided hypothesis. Overall the data do not seem to
reject the value of 0.2720 computed numerically in the exercise of Section 5 as the
true value of the Taylor rule. Nevertheless, the result of the test on the empirical
performance of the model is mixed and depends on the estimates considered.
7 Conclusions
This paper argues that the counterfactual pro-cyclicality of default rates in “costly
state verification” models disappears if the risk-free rate moves pro-cyclically. As
explained, the success of such an approach lies in the fact that upward movements
in the real interest rate trigger a substitution effect of opposite sign, if compared
to the one generated by an increase in productivity. Since Taylor rules prescribe
a positive response of the interest rate to output, exploiting a Taylor rule in this
direction could prove successful in reconciling the “costly state verification” model
with the cyclicality of output, capital and defaults.
The paper computes numerically the coefficient of a simplified Taylor rule that
prescribes a positive response of the risk-free rate to a productivity shock. It is
shown that the model generates pro-cyclical output and counter-cyclical defaults.
To generate pro-cyclical capital it suffices to add an infinitesimal pro-cyclical shock
to net worth which mimics an evaluation effect on asset prices.
Comparing the coefficients on the Taylor rule computed numerically in the pa-
per with the empirical estimates available in the literature is not immediate, since
the specification of the model differs from empirical estimations along important
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dimensions. Nevertheless, an approximate comparison suggests that the coefficient
computed numerically in the exercise (slightly below 0.2720) lies close to the coef-
ficient value estimated in the literature (between 0.25 and 0.9). In particular, the
data does not systematically reject the hypothesis that the true coefficient in the
Taylor rule equals the value, computed numerically in the paper, which reconciles
the “costly state verification” with the cyclicality of output, capital and defaults.
Caution should be paid, though, since the final assessment of the idea developed in
this paper should not ultimately rely on the partial equilibrium analysis presented
here. A proper general equilibrium extension of the model is left for future research.
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8 Appendix A: The role of depreciation
This appendix explains the role of the depreciation parameter in the linear version
of the model and shows that the result from Proposition 3 does not rely on the
assumption of δ < 1.
In the special case of δ = 1, equations (7), (8) and (9) become
ω¯∗ = f
( θ
1 + r
)
, f ′(.) > 0, (14)
k∗ =
n
1−G(ω¯∗) θ
1+r
, (15)
y∗ = θk∗ =
n
1
θ
− G(ω¯∗)
1+r
. (16)
It is clearly evident that an increase in θ and a decrease in r increase equilibrium
investment by the same amount as long as they have the same impact on θ
1+r
. The
effect on output is stronger in the former case. This means that if r increases in
response to an increase in θ by just enough to keep k constant, output still increases
due to the productivity effect. Hence, by continuity, if r responds by just enough
to marginally decrease θ
1+r
, defaults and capital decrease and output increases.
If δ < 1, then equations (7), (8) and (9) equal
ω¯∗ = f
( θ
δ + r
)
, f ′(.) > 0, (17)
k∗ =
1 + 1−δ
δ+r
1−G(ω¯∗) θ
δ+r
n, (18)
y∗ = θk∗ =
1 + r
δ+r
θ
−G(ω¯∗)n. (19)
An increase in θ and a decrease in r now have different effects on k even if
the ratio θ
δ+r
is affected identically. For a given impact on θ
δ+r
the increase in k is
stronger if generated by a decrease in r. y increases in both cases, but by more in
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case the variation in θ
δ+r
is triggered by a decrease in θ. The validity of Proposition
3 can be seen by noting that, if r increases in response to an increase in θ by just
enough to keep θ
δ+r
constant, defaults are unchanged, capital decreases and output
increases. By continuity, an increase in r that marginally decreases θ
δ+r
decreases
defaults, but still increase output, delivering the result.
9 Appendix B: Data used to calibrate r and rb
I extracted daily data from January 1986 to May 2012 from the Federal Reserve
Board statistical release. Two variables were considered, the federal funds rate
(H15/RIFSPFF N.WW) and the average prime lending rate on bank loans to firms
(H15/RIFSPBLP N.WW). The evolution of these variables is shown in figure 8. As
explained in Section 4.1, the fed funds is used to calibrate the exogenous interest rate
r and the prime borrowing rate is used to calibrate the endogenous borrowing rate rb.
For comparability, the data used to measure the interest rate sample averages cover
the period 1986 - 2004, as in Covas and Den Haan (2010). Summary statistics are
also provided for the entire time period spanned by the dataset. Data on inflation
rates were taken from the CPI index available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(series CUUR0000SA0).
Table 8: Federal funds rate and prime lending rate to firm
Time period Variable mean std.dev. p1 p99
01/01/1986 - 31/03/2012 Fed funds rate 0.0422 2.57 0.08 9.69
Prime rate 0.0697 2.24 3.25 11.5
Inflation 2.9% 1.30 -1.3% 6.3%
01/01/1986 - 31/12/2004 Fed funds rate 0.0504 2.24 0.98 9.79
Prime rate 0.0769 1.90 4 11.5
Inflation 3% 1.13 1.1% 6.17%
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Figure 8: Federal funds rate and lending rate to firm
10 Appendix C: The full model with non-linear
production, stochastic depreciation and fixed
production cost
The production function is given by
ωθkα + (1− δ0eδ1ω)k − η , δ1 < 0 , η > 0.
This implies that the debt contract solves the following maximization problem:
max
{k,ω¯,rb}
∫ ∞
ω¯
[
ωθkα − η + (1− δ0eδ1ω)k − (1 + rb)(k − n)
]
dΦ(ω),
subject to
∫ ω¯
0
[
ωθkα+(1−δ0eδ1ω)k−µθkα−η
]
dΦ(ω)+
∫ ∞
ω¯
[
(1+rb)(k−n)
]
dΦ(ω),≥ (1+r)(k−n)
(20)
ω¯θkα − η + (1− δ0eδ1ω¯)k = (1 + rb)(k − n). (21)
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Substitute now the second constraint in the objective function:
∫ ∞
ω¯
[
ωθkα + (1− δ0eδ1ω)k − ω¯θkα + (1− δ0eδ1ω¯)k
]
dΦ(ω),
∫ ∞
ω¯
[
(ω − ω¯)θkα]dΦ(ω)− δ0k[ ∫ ∞
ω¯
eδ1ωdΦ(ω)− [1− Φ(ω¯)]eδ1ω¯
]
,
F (ω¯)θkα − [ ∫ ∞
ω¯
eδ1ωdΦ(ω)− [1− Φ(ω¯)]eδ1ω¯]︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(ω¯)
δ0k,
F (ω¯)θkα −H(ω¯)δ0k,
with H(ω¯) = 0 if δ1 = 0, and with
F ′(ω¯) = −[1− Φ(ω¯)] < 0,
F ′′(ω¯) = Φ′(ω¯) > 0,
H ′(ω¯) = −[1− Φ(ω¯)]δ1eδ1ω¯ = F ′(ω¯)δ1eδ1ω¯ > 0,
H ′′(ω¯) = −[1− Φ(ω¯)]δ21eδ1ω¯ + Φ′(ω¯)δ1eδ1ω¯ < 0.
Substitute the second constraint in the first constraint:
∫ ω¯
0
[
ωθkα−η+(1−δ0eδ1ω)k−µθkα
]
dΦ(ω)+
∫ ∞
ω¯
[
ω¯θkα−η+(1−δ0eδ1ω¯)k
]
dΦ(ω) ≥ (1+r)(k−n),
G(ω¯)θkα − η +
(
1− δ0
[ ∫ ω¯
0
eδ1ωdΦ(ω) + [1− Φ(ω¯)]eδ1ω¯])k ≥ (1 + r)(k − n),
G(ω¯)θkα−η+
(
1−δ0
[ ∫ ∞
0
eδ1ωdΦ(ω)−
∫ ∞
ω¯
eδ1ωdΦ(ω)+[1−Φ(ω¯)]eδ1ω¯])k ≥ (1+r)(k−n),
G(ω¯)θkα−η+k−
(∫ ∞
0
eδ1ωdΦ(ω)−
∫ ∞
ω¯
eδ1ωdΦ(ω) + [1− Φ(ω¯)]eδ1ω¯
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T (ω¯)
δ0k ≥ (1+r)(k−n),
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G(ω¯)θkα − η + (1− T (ω¯)δ0)k ≥ (1 + r)(k − n),
with T (ω¯) =
∫∞
0
eδ1ωdΦ(ω)−H(ω¯) = 1 if δ1 = 0 and with 22
G′(ω¯) = −F ′(ω¯)− µΦ′(ω¯) > 0,
G′′(ω¯) = −F ′′(ω¯)− µΦ′′(ω¯) < 0,
T ′(ω¯) = −H ′(ω¯) < 0,
T ′′(ω¯) = −H ′′(ω¯) > 0.
The maximization problem then rewrites as
max
{k,ω¯}
F (ω¯)θkα −H(ω¯)δ0k,
subject to G(ω¯)θkα + (1− T (ω¯)δ0)k ≥ (1 + r)(k − n). (22)
Note that the sum of what agents obtain in expected value (right-hand side of
equation (23)) equals expected revenues plus expected non-depreciated capital net
of expected auditing costs (left-hand side of equation (23)):
θkα − η +
(
1− δ0
[ ∫ ∞
0
eδ1ωdΦ(ω)
])
k − µΦ(ω¯)k =
=
(
F (ω¯) +G(ω¯)
)
θkα − η + (1− T (ω¯)δ0 −H(ω¯)δ0)k. (23)
11 Appendix D: Calibration
The model derived in Section 5 consists of the following 5 equations:
22The first inequality holds only in the lower part of the support of ω. See also note 10.
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CON(ω¯, µ, σ, θ, k, α, δ0, δ1, η, r, n) = 0 (24)
OPT (ω¯, µ, σ, θ, k, α, δ0, δ1, r, n) = 0 (25)
1 + rb = BR(ω¯, θ, k, α, δ0, δ1, r, n, η) (26)
def = DFT (ω¯, σ) (27)
E(deprec) = DPR(σ, δ0, δ1) (28)
Equation (24) represents the indifference condition of the lender, equation (25)
the optimality condition pinning down the default threshold value, equation (26)
the borrowing rate implied by equation (2), equation (27) the default probability
implied by the default threshold value and equation (28) the expected depreciation
rate. The set of parameters involved is displayed in each equation. The model is
calibrated in {µ, σ, θ, α, δ0, δ1, η, r, n} in order to deliver an expected depreciation
E(deprec) of 0.10 and in order to guarantee that in equilibrium the endogenous
variables ω¯ and k deliver the following three moments:
def = 0.0220
rb = 0.0469
k
n
= 2.10
The initial guess of the set of parameters is crucial to determine whether the
numerical algorithm matches the desired empirical moments or not. This is due to
the strong non-linearities present in the model. Instead of searching numerically for
the initial guess that brings the calibration sufficiently close to the desired equilib-
rium, I follow an alternative, relatively simpler and less time-consuming approach,
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which consists of 8 steps:
1. guess a parameter value for σ and use equation (27) to compute the corre-
sponding equilibrium value of ω¯ so that the target value on the default rate is
met;
2. guess a parameter value for δ0 and use equation (28) to compute the cor-
responding value of δ1 so that, given σ, the target value on the expected
depreciation is met;
3. set r = 0.00204, the average real fed funds rate;
4. set α = 0.30, a value in line with the literature;
5. restrict the attention to an equilibrium in which k lays in the neighbourhood of
1. From the target value of the leverage ratio, n must equal 1/2.10 = 0.4762;
6. given r, α, n, k, σ, ω¯, δ0, δ1 and the target value of rb, guess a relatively high
parameter value of µ and compute the value of η that implies that equations
(24) and (26) yield the same θ;
7. move back to step 1 and 2 and search numerically for the parameter values
of σ and δ0 that satisfy equation (25). If such a combination of σ and δ0 can
be found it means that the entire set of parameters delivers the target values
for k
n
, Φ(ω¯) and rb and by construction meets the target value of the expected
depreciation rate;
8. repeat the exercise by decreasing µ to the lowest value that still allows the
calibration over σ and δ0 to deliver the desired target values for the leverage
ratio, the default rate and the borrowing rate.
This approach is convenient because, by calibrating one parameter at the time,
it gives much more flexibility in using visual inspection to identify the most appro-
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priate initial guess. This would not be the case, however, if one contemporaneously
calibrates the model on the entire set of parameters and lets the algorithm search
for the combination of values that delivers the desired outcome. In fact, call Λ the
set of values for {µ, σ, θ, α, δ0, δ1, η, r, n} found using the suggested step-by-step pro-
cedure and displayed in table 1 from Section 5.2. The non-linear algorithm fsolve in
Matlab delivers approximately the same solution if the initial guess of the parame-
ters lies in the neighborhood of Λ, but it fails to do so if the initial guess is far away
from Λ. It was found, in fact, that the algorithm delivers the desired equilibrium
as long as the initial guess is up to 50% away from Λ, where each parameter was
allowed to randomly deviate either upwards or downwards. The algorithm fails to
find the desired equilibrium as soon as the initial guess diverges from Λ by slightly
more than 50%.
A second advantage of the step-by-step procedure explained above lies in the
fact that it helps to develop an intuition of the trade-offs that the model implies
for the parameters. Ideally, one would like to calibrate the model with a value of α
equal to 0.70 and a relatively low value of the auditing cost (see Section 5.2). Table
11 shows the search for the lowest parameter value for µ compatible with α = 0.30,
as explained in step 8. The line marked with the right-ward arrow indicates the set
of parameters chosen in the final calibration. The table shows that, having fixed
α to 0.30, values of µ above 0.55 allow the model to match the desired empirical
moments perfectly, but as soon as µ decreases below 0.54 the model performs poorly
very rapidly. An additional heuristic assessment of the trade-off between α and µ is
shown in table 12, which displays the calibration of the model for values of α slightly
above 0.30 and adjusts µ according to step 8. Again, the line marked with the
right-ward arrow indicates the final calibration. An increase in α of 0.01 requires an
increase in the auditing cost µ of approximately 0.015 to let the model still perform
well. This implies that the model cannot possibly generate the right moments using
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high values of the marginal return to capital and low values of the auditing cost
simultaneously. Note also that no trade-off appears to be in place between α and
the parameters other than µ, since the computed values of σ, δo, δ1, η, θ are fairly in
line with the parameter values found under α = 0.30. A decrease in the auditing
cost can instead be reconciled with α = 0.30 if the risk-free interest rate increases
above 0.0204. Table 13 calibrates the model considering values of r 25 basis points
below and 25 and 50 basis points above the value used in the calibration. The
model is found to be compatible with lower values of µ only if r increases above
0.0204, which was the value chosen on US data, as explained in Section 5.2 and in
Appendix B.
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Figure 9: Increase in productivity
Figure 10: Increase in the exogenous interest rate
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Figure 11: Weak (top) vs. strong (bottom) response of r to θ
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Table 9: With different productivity shocks
θ˙
θ
n˙
n
new r γ k˙
k
y˙
y
Φ(˙ω¯)
0.005 0.0027 0.0208 0.0732 0.2899 0.70 0
0.0218 0.2709 0 0.5959 -0.0004
Ωγ = (0.0731, 0.2709)
0.01 0.0047 0.0211 0.0731 0.5802 1.4009 0
0.0231 0.2720 0 1.1918 -0.0007
Ωγ = (0.0732, 0.2720)
0.05 0.0238 0.0240 0.0714 2.9443 7.0533 0
0.0344 0.2804 0 5.9591 -0.0034
Ωγ = (0.0714, 0.2804)
0.10 0.0485 0.0273 0.0691 6.0076 14.2330 0
0.0496 0.2917 0 11.9183 -0.0064
Ωγ = (0.0691, 0.2917)
0.20 0.1029 0.0330 0.0632 12.8655 29.1247 0
0.0848 0.3219 0 23.8365 -0.0118
Ωγ = (0.0632, 0.3219)
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Table 10: With different auditing costs
µ n˙
n
new r γ k˙
k
y˙
y
Φ(˙ω¯)
0.60 0.0048 0.0211 0.0705 0.5857 1.4088 0
0.0230 0.2570 0 1.1969 -0.0007
Ωγ = (0.0705, 0.2570)
0.59 0.0048 0.0211 0.0707 0.5873 1.4129 0
0.0230 0.2605 0 1.1998 -0.0007
Ωγ = (0.0707, 0.2605)
0.58 0.0047 0.0211 0.0709 0.5893 1.4177 0
0.0230 0.2640 0 1.2033 -0.0007
Ωγ = (0.0709, 0.2640)
0.57 0.0047 0.0211 0.0713 0.5891 1.4170 0
0.0231 0.2678 0 1.2028 -0.0007
Ωγ = (0.0713, 0.2678)
0.56 0.0047 0.0211 0.0708 0.5911 1.4219 0
0.0229 0.2528 0 1.2063 -0.0008
Ωγ = (0.0708, 0.2528)
0.55 0.0046 0.0211 0.0707 0.5902 1.4195 0
0.0228 0.2391 0 1.2046 -0.0008
Ωγ = (0.0707, 0.2391)
0.54 0.0047 0.0211 0.0732 0.5802 1.4009 0
0.0231 0.2720 0 1.1918 -0.0007
Ωγ = (0.0731, 0.2720)
Table 11: Calibration with different values of µ given α = 0.30
Parameters Equilibrium
µ σ δ0 δ1 η θ Φ(ω¯
∗) r∗b
k∗
n
0.60 1.1418 0.4291 -3.2376 0.1309 0.7961 0.0220 0.0469 2.1000
0.59 1.1510 0.4244 -3.2056 0.1320 0.8076 0.0220 0.0469 2.1000
0.58 1.1604 0.4194 -3.1711 0.1333 0.8196 0.0220 0.0469 2.1000
0.57 1.1698 0.4143 -3.1340 0.1348 0.8321 0.0220 0.0469 2.1000
0.56 1.1789 0.4088 -3.0916 0.1367 0.8450 0.0220 0.0469 2.1000
0.55 1.1883 0.4031 -3.0476 0.1389 0.8584 0.0220 0.0469 2.1000
⇒ 0.54 1.1944 0.3995 -3.0180 0.1406 0.8730 0.0227 0.0473 2.1057
0.53 1.1922 0.3999 -3.0214 0.1416 0.8887 0.0251 0.0489 2.1266
0.52 1.1922 0.3999 -3.0214 0.1423 0.9053 0.0273 0.0504 2.1460
0.51 1.1902 0.4003 -3.0243 0.1433 0.9222 0.0303 0.0523 2.1713
0.50 1.1897 0.4004 -3.0250 0.1442 0.9399 0.0333 0.0542 2.1967
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Table 12: Calibration with different values of α
Parameters Equilibrium
α µ σ δ0 δ1 η θ Φ(ω¯
∗) r∗b
k∗
n
⇒ 0.30 0.54 1.1944 0.3995 -3.0180 0.1406 0.8730 0.0227 0.0473 2.1057
0.31 0.55 1.1918 0.4001 -3.0224 0.1402 0.8573 0.0238 0.0481 2.1157
0.32 0.57 1.1923 0.3999 -3.0212 0.1389 0.8281 0.0225 0.0473 2.1046
0.33 0.58 1.1914 0.4001 -3.0225 0.1384 0.8142 0.0233 0.0478 2.1112
0.34 0.60 1.1911 0.4001 -3.0229 0.1372 0.7878 0.0223 0.0471 2.1022
0.35 0.61 1.190 0.4005 -3.0255 0.1367 0.7752 0.0230 0.0470 2.1085
Table 13: Calibration with different values of r given α = 0.30
Parameters Equilibrium
r µ σ δ0 δ1 η θ Φ(ω¯
∗) r∗b
k∗
n
0.0179 0.55 1.1987 0.3987 -3.0123 0.1417 0.9113 0.0241 0.0483 2.1181
⇒ 0.0204 0.54 1.1944 0.3995 -3.0180 0.1406 0.8730 0.0227 0.0473 2.1057
0.0229 0.52 1.1854 0.4013 -3.0312 0.1406 0.8633 0.0236 0.0479 2.1136
0.0254 0.50 1.1770 0.4030 -3.0432 0.1400 0.8681 0.0235 0.0479 2.1136
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Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Default
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Abstract
I use the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model to study the effect
of monetary policy on the probability that firms default on loans. I argue that
a monetary expansion affects defaults through two opposing partial equilib-
rium effects. It increases defaults because it leads firms to take on more debt
and leverage up net worth, and it decreases defaults because the cost of bor-
rowing decreases and aggregate demand shifts out, increasing firms’ profits
and net worth. I argue that the leverage effect could explain the empirical
partial equilibrium finding by Jimenez et al. (2008) that defaults on new
loans increase after a monetary expansion. I then argue that this effect does
not hold in general equilibrium due to an increase in firms’ profits. In the
full model, defaults decrease after a monetary expansion, although the effect
equals only few basis points.
JEL Classification: E44, E52
Keywords: Monetary policy, risk taking channel, costly state verification,
default probability
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1 Introduction
This paper uses the “costly state verification” contract by Townsend (1979) to study
the effect of monetary policy on the probability that firms default on loans. A recent
empirical literature has argued that a monetary expansion decreases firms’ default
probability on existing loans and increases their default probability on new loans.
In particular, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro´ and Saurina (2008), Ioannidou, Ongena and
Peydro´ (2008) and Lopez, Tenjo and Zarate (2011) argue that this asymmetric effect
on new versus existing loans holds for Spain, Bolivia and Columbia, respectively.
The analysis of these papers is carried out in partial equilibrium. In this paper I
first use the Townsend (1979) model to argue that a leverage effect could potentially
contribute to explain the partial equilibrium result that defaults on new loans are
higher after a monetary expansion. I then argue that, according to the Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) extension of the debt contract by Townsend (1979), the
increase in defaults on new loans does not hold in general equilibrium. In the general
equilibrium model, defaults on both new and existing loans decrease, although by
only a few basis points. The results that defaults effectively remain constant in
general equilibrium is consistent with the empirical analysis by Buch, Eickmeier
and Prieto (2011) and by Piffer (2014), who do not find a statistically significant
response to a monetary expansion of the issuance of risky loans by banks and on
the delinquency rate on business loans, respectively.
The model isolates two intuitions. The first intuition relates to the increase in
defaults in partial equilibrium. The debt contract by Townsend has only one period,
hence it features only new loans. A decrease in the risk free rate exerts two opposing
effects on defaults, a revenue effect and a leverage effect. The revenue effect predicts
that defaults decrease because a monetary expansion increases firms’ revenues by
decreasing the cost of borrowing or by increasing aggregate demand. The leverage
effect, instead, predicts that defaults increase because firms react to the lower cost
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of borrowing by leveraging up their net worth. In the partial equilibrium model, the
leverage effect dominates for any calibration of the parameters. The second intuition
relates to the general equilibrium effect. In general equilibrium, firms’ return on
capital is not held constant. In the model, the increase in investment following the
monetary expansion increases the price of capital and hence the return on capital,
pushing firms’ profits up. The increase in profits dominates for all calibrations
considered, ultimately leading to a decrease in defaults for both new and existing
loans. Leverage decreases in general equilibrium because of the accumulation of net
worth by firms, following the increase in profits. The effect on leverage and defaults
is quantitatively very small and only equal to a few basis points in response to a
monetary expansion that decreases the policy rate by 100 basis points.
The “costly state verification” contract by Townsend (1979) has found many ap-
plications in the macroeconomic literature. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowl-
edge, it has rarely been used explicitly to study the effect of monetary policy on
default probabilities.1 One exception is Hafstead and Smith (2012), who also find
that a monetary expansion decreases the default rate by few basis points. The
literature has discussed the fact that the general equilibrium application of the
Townsend model proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and used in
this paper is suboptimal, because the borrowing rate is not made state contingent
on the aggregate shock. As discussed in Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2011), an
optimal contract would imply a smaller variation in firms’ net worth in response
to shocks, since part of the effect is absorbed by a state-contingent borrowing rate.
The results of this paper hold also using an optimal contract, as implied in the
1Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) use the “costly state
verification” model to generate hump-shaped impulse response functions for output and to model
a financial accelerator, respectively. As discussed for example by Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003)
and Quadrini (2011), the “costly state verification” model generates procyclical defaults when
business cycles are generated by productivity shocks. Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2008), Medina
(2006) and Covas and Den Haan (2012) propose possible modifications of the model in order to
reconcile it with countercyclical defaults, as observed in the data.
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analysis by Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013).
The paper relates to the literature on the “risk taking channel of monetary
policy”. This literature was sparked by Rajan (2006) and Borio and Zhu (2008),
who argued that a monetary expansion leads lenders to “search for yield” and
worsens their perception of risk. Their contributions are part of a broader literature
on the effects of monetary policy on financial stability. Eichengreen et al. (2011),
Adrian and Shin (2008) and Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2010) offer an
overview of the debate.
The model contributes to the literature by stressing the role of ex-ante ho-
mogeneous borrowers who have access to the same production function and draw
idiosyncratic productivity shocks from a common distribution. Borrowing charac-
teristics depend endogenously on the leverage ratio of the borrower and determine
the level of the idiosyncratic shock below which the borrower defaults on debt. An
alternative approach would be to stress the role of the quality of the project fi-
nanced rather than the leverage ratio of the borrower. In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
borrowers either differ ex ante in terms of riskyness of projects, or they can ex post
divert funds towards more risky projects. The size of the investment does not play
a role in either of these two cases. A similar approach is followed by Drees, Eck-
wert and Vardy (2012), where agents have one unit to invest and choose between
a risky and a safe project. In contrast, several papers abandon the assumption of
a fixed unit of investment, but they do not use a debt contract or they focus on
mechanisms that differ from the one studied in this paper. For example, Riccetti,
Russo and Gallegati (2011) use a model with “rule-of-thumb” agents who interact
through non-Walrasian prices. Acharya and Naqvi (2012) and Angeloni, Faia and
Lo Duca (2011) study liquidity shocks and endogenous bank runs. Challe, Mojon
and Ragot (2012), Dubecq, Mojon and Ragot (2009), Agur and Demertzis (2012)
and Cociuba, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2012) develop models in which the choice
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of the leverage ratio interacts with the ex-ante heterogeneity of borrowers. Bruno
and Shin (2012) use a model in which leverage ratios interact with the real value of
the currency. Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez (2010) analyze a setting in which
the lender controls the default probability of the borrower through monitoring. Va-
lencia (2011) considers the special case of a monopolistic bank. Fahri and Tirole
(2009) consider projects that might need to be refinanced before maturity. Stein
(2012) analyzes the role of the debt maturity structure.
The rest of the paper is organized in three Sections. Section 2 uses the partial
equilibrium “costly state verification” model to develop the intuition behind the
revenue and leverage effects. Section 3 uses the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) model to extend the partial equilibrium analysis to general equilibrium. The
last Section concludes and suggests possible extensions for future research.
2 A simple model with defaults
This section uses the “costly state verification” model in partial equilibrium to
highlight the leverage effect. Sections 2.1 describes the model, Section 2.2 analyses
the optimality condition.
2.1 The model
A risk-neutral entrepreneur has limited net worth N . At the beginning of the
period he borrows QK−N from a risk-neutral lender, where K stands for the level
of investment and Q for the price of investment.2 The entrepreneur has access to
the following production function:
2Q is not strictly necessary for the purpose of the partial equilibrium model of this section, but
it will play an important role in Section 3. Risk neutrality is assumed to simplify the exposition
of the model, but it is not required to derive the optimality of the debt contract, as shown in
Townsend (1979).
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y = ωRKK.
The shock ω represents an idiosyncratic productivity shock with support [0,∞),
expected value of 1 and cumulative distribution function Φ(ω). Rk stands for the
deterministic aggregate return on the risky technology and is known by both agents
at the beginning of the period. No aggregate shock enters the partial equilibrium
model. Capital fully depreciates and cannot be consumed at the end of the produc-
tion.3
Information is symmetric ex-ante but asymmetric ex-post. The contract is signed
at the beginning of the period. The shock ω is realized at the end of the period.
If the shock was costlessly observed by both parties at the end of the period, then
state-contingent contracts would allow the borrowing rate of the contract to be some
optimal function of the ex-post entrepreneur’s revenues. Assume, instead, that ω
is costlessly observed by the entrepreneur, but it is not observed by the lender
unless he pays a fraction µ < 1 of ex-post revenues ωRkK. This observation cost
captures the idea that borrowers typically have a richer information set regarding
their project relative to lenders. Given asymmetric information, the repayment
scheme cannot be contingent on the shock, because it would lead the entrepreneur
to opportunistically under-report ω in order to pay a lower interest rate.4
Monetary policy enters the model through the opportunity cost of lending, as
in Woodford (2003) and Curdia and Woodford (2009). Let R < Rk represent
3The main results of the model do not depend on the linearity assumption in the production
function nor on the assumption of full depreciation, which only make the intuition clearer. See
Covas and Den Haan (2012) for a study of non-linearities in production and capital depreciation in
“costly state verification” models. The general equilibrium extension of the model used in Section
3 allows for capital depreciation.
4Verification is assumed to be deterministic, although Townsend (1979) shows that it is dom-
inated by stochastic verification. The assumption that the verification cost is proportional to
ex-post revenues is without loss of generality. Townsend (1979) shows that the optimality of the
debt contract holds irrespectively on whether this cost is constant or not in the realization of the
revenues of the borrower.
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this opportunity cost of lending. In the model, the central bank controls R either
directly, as in the partial equilibrium version of this section, or through nominal
price rigidities, as in the general equilibrium version of Section 3.
Entrepreneurs borrow from lenders in competitive markets. Perfect competi-
tion takes the form of lenders competing among each other to provide loans to
entrepreneurs. Under the assumptions of perfect competition among lenders and
risk neutrality of all agents, the contract maximizes the expected profits of the
entrepreneur under the condition that the expected return on lending equals the
opportunity cost of lending.5
Townsend (1979) shows that in this setting the optimal contract is a simple
debt contract, that is, the borrower either repays a fixed amount independently
on the realization of the shock or defaults.6 Let Rb stand for the borrowing rate.
When the borrower and the lender agree on K − N and Rb they indirectly agree
on an endogenous threshold value ω¯ for ω below which the entrepreneur’s revenues
are insufficient to cover the debt repayment obligation. This threshold value is
pinned down by ω¯RkK = Rb(QK − N). If ω > ω¯, then the entrepreneur pays
back Rb(QK − N) and keeps profits ωRkK − Rb(QK − N). If ω < ω¯, then the
entrepreneur defaults and the lender recovers (1− µ)ωRkK.
The contract maximizes the expected profit of the entrepreneur subject to the
5This form of perfect competition is taken from the original paper by Townsend (1979) and
from several papers that draw from it, for example Covas and Den Haan (2012) and Faia and
Monacelli (2006).
6The key intuition behind the optimality of the debt contract comes from the fact that it is
optimal to limit the probability that the dead-weight observation cost will be incurred. To do so,
the lender leaves no revenue to the entrepreneur in case of default in order to reduce the borrowing
rate to be paid in case of no default. The debt contract is optimal if µ is an observation cost, i.e.
a cost that the lender must pay to discover that the entrepreneur cannot afford to repay the debt.
It is not optimal, however, if µ is only a bankruptcy cost, i.e. a cost that the lender must pay
to seize the revenues of the entrepreneur. In fact, if it was not costly to observe the revenue but
only to organize, say, the dissembling of the firm and the sale of the entrepreneurs’ assets, then in
the event of a default it would be optimal ex-post to renegotiate the loan and avoid incurring the
cost. This is not the case for an observation cost, because the lender needs to observe that the
ex-post return on revenues is insufficient to cover the entrepreneur’s repayment obligation before
agreeing to renegotiate, otherwise entrepreneurs would demand to renegotiate irrespectively of the
realization of ω. The above remark is discussed, for instance, in Covas and Den Haan (2012).
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participation constraint of the lender. The maximization problem is solved in
ω¯, Rb, K and is written as
max
{ω¯,Rb,K}
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωRkK −Rb(QK −N)dΦ(ω),
subject to
ω¯RkK = Rb(QK −N), (1)
[1− Φ(ω¯)]Rb + Φ(ω¯)(1− µ)E(ω | ω < ω¯)RkK
QK −N ≥ R. (2)
Equation (1) defines the threshold value ω¯ as a function of Rb and K. Equation (2)
gives the participation constraint of the lender. This constraint imposes that the
expected return on lending (left-hand side) is not lower than the opportunity cost
of lending (right-hand side).7
It is convenient to simplify the maximization problem by substituting out the
endogenous variable Rb from equation (1) into equation (2) and into the objective
function. This substitution reduces the maximization problem to
max
ω¯,K
F (ω¯)RkK,
subject to
G(ω¯)RkK
QK −N ≥ R, (3)
where F (ω¯) and G(ω¯) are equal to
7An equivalent way of writing down the participation constraint of the lender is
(1− µ)
∫ ω¯
0
ωRkKdΦ(ω) +
∫ ∞
ω¯
Rb(QK −N)dΦ(ω) ≥ R(QK −N).
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F (ω¯) =
∫ ∞
ω¯
ωdΦ(ω)− [1− Φ(ω¯)]ω¯,
G(ω¯) = 1− F (ω¯)− µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωdΦ(ω).
To develop intuition behind the notation, use the expressions for F (ω¯) and G(ω¯)
and the condition E(ω) = 1 to derive the following equality:
[
1− µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωdΦ(ω)
]
RkK︸ ︷︷ ︸
net expected output
= RkK
[
F (ω¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
share to the
entrepreneur
+ G(ω¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
share to
the lender
]
. (4)
Equation (4) shows that F (ω¯) and G(ω¯) determine the shares of expected output
RkK net of expected monitoring costs µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωRkKdΦ(ω) allocated to respectively
the entrepreneur and the lender. These shares are implicitly pinned down by the
debt contract, once the borrower and the lender agree on K −N and Rb.
Since the expected monitoring cost µ
∫ ω¯
0
ωdΦ(ω) for each unit ofRkK is relatively
small for any realistic calibration of µ, F (ω¯) and G(ω¯) approximately add up to one.8
Borrowing conditions that indirectly imply a higher share of expected revenues to
the borrower F (ω¯) imply a lower share of expected revenues to the lender G(ω¯) and
vice-versa. The leverage effect is driven by the positive first derivative of G(ω¯) with
respect to the default threshold ω¯.9 An increase in the share of expected revenues
8F (ω¯) and G(ω¯) add up to 0.9983 in the partial equilibrium exercise of Section 2.2 and add up
to 0.9983 in the general equilibrium analysis of Section 3.
9More precisely, G(ω¯) is increasing in ω¯ only in the lower support of ω¯. Since a level of ω¯∗
where G(ω¯) decreases would be suboptimal (both parties would benefit from a reduction in ω¯) we
can disregard the decreasing part of G(ω¯) from the analysis. ω¯∗ will be pinned down by equation
(5). Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) show that condition G′(ω¯∗) > 0 holds if Φ(ω) is such
that
d
dω
ω
dΦ(ω)
1− Φ(ω) > 0.
This condition is satisfied for standard distributions, including the log normal distribution used
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promised to the lender G(ω¯) is associated with an increase in the default threshold
ω¯ because it is harder for the entrepreneur to meet the higher repayment obligation
to the lender.
F (ω¯) +G(ω¯) ≈ 1 with F ′(ω¯) < 0 and G′(ω¯) > 0.
Return now to the simplified maximization problem. To understand the intuition
of the model, note that the expected return on lending G(ω¯)RkK
QK−N in equation (3) is
affected by G(ω¯) and K in opposite directions. It increases in the share G(ω¯) to the
lender because, given K, the lender receives a higher share of expected revenues.
It decreases in K because, given G(ω¯), an increase in investment pushes up the
entrepreneur’s leverage and decreases the relative buffer provided by his net worth.
To solve the maximization problem, substitute for K using constraint (3) in the
objective function and derive the optimality condition with respect to ω¯:
− F ′(ω¯∗) = F (ω¯∗) G
′(ω¯∗)
Q · (Rk
R
)−1 −G(ω¯∗) . (5)
Equation (5) pins down the equilibrium default threshold ω¯∗ and the default
probability Φ(ω¯∗).10 The economic intuition behind equation (5) is explained in
the next section in detail. To close the model, substitute ω¯∗ in constraint (3) and
compute the equilibrium level of investment K∗. Last, use ω¯∗ and K∗ to compute
the equilibrium borrowing rate Rb from equation (1).
later.
10As shown in Covas and Den Haan (2012), the equilibrium default threshold is independent on
the entrepreneur’s net worth due to the linearity in the production function.
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2.2 Interpreting the optimality condition
The threshold value ω¯∗ pinned down by equation (5) is a decreasing function of R
for any parametrization of the model (see Covas and Den Haan (2012), appendix
C).11 This means that a decrease in the opportunity cost of lending increases the
equilibrium default probability of the entrepreneur.
To develop the economic intuition behind this result, it is convenient to decom-
pose the equilibrium effect into two partial effects. When R decreases,
the default probability decreases because, for each level of borrowing, perfect
competition pushes down the borrowing rate, making debt cheaper (revenue
effect);
the default probability increases because the reduction in the opportunity cost
of lending increases the discounted profits, pushing up the optimal level of in-
vestment and leading the entrepreneur to leverage up his net worth (leverage
effect).
In the rest of this section I analyze the revenue and leverage effects, graphi-
cally, mathematically, and with a simple numerical exercise. Section 3 studies how
general equilibrium effects impact on the revenue and leverage effects and on their
interaction.
Graphical representation
Figure 1, panel a, shows combinations of K and G(ω¯). As can be seen from the
simplified maximization problem, these combinations differ for the implied expected
profit of the entrepreneur and for whether they satisfy the participation constraint
of the lender.
11Covas and Den Haan (2012) study the relationship between ω¯∗ and Rk. Their proof extends
to the relationship between ω¯∗ and R, after accounting for how Rk and R affect the discounted
return to capital Rk/R in the optimality condition (5).
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The red dash-dotted lines represent iso-profit curves of the entrepreneur. Ex-
pected profits increase towards the top left part of the graph, where the entrepreneur
invests more with a contract that implies a lower share of expected revenues to the
lender. For the entrepreneur, it would be best to borrow an infinite amount and
promise a zero share of expected revenues to the lender. Of course, this violates the
participation constraint of the lender.
The participation constraint of the lender is shown in the solid, convex line. All
combinations of (K,G(ω¯)) below the solid line satisfy the participation constraint of
the lender, while all combinations above the line violate the participation constraint
of the lender. The initial equilibrium is shown in point A, which is the point along
the participation constraint which reaches the highest possible iso-profit curve of
the entrepreneur.
The participation constraint of the lender is upward sloping in the space (K,G(ω¯)).
This positive slope reflects the leverage effect that drives the result of the model.
To see why, rewrite constraint (3) in terms of an upward limit to the entrepreneur’s
leverage ratio:
K
N
≤ 1
Q− Rk
R
G(ω¯)
= k(ω¯). (6)
Equation (6) shows that the maximum entrepreneurial leverage compatible with
the participation constraint of the lender is an increasing function of G(ω¯). Given
net worth N , and assuming that the constraint is initially binding, the entrepreneur
can invest more only by borrowing more. For given G(ω¯), the increase in borrowing
violates the participation constraint of the lender. In fact, it increases the en-
trepreneur’s leverage ratio, which reduces the relative buffer that the constant net
worth provides to the risky loan. To compensate the lender for this leverage effect,
the entrepreneur must pay a leverage premium that takes the form of a higher G(ω¯),
i.e. a higher share of expected revenues to the lender. The increase in G(ω¯) has a
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negative effect on the expected profit of the entrepreneur because it decreases F (ω¯)
due to the higher default probability. Nevertheless, it is necessary to move along
the participation constraint and convince the lender to issue more credit.
Consider now what happens when the opportunity cost of lending decreases. A
decrease in R rotates the constraint upwards and expands the set of combinations
compatible with the participation constraint of the lender. This is because perfect
competition pushes down the return on lending, requiring now a lower borrowing
rate for any given level of lending. The crucial issue is, which point along the new
participation constraint reaches the highest iso-profit curve of the entrepreneur.
Consider first the special case in which the level of investment K is forced to
remain at the initial value. This case is shown in figure 1, panel b. If K remains
constant, the upward rotation of the constraint moves the equilibrium from point
A to point B. In B, the entrepreneur borrows the same amount and pays a lower
borrowing rate due to perfect competition. This is the revenue effect. The lower
cost of debt implies a lower share of revenues to the lender and hence a lower default
probability of the entrepreneur. If this was the only effect in place, the reduction
in R would decrease the equilibrium default probability.
In this debt contract, though, point B is not optimal because the entrepreneur
has an incentive to move along the new participation constraint of the lender. In
fact, the productivity Rk of each unit of investment has remained the same, but
the discounted return to capital Rk/R has increased, making each unit of invest-
ment more productive in discounted terms. From point B, investing more requires
a higher expected share of revenues G(ω¯) promised to the lender due to the leverage
effect discussed above. This means that any point on the new participation con-
straint on the right of point B implies an increase in the default probability relative
to point B, although not necessarily relative to point A.
In principle, it could be that the optimal increase in the leverage ratio is not
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Figure 1: Effects of a decrease in the opportunity cost of lending
panel a) Initial Equilibrium
panel b) Revenue effect only
panel c) Both revenue and leverage effects
Notes: A decrease in the opportunity cost of lending relaxes the participation constraint of
the lender and reduces the cost of borrowing. The entrepreneur reacts to the lower cost of
borrowing by leveraging up its net worth in order to invest more and reach point Z. The
equilibrium default probability is higher in point Z relative to point A due to the leverage
premium demanded by the lender.
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strong enough to offset the revenue effect, leading to a new equilibrium with a lower
default probability relative to the initial equilibrium of point A. This is the case
of point C of figure 1, panel c. In this contract, instead, the leverage effect always
dominates on the revenue effect, taking the new equilibrium to the right of point A
(point Z). This is implied mathematically by the optimality condition (5), which
determines a negative relationship between ω¯∗ and R. The new equilibrium features
a higher default probability because the entrepreneur finds it so profitable to invest
more that he accepts to pay a higher share of expected revenues to the lender.
Mathematical derivation
An alternative way of seeing the intuition above is to derive the intermediate steps
behind the optimality condition (5). Substitute the participation constraint (3) in
the objective function and rewrite the maximization problem of the debt contract
only in the endogenous variable ω¯:
max
ω¯
F (ω¯)k(ω¯)NRk.
k(ω¯) is defined by equation (6) and is increasing in ω¯ due to the leverage effect
commented on above. Taking the first order condition in ω¯ gives
− dF (ω¯)
dω¯
k(ω¯) = F (ω¯)
dk(ω¯)
dω¯
. (7)
Equation (7) states that, in an interior solution, the entrepreneur accepts a debt
contract only if it implies that the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of a higher
default threshold ω¯ are equal. The marginal cost of a higher ω¯ equals the foregone
expected revenue implicit when accepting a higher share of revenues to the lender
(−dF (ω¯)
dω¯
k(ω¯)). The marginal benefit of a higher ω¯ equals the benefit associated with
the corresponding marginal increase in the leverage ratio (F (ω¯)dk(ω¯)
dω¯
).
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Define now the leverage premium as the increase in G(ω¯) associated with a 1%
increase in the leverage ratio of the entrepreneur. The implicit function theorem
gives
dG(ω¯)
dk(ω¯)
k(ω¯)
= Q ·
(
Rk
R
)−1
−G(ω¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Leverage Premium
> 0.
The leverage premium is strictly positive under the assumption that the maximiza-
tion problem has an interior solution for K. This assumption is satisfied if, in the
optimum, ω¯ satisfies Rk < Q
R
G(ω¯)
.12. Substituting out dk(ω¯)
k(ω¯)
in equation (7) and
rearranging the terms gives
−F ′(ω¯) = F (ω¯) G
′(ω¯)
Leverage Premium
,
which is the optimality condition of equation (5). It can be shown mathematically
that equation (5) pins down a negative relationship between R and ω¯∗. This means
that, in response to a decrease in R, the marginal benefit of expanding the size
of investment outweighs the marginal cost of running a higher default probability
associated with the increase in leverage.
Numerical exercise
The graphical and mathematical representations developed the intuition behind the
leverage effect, but they are not suitable for a discussion of the borrowing rate. In
fact, it is possible to show numerically that the sign of the variation in Rb is not
uniquely pinned down. To analyze the behaviour of Rb and of the spread on the risk
free interest rate I use a simple numerical example. In both the numerical example
below and the general equilibrium analysis in the next section the borrowing rate
12If this was not the case, the aggregate return Rk would be high enough to make the asymmetric
information irrelevant because the lender would supply an infinite amount of credit for any level
of ω¯.
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decreases and the spread increases following a monetary expansion.
The calibration of the exercise is chosen to simplify the intuition as far as pos-
sible, leaving a full calibration of the model to Section 3. Net worth is normalized
to 1, as well as the price of capital. The initial net opportunity cost of lending is
set at 2% and the net return to capital at 4%, implying a net discounted return to
capital of 1.96%. The variance of the idiosyncratic shock and the observation cost µ
are calibrated to match an equilibrium leverage ratio of 2 and a default probability
of 3%, obtaining V ar(ω) = 0.3434 and µ = 0.1655. Note that the normalization of
net worth to 1 implies that investment and leverage coincide.
Table 1: A decrease in the opportunity cost of lending from 2 % to 1 %
Opp. cost Borrower’s Borrowing Spread Default Borrower’s
of lending leverage rate (in bps) probability E(revenues)
R K ≡ K/N Rb Rb −R Φ(ω¯) · 100 F (ω¯)RkK
Case A:
Initial equilibrium 1.02 2 1.0278 78 3% 1.0556
Case B:
Constant leverage 1.01 2 1.0172 72 2.80% 1.0659
(0) (-106) (-6) (-20)
Case C:
Intermediate case 1.01 2.01 1.0175 75 2.90% 1.0660
(+50) (-103) (-3) (-10)
Case D:
Constant default 1.01 2.02 1.0178 78 3% 1.0661
(+100) (-100) (0) (0)
Case Z:
Final equilibrium 1.01 2.2057 1.0242 142 5.14% 1.0671
(+1034) (-35) (+64) (+214)
Notes: In the initial equilibrium the entrepreneur borrows 1 at 2.78%, he invests 2 and runs
a 3% probability of default. When the opportunity cost of lending decreases from 2% to 1%,
the entrepreneur could invest the same amount and enjoy a default probability of 2.80% as a
consequence of the lower cost of borrowing (revenue effect). Instead, the entrepreneur increases
his leverage from 2 to 2.2057 to invest more (leverage effect). This increase in leverage pushes up
his default probability from 3% to 5.14% despite the overall decrease in the borrowing rate.
Given these parameter values, the entrepreneur and the lender sign a contract in
which the entrepreneur borrows 1 unit from the lender at an interest rate of 2.78%,
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equivalent to a 78 basis point spread on the risk free rate of 2%. The entrepreneur
invests 2 units. At the end of the period, if the realization of the shock is such that
revenues exceed the gross repayment obligation of 1.0278, then the entrepreneur
pays back his debt and keeps what is left as profits. Otherwise, the entrepreneur
defaults and the lender obtains revenues, net of monitoring costs.
Table 1 compares optimal vs. suboptimal combinations of K, ω¯, Rb when the op-
portunity cost of lending decreases from 2% to 1%, keeping all the other parameters
fixed. To simplify the comparison, I report in parenthesis the basis point variations
from the initial equilibrium.
Start from the initial equilibrium and decrease the opportunity cost of lending.
Following the decrease in R, if the entrepreneur invests the same amount, then
perfect competition reduces the cost of the loan by 106 basis points (case B). The
lower cost of debt pushes down the default probability by 20 basis points, which is
in fact reflected in the decrease in the spread on the risk-free rate from 78 to 72
basis points. This is the revenue effect.
A constant level of investment, though, is not optimal, because the reduction
in the risk-free rate pushes up the net discounted return to capital from 1.96% to
2.97% (unreported in the table), making each unit of investment more productive in
discounted expected terms. If the entrepreneur increases investment by 0.01, as in
case C, then the increase in leverage is relatively weak and the default probability
still decreases. Of course, the entrepreneur is not constrained to borrow only 0.01
more. If he borrows 0.02 more, case D, then his leverage ratio increases by just
enough to offset the revenue effect, keeping the default probability unchanged. In
the new equilibrium of case Z, instead, the default probability increases despite the
ultimate decrease in the borrowing rate because the increase in leverage offsets the
revenue effect. In the case considered in this numerical example, the reduction in
the opportunity cost of lending from 2% to 1% leads the entrepreneur to increase
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his leverage from 2 to approximately 2.20, which pushes his default probability
from 3% to 5.14% despite the decrease in the borrowing rate from 2.78% to 2.42%.
The lender is indifferent to the new default probability because he prices the loan
accordingly by demanding an increase in the spread on the risk-free rate from 78 to
142 basis points. The entrepreneur, instead, is better off by accepting the increase
in defaults in exchange for an increase in investment, as shown by the increase in
his expected profits (last column of table 1).
3 A New Keynesian extension of the model
The analysis of the previous section showed that, in the “costly state verification”
model, the default probability of the borrower can be implicitly rewritten as a func-
tion of the discounted return to capital and the entrepreneur’s leverage (equation
(8) below).13 A decrease in R reduces the borrowing cost (revenue effect), but since
the entrepreneur reacts by increasing his leverage, the default probability ultimately
increases (leverage effect).
Prob(default) = f
(Rk
R
,
K
N
)
, with f ′1 < 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revenue effect
and f ′2 > 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Leverage effect
. (8)
From equation (8), we see that whether the default probability still increases in
general equilibrium depends on the behaviour of Rk and N and on their feedback
effects on K. In this Section I address these issues using a New Keynesian model.
Section 3.1 describes the full model, Section 3.2 shows the calibration, Section 3.3
discusses the results and the robustness of the results.
13Non linearities prevent from deriving equation (8) analytically.
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3.1 The full model
The New Keynesian model used in this section draws from the model developed
by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and from several papers related to their
contribution. Since most of the features of the model are standard in the literature,
I discuss them only briefly, unless they are key in driving the result. Christiano,
Trabandt and Walentin (2011) provide an excellent description of New Keynesian
models. An assessment of the costly state verification model in a general equilibrium
framework can also be found in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2008), Hafstead
and Smith (2012) and Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2013).
Figure 2: Timing of the full model
The model is populated by seven representative agents: households, lenders,
capital producers, entrepreneurs, intermediate good producers, retailers and a cen-
tral bank. The timing of their interaction is shown in figure 2. The basic structure
is as follows. At the end of period t − 1 entrepreneurs use net worth and loans
to buy capital for the next period. At the beginning of period t, capital is rented
out to intermediate good producers. Then, each entrepreneur draws an idiosyn-
cratic shock for the return to capital and the central bank sets the risk-free nominal
interest rate. At the end of period t, entrepreneurs either pay back their debt or
default, depending on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. A constant fraction
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of non-defaulting entrepreneurs retires. The entrepreneurs that do not default nor
retire accumulate aggregate revenues into end-of-period net worth, take new loans
and proceed to period t+ 1. The debt contract is written in real terms.
Households
Households are risk averse and derive utility from a basket of imperfectly substi-
tutable consumption goods and from leisure. The instantaneous utility function is
log(Ct) − χH
1+1/η
t
1+1/η
. Households are infinitely lived, they discount future utility by
β < 1 and postpone consumption through the deposit services of lenders. These
services take the form of deposits and pay the real risk-free rate Rt−1 at period t.
Lenders
At time t − 1, lenders collect deposits from households and provide loans to en-
trepreneurs at the non-contingent real borrowing rate Rb,t−1. Lenders remunerate
deposits at the risk free rate Rt−1, as implied by four assumptions. First, that there
is perfect competition among lenders in providing deposit services to households.
Second, that lenders perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic shocks of entrepreneurs by
providing loans to an infinite number of entrepreneurs. Third, that entrepreneurs
are risk neutral and hence are willing to bear aggregate uncertainty without requir-
ing compensation. Fourth, that households have the outside option of postponing
consumption through the risk-free bond instead of through deposits.14 Lenders
make zero profits and do not consume.
Capital producers
Each period, capital producers buy all non-depreciated capital from entrepreneurs,
invest in new units of capital and sell the new stock to entrepreneurs. The technology
14Since risk free bonds and deposits yield the same return, only the latter are modeled explicitly
in the budget constraint of the households.
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that produces new units of investment goods is subject to investment adjustment
costs. These costs capture disruption costs, replacement of installed capital and
costly learning. The adjustment cost function is taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2008) and Smets and Wouters
(2003):
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It. (9)
The adjustment costs are zero in steady state and have constant second derivative,
i.e. S(1) = S(1)′ = 0, S(1)′′ = ν > 0. These costs equal S
(
It
It−1
)
= ν
2
(
It
It−1
− 1)2.15
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. At time t−1 they own net worth accumulated from
retained earnings and borrow from lenders to buy capital from capital producers.
Capital is then rent out at time t to intermediate good producers in competitive
markets.
The ex-post realization of the aggregate real return to capital Rk,t is a function of
the real rental rate on capital rk,t plus the capital gain or loss from non-depreciated
capital:
RKt =
rkt + (1− δ)Qt
Qt−1
. (10)
As explained below in more detail, Rk,t is affected by aggregate uncertainty because
an unanticipated monetary policy shock to the nominal risk-free rate affects the
investment decisions at time t and unexpectedly moves price Qt. The ex-post return
to capital that the entrepreneur actually receives is ωtRk,t, i.e. the aggregate return
15The assumption of convex adjustment costs is justified by convenience rather than realism.
Existing empirical evidence documents that investment decisions on micro data display lumpiness,
periods of inactions and spikes that are inconsistent with the smooth behaviour of investment
implied by convex adjustment costs. It appears, though, that the severity of these non-linearities
is dampened by the aggregation, as argued by Caballero (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), and by general equilibrium effects, as argued by Veracierto (2002).
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to capital Rk,t after it has been hit by the idiosyncratic shock ωt.
16
Non-defaulting entrepreneurs obtain aggregate revenues Vt given by
Vt = F (ω¯t)R
K
t Qt−1Kt−1, (11)
where, by the law of large numbers, F (ω¯) detects now the ex-post share of aggregate
revenues to non-defaulting entrepreneurs.17
To avoid an accumulation of net worth that allows the entrepreneur to fully
self-finance investment with retained earnings, an exogenous fraction 1− γ of non-
defaulting entrepreneurs die and the same mass of entrepreneurs is born. This
assumption is standard in the literature. Being risk-neutral, the entrepreneurs who
remain in business allocate their revenues into net worth. Reborn entrepreneurs
enter their first debt contract with a positive net worth that can be made arbitrar-
ily small, as in De Fiore, Teles and Tristani (2011) and in Carlstrom, Fuerst and
Paustian (2012). Entrepreneurial net worth at the end of period t is given by
Nt = γVt. (12)
Intermediate good producers
Entrepreneurs rent capital to intermediate good producers. Intermediate good pro-
ducers use capital and labor in the following Cobb-Douglas production function to
produce intermediate goods.
Yt = K
α
t−1H
1−α
t . (13)
16Contrary to the partial equilibrium model, ωt is not a structural shock to production, but
enters the model as a shock to the market return to capital Rk,t. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2008) avoid this shortcoming of the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model by assuming
that the idiosyncratic shock affects the share of the stock of capital that can be effectively used in
production.
17Q enters equation (11) because equation (10) defines Rk as a ratio.
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Retailers
Retailers buy intermediate goods, diversify them costlessly and sell them to con-
sumers as final consumption goods. Retailers enjoy some price-setting power be-
cause households view final goods as imperfect substitutes. Under the assumption
of Calvo price setting, prices are set as a mark-up over the weighted average of
marginal costs over time. This nominal rigidity gives monetary policy real effects
in the short term.
Central bank
The key driver of the model is the monetary policy shock in the Taylor rule. The
monetary shock enters at time t by changing the risk-free nominal interest rate Rnt
between t and t + 1. In doing so, it affects the opportunity cost of lending and
the investment decisions starting from period t onwards. The central bank sets the
policy rule according to the following Taylor rule:
Rnt
Rnss
=
(Rn,t−1
Rnss
)ρ[( Πt
Πss
)γpi( Yt
Yss
)γy]1−ρ
et . (14)
Equation (14) is similar to the Taylor rule used by Faia and Monacelli (2007) and
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), as it features inflation and output in deviations
from their value in steady state.18 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) use a
similar Taylor rule, except that γy is set equal to zero.
An important remark is due before continuing. Debt contracts are signed each
period based on the expectation of the return to capital in the following period.
Agents know that the ex-post realization of the return to capital can differ from
18It differs from the Taylor rule in Faia and Monacelli (2007) because it does not include the
price of assets, and it differs from the Taylor rule in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) because it
considers the response of the policy rate to contemporaneous instead of future levels of inflation
and output.
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its expected value because of the effect that policy shocks have on the capital gain
on non-depreciated capital. Entrepreneurs are willing to bear this aggregate uncer-
tainty due to their risk neutrality, implying that the borrowing rate Rb,t−1 is not
a function of unexpected changes to Rk,t. The non-contingency of Rb,t−1 on either
Rk,t or ωt implies that the default threshold ω¯t is a function of the aggregate shock,
otherwise equation (2) would be violated for some values of Rk,t.
19
This link between ω¯t and the ex-post realization of Rk,t is crucial in the Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Contracts are signed based on the expectation of
the default probability. Whether the actual rate of default is below or above the
expected default probability depends on whether the ex-post return to capital is
respectively above or below its expected value. This effect is realistic and detects
the fact that an unexpected increase in firms’ revenues reduces their default rate
because it increases the cash flow that can be used to meet the repayment obligation.
As will be explained, an unexpected monetary expansion takes Rk above expectation
and pushes up revenues, which on impact mitigate the default rate of outstanding
loans.20
19The participation constraint of the lender is rewritten below for convenience:
[1− Φ(ω¯t)]Rb,t−1 + Φ(ω¯t)(1− µ)Et−1(ωt | ωt < ω¯t)Rk,tKt−1
Qt−1Kt−1 −Nt−1 ≥ Rn,t−1.
In the partial equilibrium model, Rk,t is known before the contract is signed and the lender
obtains Rn,t−1 in expected value, but not ex-post, unless he diversifies. In the general equi-
librium model, Rk,t is stochastic and not known when the contract is signed. If ω¯t was not
a function of the realization of Rk,t, an unexpected increase in Rk,t would increase the return
on lending above Rn,t−1, because it would increase the return on defaulting entrepreneurs (term
(1−µ)Et−1(ωt|ωt<ω¯t)Rk,tKt−1Qt−1Kt−1−Nt−1 in the above equation), making the participation constraint not bind-
ing ex-post. In this model, it is assumed that the zero profit condition holds in any state of the
world. ω¯t adjusts to Rk,t to ensure that the ex-post return on lending equals the opportunity
cost of lending. While the debt contract used in Section 2 is optimal, the general equilibrium
extension of the contract used in this Section is not, as for instance discussed by Carlstrom, Fuerst
and Paustian (2012). In Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2012) lenders write down a contract in
which the borrowing rate Rb,t is a function of the realization of Rk,t.
20The revenue effect in the general equilibrium model is partially different from the one in the
partial equilibrium analysis from Section 2. While in both cases revenues increase, in partial
equilibrium they increase due to the lower cost of borrowing, while in general equilibrium they
increase due to the increase in aggregate demand. In both cases, it is the higher level of revenues
that pushes down the default rate.
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3.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model using observations on Spain, the country for which Jimenez
et al. (2008) estimate duration models on defaults. The calibration is shown in
table 2. The model is calibrated quarterly. For convenience, table 2 reports the
equilibrium interest rate and the default probability in annualized terms. A wider
range of parameter values is considered in Section 3.4 to assess the robustness of
the results.
Table 2: Calibration of the full model
Description Parameter Value Target / Source
Discount factor β 0.9979 Interbank rate
Variance of idiosyncratic component eω σ2 0.0256 Spanish leverage and defaults
Observation cost for the lender µ 0.0925 Spanish leverage and defaults
Probability that entrepreneur retires 1− γ 0.0139 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Weight on disutility of labour χ 18.70 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Policy rate persistence ρ 0.87 Sauer and Sturm (2007)
Weight on inflation in Taylor rule γpi 1.85 Sauer and Sturm (2007)
Weight on output in Taylor rule γy 0.59 Sauer and Sturm (2007)
Investment adjustment cost ν 3.60 Christiano et al. (2005)
Elasticity of substitution across varieties  10 Chari et al. (2000)
Marginal product of capital α 0.35 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Depreciation rate δ 0.025 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Frisch elasticity of labour η 3 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Probability of Calvo price optimization 1− ψ 0.25 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Description Moment Model Data Source
Annualized default rate Φ(ω¯) 0.0292 0.0291 Jimenez et al. (2008)
Leverage ratio K/N 3.03 3.0785 Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012)
Annualized risk free rate Rn 0.0085 0.0085 Interbank rate
Discounted return to K RK/R 1.0049 1.0049 Bernanke et al. (1999)
Notes: the model is calibrated to match the leverage ratio and the default probability of Spanish
firms, following the empirical results by Jimenez et al. (2008). The rest of the parameters are
calibrated from the literature. Alternative values of the calibration are considered in Section 3.3.
Parameters calibrated from the data
The discount factor β is calibrated to ensure that the steady state risk-free rate
Rn equals the quarterly average of the policy rate used by Jimenez et al. (2008).
This rate is the German interbank rate between 1986 and 1998 and the European
Overnight Index Average (EONIA) between 1999 and 2006. In the model, the
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nominal and the real interest rates coincide in the steady state, because in the
steady state inflation is zero, as for instance in Curdia and Woodford (2009). To be
consistent with this assumption, I calibrate β to match the observed real rather than
the nominal value of the average interbank rate. This value is 0.85% annually, which
equals 4.60% nominal interest rate net of 3.75% inflation. The implied quarterly
discount factor is 0.9979. The relatively high value of this parameter reflects the
very low level of the real interest rate in Spain. Section 3.3 shows that this non
conventional value of β is not crucial for the result.
The idiosyncratic shock ωt is assumed to be log normally distributed. The vari-
ance of ωt and the observation cost µ are calibrated to match the default probability
and the leverage ratio of Spanish firms. Jimenez et al. (2008) estimate an average
default probability of 0.6% quarterly, or 2.4% annually, for the median loan one
quarter after loan origination. I adjust this measure to 0.7291% quarterly, or 2.92%
annually, to partially control for differences between the debt contract in the model
and the median loan in Jimenez et al. (2008) (see Appendix A for the details).21
A measure of the leverage ratio, instead, is not available from their paper. The
leverage ratio of Spanish firms is taken from Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yesil-
tas (2012), who find a median leverage ratio of listed and non-listed non-financial
Spanish firms of 3.0785.22
21The model features non-collateralized, one-quarter-ahead loans issued by an intermediary at
a fixed interest rate. In the dataset used by Jimenez et al. (2008), almost 85% of the loans have
no collateral, the average maturity is 5 quarters, around 90% are issued by a commercial or saving
bank and most have non adjustable rates. See also Jimenez and Saurina (2004) for a description
of the data in the Spanish credit registry.
22The dataset assembled by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yesiltas (2012) covers the period
between 2000 and 2009, which falls short of the period for which I calibrate the default probability
of firms. Alternative empirical estimates are less suitable for the calibration because they cover
a shorter period of time and focus on only one particular type of firms (Reverte (2009) studies
firms listed in the IBEX35 index in years 2005 and 2006, Inchausti (1997) concentrates on firms
listed on the Valencia Stock Exchange, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) focus on small
and medium enterprises in the manufacturing sector, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) study publicly
traded firms between 1987 and 2000). I use the median instead of the mean value because the
latter (9.0443) is heavily biased upwards due to relatively few outliers. Spanish firms tend to
have a higher leverage than European firms. In the dataset by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and
Yesiltas (2012), 90% of the observations of the median leverage ratio of non-financial firms in the
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The exogenous probability γ that entrepreneurs retire and the relative disutility
of labour χ in the instantaneous utility function follow from the calibration to 200
basis points of the annual spread between the aggregate return to capital Rk and
the risk free rate R. This measure is taken from Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999).
The last parameters calibrated from the data regard the Taylor rule. The iden-
tification strategy by Jimenez et al. (2008) relies on the exogeneity of the policy
rate. The authors defend this assumption by arguing that the policy rate is set
by the European Central Bank with limited attention to Spanish-specific consider-
ations. It is not possible to fully account for this assumption in a New Keynesian
model, because an exogenous risk-free rate would leave inflation expectations un-
determined, giving room for sunspot equilibria. The divergence between the model
and the empirical estimation by Jimenez et al. (2008) is reduced using the following
approach. I start from the empirical estimation of the Taylor rule of the European
Central Bank computed by Sauer and Strum (2007). These estimates are 0.87 for
the persistence parameter ρ, 1.85 for the coefficient γpi attached to inflation and
0.59 for the coefficient γy attached to output. Then, to mimic the relative attention
that the European Central Bank presumably gives to Spanish-specific business cycle
considerations, I multiply the coefficients on inflation and output by a parameter
λ ∈ [0, 1], which reflects the relative role played by the Spanish business cycle in
the determination of the common monetary policy by the European Central Bank.
A high (low) value of λ implies a relatively endogenous (exogenous) response of the
policy rate to the Spanish business cycle. It then remains to calibrate the parameter
λ.
Calibrating λ requires an assessment of how close the Spanish business cycle is
to the business cycle of the monetary union. The literature on the synchroniza-
European Monetary Union range between 2.29 and 3.34, with the distribution skewed to the left
(the skewness equals 1.1535). I am grateful to the authors for having shared these statistics.
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tion of business cycles does not reach a consensus on this point, since the results
strongly depend on the sample, the methodology, the data and the data transfor-
mation (see for instance the discussion by De Haan, Inklaar and Jong-A-Pin (2008)
and by Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2008)). In this paper I calibrate λ using the
analysis developed by Camacho, Perez-Quiros and Saiz (2008), who move beyond
the assessment of business cycle syncronization across countries and compare the
duration, amplitude and shape of the business cycles of European and non European
countries. Their analysis shows that the Spanish business cycle is not significantly
dissimilar from the business cycle of the monetary union, as commented on exten-
sively in Appendix B. For this reason I calibrate λ to 0.9, which implies a baseline
calibration of (γpi, γy) is 0.9*(1.85,0.59) = (1.665, 0.531). This approach is of course
an approximation, but it serves the purpose of the analysis of the paper.23 Al-
ternative calibrations of the Taylor rule will be considered in the analysis of the
results.
Parameters calibrated from the literature
The remaining parameters are set according to the literature.
The parameter ν stands for the second derivative of the adjustment cost function
of investment. ν and β pin down the elasticity of investment to a temporary and a
permanent increase in the price of installed capital, which equal 1
ν
and 1
ν·(1−β) , re-
spectively (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). By construction, ν does
not affect the steady state of the model, although it does play a role in the dynamics
outside the steady state. The value of ν is taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) and implies an elasticity of 0.28 to a temporary increase in the price
of installed capital. I use this value as a lower bound in the calibration, because
23An equally approximate approach has been used in the literature to estimate the Taylor rules
for the European central bank in its early years of operation or to estimate the hypothetical Taylor
rule of the European Central Bank before it started its operations in 1999. See the discussion on
this point in Sauer and Sturm (2007).
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the high value of β in this paper implies an elasticity of investment to a permanent
increase in the price of installed capital of 131%. Robustness checks consider values
of ν up to the level required to generate an elasticity of 38%, which is the value
implicit in the calibration by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
The elasticity of substitution across varieties of consumption goods  is set equal
to 10. This value is based on Basu (1996) and Basu and Kimball (1997) and is also
used by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000). The literature tends to use lower
values. Faia and Monacelli (2006) use 8, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) use 5. I
consider all these values for robustness.
The Frisch elasticity of labour supply η is set equal to 3, as in Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999). This value is consistent with Cho and Cooley (1994) and King
and Rebelo (1999), who report Frisch elasticities that range from 2.6 to 4. This is
the range of values that I also consider in the robustness checks.24
As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Trabandt and
Walentin (2011), the probability 1 − ψ that the retailer optimizes his price is set
equal to 0.25, implying an average period of price adjustment of 4 quarters. I will
also consider values up to 0.5, implying an average price duration of half a year.
The parameter α for the marginal productivity of capital is set equal to 0.35.
There is a general agreement on the plausible set of values for this parameter, at
least in models with both capital and labour in the production (see Covas and Den
Haan (2012), note 29).
The depreciation rate δ is set to 0.025, corresponding to a 10 % annual rate.
There is a general agreement on the value of δ, at least within this class of models.
24Empirical estimates of the Frisch elasticity on macroeconomic data tend to exceed estimates
based on microeconomic data, which are usually below 1. See Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin
(2011) for an explanation of this divergence and Reichling and Whalen (2012) for a survey of
different empirical estimates of the elasticity of labour supply.
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3.3 Results
Figure 3 shows the effects of a 100 annual basis point decrease in the nominal
interest rate Rnt generated by a policy shock t in the Taylor rule. The horizontal
axis represents time, which is expressed in quarters. Variables are displayed in either
basis point or percentage point deviations from the steady state, as specified for each
variable. Interest rates, inflation and the default rate are reported in annualized
terms.
The 100 basis point decrease in Rn pushes down the annualized borrowing rate
by just as much, effectively leaving the spread unchanged (the decrease is smaller
than one basis point).25 The decrease in the borrowing rate increases end-of-period
investment by 1.2% and pushes up the price of capital by 1.24%. This is because
capital producers anticipate that entrepreneurs will demand more capital starting
from the end of the period. The unanticipated increase in the price of capital
unexpectedly increases the return to capital Rk above steady state by 1.5%. This
increase is mainly driven by the capital gain on non-depreciated capital, but it also
reflects a 3.25% increase in the rental rate of capital and a 1.4% increase in labour.
Capital starts to increase, although the increase is small.
The unexpected increase in the return to capital pushes up entrepreneurs’ rev-
enues and net worth by 1.3%. This decreases on impact the annualized default
probability, although the effect is very small and equals less than a basis point. On
impact, the market value of leverage QK/N decreases because the unexpected in-
crease in net worth dominates the increase in the price of capital. Output increases
by almost 1% and inflationary pressures arise from the first period onwards.
25In the model by Curdia and Woodford (2009) the spread increases, reflecting the cost of
intermediation. The increase in the spread in their model reflects the assumption of convex
intermediation costs and is lost when this cost is assumed proportional. The empirical evidence
on the behaviour of defaults is mixed. Eickmeier and Hofmann (2012) find that a monetary policy
expansion decreases the spread on commercial paper and on commercial and industrial loans,
increases the spread on consumer loans and does not affect significantly the Moody’s corporate
bond spread, i.e. the spread of BAA corporate yield over AAA corporate yield.
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Figure 3: Expansionary monetary policy shock of 100 basis points annually
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shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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From the second period the nominal interest rate reverts to the mean. The
accumulation of capital would push the leverage ratio up, but the higher level of
net worth dominates, leading to a further decrease in the leverage ratio. The default
rate follows the leverage ratio, although the effect on defaults remains quantitatively
small, being equal to just a basis point 3 quarters from the shock. As the leverage
ratio reverts to the mean, the default rate reverts to steady state. Note also that the
ex-post return to capital decreases below steady state after the first period due to
the capital loss on non-depreciated capital when Qt decreases towards steady state.
Capital remains above steady state for much longer than output, a fact consistent
with the very small increase in capital, the low value of α in the production function
and the temporary decrease in labour 5 quarters after the shock.
Figure 3 ultimately shows that the leverage effect discussed in Section 2 does
not hold in the general equilibrium model used in the paper. The reason being
that, in general equilibrium, the decrease in the cost of borrowing pushes up profits,
which push the default rate down. Put it differently, it is true that firms react
to the lower cost of borrowing by borrowing more and leveraging up net worth,
but since profits increase in general equilibrium due to the increase in the price of
capital, leverage ultimately decreases, pushing down defaults. In the rest of this
section I argue that the result is robust to alternative calibrations of the model.
For simplicity, the figures corresponding to robustness checks are reported at the
end of the paper. In all cases considered I give a monetary shock such that the
policy rate decreases by 100 basis points. I find that defaults always decrease, i.e. it
was not possible to find a parametrization of the model that replicates qualitatively
in general equilibrium the partial equilibrium result from Section 2. The order of
magnitude of the decrease in defaults was always very small and equal to only a few
basis points. This implies that defaults were effectively constant.
The model was first recalibrated using alternative values of the structural pa-
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rameters {ρ, λ, ν, , α, δ, η, ψ}, keeping constant the calibration necessary to match
the empirical moments explained in Section 3.2. Figure 6 shows that the higher
the reduction in the parameters on inflation and output in the Taylor rule, the
higher the decrease in the borrowing rate, hence the higher the increase in profits,
the decrease in leverage and ultimately the decrease in defaults. Figure 8 shows
that the more frequently retailers reoptimize prices, the sooner the nominal risk
free rate reverts to the mean and the less profits increase, implying a smaller de-
crease in leverage and defaults. No particular change in the results was found when
considering alternative values of the other parameters.
The model was then recalibrated around higher values of the steady state risk-
free rate, which was remarkably low in the baseline calibration due to the relatively
high value of inflation in Spain (see Section 3.2). The new value considered is
4% annually, implying a value of β of 0.99 (figure 9). Similarly, the model was
recalibrated with a default probability of 1% and 4% annually (figure 11) and a
value of the leverage ratio of 2 and of 4 (figure 10). Overall, I found that defaults
decrease more the higher the risk-free rate, the higher the steady state level of
defaults, and the lower the steady state leverage ratio. The deviations from steady
state remain nevertheless very small.
Last, I studied if the persistence in the policy rate affects the variation in de-
faults. To do so, I generated a series of subsequent monetary shocks that replicate
the policy rate generated by a single and persistent monetary shock. The exercise
is designed to study the role of the expectation that entrepreneurs have regarding
future variations in the policy rate. In the case of no persistence, agents are contin-
ually surprised by monetary shocks, while in the case with persistence they know
the time path of the risk free rate from the second period onwards. In general, with
a positive persistence parameter in the Taylor rule, agents anticipate that the policy
rate remains low for more than one period. Since the Euler equation prescribes an
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increase in consumption for many periods to come, entrepreneurs increase invest-
ment in order to satisfy the high demand from intermediate good producers. On the
contrary, when the persistence in the policy rate is zero, agents do not anticipate
a strong increase in consumption and investment increases by less. The results of
the exercise are shown in figure 12. Compared to the baseline model of ρ = 0.87, a
zero persistence effectively decreases the spread by less, hence increases investment
by less. Since this leads to a milder increase in the price of capital, the increase in
profits is lower, implying a smaller decrease in defaults.
4 Conclusions
This paper argues that the default probability on loans by firms effectively remains
unchanged after an expansionary monetary shock. Jimenez et al. (2008) show that
a monetary expansion leads to a lower default probability on existing loans and to
a higher default probability on new loans. Their result holds in partial equilibrium.
I have argued that a leverage effect on the side of firms might contribute to explain
their result on new loans. I have then used the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) model to argue that this increase might not hold in general equilibrium. In
the model, this happens because the monetary expansion increases firms’ profits,
which in turn push up their net worth, decrease leverage and ultimately decrease
the default rate. The effect on defaults equals only a few basis points, implying
that defaults effectively remain constant. The result is consistent with the general
equilibrium analysis in Piffer (2014), where I argue that one cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that delinquency rates on business loans in the US respond to a monetary
shock.
The model used in this paper features ex ante homogeneous borrowers. Whether
defaults increase or decrease after a monetary expansion depends on how the lever-
105
Chapter 2
age ratio of firms changes. An interesting extension of the model would be to allow
borrowers to draw idiosyncratic shocks from distributions with different variance
and allow for monetary policy to affect the allocation of credit across risky versus
safe borrowers. The mechanism would be complementary to the leverage effect dis-
cussed in the paper, and could potentially yield interesting results in both partial
and general equilibrium. The analysis is left for future research.
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Appendix A: Calibrating the default probability
using duration models
This appendix gives a short introduction to duration models and explains how the
empirical results by Jimenez et al. (2008) are used in the calibration of the model.
The interested reader is referred to Kleinbaum and Klein (2005) and Keifer (1988)
for a more comprehensive analysis of duration analysis.
Duration analysis on default rates use ex-post information on the actual time
to default to infer the stochastic process generating the observed switching from
non-default to default.26 Define f(t) the probability density function determining
the time to default, where t represents the time after loan origination. From f(t)
and from the corresponding cumulative distribution function F (t), compute the
surviving function S(t) = 1−F (t), which gives the probability that the loan survives
until time t. Having a dataset on loans until time T , assume the functional form of
f(t) up to a parameter set and construct the log likelihood as the combination of
densities and cumulative densities, respectively for observations of loans defaulted
before T and for observations of loans still outstanding at time T or that have been
repaid. Last, compute the parameters that maximize the likelihood that the default
patter is the observed one.
It is convenient to synthesize the information content of f(t) into the hazard
function h(t), which detects the instantaneous rate of default at time t given that
the loan has not defaulted yet (alternatively, the conditional rate of default per time
unit in an infinitesimally small interval). Formally, h(t) is defined as
h(t0) = lim
→0
P (t0 < t < t0 +  | t ≥ t0)

.
26The switching from one state to another is studied extensively also in other branches of the
Social Sciences, as for instance Medicine and Epidemiology.
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h(t0) detects approximately P (t0 < t < t0 + | t ≥ t0), i.e. the probability of default
between time t0 and t0 + conditioning on the fact that the default has not occurred
yet, with  being the approximating factor:27
P (t0 < t < t0 +  | t ≥ t0) ≈ h(t0).
Duration analysis uses heuristic data inspection to infer a realistic hazard rate
(usually the exponential or the Weibull distribution), computes the corresponding
f(t), constructs the likelihood function and solves the problem parametrically.28
It is common in the literature to study the role of other variables (or covariates)
by assuming that they affect the hazard rate in the following convenient form:
h(t0) = h0(t0) · eXtβ,
where h0(t0) stands for the baseline hazard function. A positive (negative) estimate
of βj implies that an increase in the covariate shifts the entire hazard function
proportionally up (down).
Following the above strategy, Jimenez et al (2008) estimate the hazard function
for loans in Spain from 1985 to 2006, obtaining 29
27One can rewrite h(t0) as the ratio between the probability density function and the surviving
function, or equivalently, as the rate of decrease of the surviving function:
h(t0) = lim
→0
F (t0 + )− F (t0)

1
1− F (t0) =
f(t)
S(t)
= −dlogS(t)
dt
.
From this it follows that P (t0 < t < t0 +  | t ≥ t0) can be rewritten as
∫ t0+
t0
f(t)
1− F (t0)dt =
F (t0 + )− F (t0)
1− F (t0) ≈
F (t0)− F (t0) + F ′(t0)
1− F (t0) =
f(t0)
1− F (t0) = h(t0).
28Given h(s), the corresponding cumulative distribution function is F (s) = 1− e−
∫ t
0
h(s)ds. Cox
(1972) proposes a partial likelihood estimation approach that exploits the ordering in which the
switch from a state to another, not the exact time. The result by Jimenez et al. (2008) is robust
to this alternative estimation strategy.
29The computation of equation (15) from Jimenez et al. (2008) exploits the information from
their paper that the hazard rate equals 0.6 for average interest rate before and after the origination,
given that some estimates included in the regression are not reported in their paper.
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Figure 4: Estimated hazards rate in Spain, 1985 and 2006
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Notes: The default probability of Spanish firms estimated by Jimenez et al. (2008) increases as
the loan approaches maturity, it increases in the policy rate before maturity and decreases in the
policy rate before origination.
h(t) = 2.2614 · t2.2614−1e−0.127·ibefore+0.293·iafter−2.0074. (15)
ibefore and iafter are the key variables of the regression and represent the monetary
policy interest rate on the quarter before the loan is originated and the monetary
policy interest rate after origination and before the loan comes to maturity, respec-
tively. The term -2.0074 includes the estimated effect of the covariates evaluated
at the median value. The regression results suggest that, other things equal, a 1
percentage point increase in the interest rate before the loan was issued decreases
the hazard rate by 0.127 percent along the entire life-time of the loan. Instead, a 1
percentage point increase in the interest rate after the loan was issued and before
it comes to maturity increases the hazard rate by 0.293 percent along the entire
life-time of the loan.30
30To argue that this shift in risk profiles is intentionally taken by banks, Jimenez et al. (2008)
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The result is robust to alternative estimation strategies and is shown graphically
in figure 4.31 Both graphs represent the instantaneous rate of default for the median
loan with 5 quarters maturity for each point in time between origination and matu-
rity. The continuous lines show the case in which the interest rates before and after
origination are equal to the mean value of 4.1%. The left graphs shows the case of
loans originated when the policy rate is at mean value and that reached maturity
when it is at its sample maximum (dashed line) or sample minimum (dotted line).
Conversely, the right graph shows the case of loans for which the policy interest
rate is equal to its mean value before maturity and that were originated when the
policy rate was at its sample maximum (dashed line) or at its sample minimum
(dotted line). We see from figure 4 that a decrease in the policy rate after the loan
is originated decreases the probability of default, while a decrease in the policy rate
before the loan is originated increases the probability of default.
Equation (15) includes the entire dataset and hence detects the hazard rate of
the median loan. As emphasized in Section 3.3, loans in the model differ from
the median loan from the Spanish credit registry for being non-collateralized and
for having one quarter maturity. To control for this difference, I adjust the corre-
sponding dummy variables in the term -2.0074 in equation (15). The corresponding
hazard function is
h(t) = 2.2614 · t2.2614−1e−0.127·ibefore+0.293·iafter−1.8125. (16)
Under this alternative parametrization of the hazard function, the default rate of
take the estimated probability density function of defaults as a proxy of the expectation that loan
officers attach to defaults of different loan applications. In this paper I only interpret their result
as suggestive evidence of an equilibrium phenomenon rather than as an effect intentionally driven
by banks’ behaviour.
31All other estimations considered by the authors deliver a negative sign for the coefficient on
ibefore and a positive sign for the coefficient on iafter. The magnitude of the estimates for the first
coefficient are between -0.0052 and 0.127 and for the second coefficient between 0.044 and 0.350,
always remaining significantly different from zero at 1% significance.
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a loan with median interest rate of 4.1% both before origination and before maturity
goes from 0.60 to 0.7291 quarterly, or from 2.4% to 2.92% annually. This is the value
used in the calibration
Equation (16) can be used to compare the effect on the default rate predicted
by the model and found empirically by Jimenez et al. (2008). It has been said that
the default rate of an adjusted median loan when the policy rate is constant at the
median interest rate of 4.1% is 2.92%. Equation (16) implies that when the interest
rate decreases temporarily by 100 basis points, then the default rate of existing
loans decreases to 2.18% and the default rate of new loans increases to 3.31%.32
A similar analysis is carried out by Ioannidou et al. (2009) for Bolivia and
by Lopez et al. (2011) for Colombia. In Bolivia, when the policy rate (i.e. the
federal funds rate) equals its mean before origination and before maturity (4.25%)
the default rate of loans is 1.84%. A 1% decrease in the policy rate decreases the
default rate on existing loans approximately to 1.51% and increases the default rate
on new loans approximately to 2.14%. In Colombia, when the policy rate (i.e. the
interbank rate) equals its mean (2.18%) the default rate of loans is 1.69%. A 1%
decrease in the policy rate decreases the default rate on existing loans approximately
to 1.47% and increases the default rate on new loans approximately to 1.71%. This
means that the result by Jimenez et al. (2008) is robust when using data on Bolivia,
but is bigger than what is found for Columbia.
32Without the adjustment for non collateralized, one quarter maturity loans the annual default
rate of 2.4% decreases to 1.8% for existing loans and increases to 2.72% for new loans, making the
model marginally more successful to match both variations.
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Appendix B: Calibrating the Taylor rule
The calibration of the Taylor rule requires the assessment of how similar the Spanish
business cycle is from the business cycle of the Eurozone as a whole. This assess-
ment then leads to the calibration of the parameter λ in Section 3.2. To do so I
use the analysis by Camacho, Perez-Quiros and Saiz (2008). They analyze different
properties of the business cycle of several countries. Since the default rate is cali-
brated on data up to 2006, I only compare the Spanish business cycle to the one of
the countries that joined the Eurozone before 2006. The business cycle is studied
using the level of the seasonally adjusted monthly observations of the industrial
production index.
Three features of business cycles are studied by Camacho et al. (2008): the du-
ration, the amplitude and the shape. The duration is defined as the average number
of months between two consecutive turning points of the cycle. The amplitude is
defined as the average percentage variation of industrial production between two
consecutive turning points of the cycle. The shape is defined as the divergence of
the average business cycle from a linear trajectory between two consecutive turning
points of the cycle. A positive value of the shape of a business cycle is associated
with a convex cycle, i.e. a cycle that begins slowly and then accelerates, if expan-
sionary, or that begins rapidly and then decelerates, if recessionary. Similarly, a
negative value of the shape of a business cycle is associated with a concave cycle,
i.e. a cycle that begins rapidly and then decelerates, if expansionary, or that begins
slowly and then accelerates, if recessionary.
Figure 5 reports the results by Camacho et al. (2008), table 3, for the countries
of interest for the calibration in this paper. The horizontal solid and dashed lines
show the unweighted and weighted average, respectively. The weights used are
computed from the relative size of real GDP in each country, relative to the real
GDP of the Eurozone. Overall, we see that, relative to the weighted Eurozone, the
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Figure 5: Comparison of the business cycle in the euro-zone, 1990M1-2004M3
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Notes: the figure replicates table 3 in Camancho et al. (2008). The horizontal line shows
the unweighted average for the euro zone. The duration is computed as the average number
of months between two consecutive turning points in the business cycle. The amplitude is
computed as the average percentage difference between two consecutive turning points in the
business cycle. The shape is computed as a normalized measure of how non linear the average
path between two consecutive turning points in the business cycle: > 0: convex, < 0: concave,
0: linear. 120
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Spanish business cycle tends to have longer expansions and shorter recessions, wider
cycles, more convex expansions and more linear recessions.
Table 3: Difference from Eurozone business cycle (1 = most similar)
Unweighted average Weighted average
country duration amplitude shape duration amplitude shape
Austria 7 3 2 10 8 6
Belgium 5 1 6 2 5 4
Finland 6 8 8 7 11 9
France 2 11 4 4 6 2
Germany 11 9 3 6 2 1
Greece 10 2 9 11 7 10
Ireland 12 12 11 12 12 12
Italy 8 10 5 8 4 3
Luxemburg 3 5 7 1 10 8
Netherlands 1 7 10 3 1 7
Portugal 9 6 12 9 9 11
Spain 4 4 1 5 3 5
Notes: the table lists the countries in terms of how different they are from the weighted
and unweighted Eurozone average, where weights refer to real GDP of the different coun-
tries. Countries that are closer to the Eurozone average are ranked first. The table builds
from the results in Table 3 of Camacho et al. (2008).
It is not clear a priori how one should judge the relative similarity of the typical
Spanish business cycle to the Eurozone business cycle. A quantitative assessment
would require the assessment of relative weights to be attached to the different
features of the business cycle. In this paper I follow a qualitative approach, which
is less affected by the judgment of the researcher. Table 3 builds on the data from
figure 5 by ordering the countries in the Eurozone according to how different they
are from the Eurozone average. A value of 1 (12) is associated with a country that
is the most similar (the most dissimilar) to the Eurozone average. The country
that has an overall average duration of the business cycle closest to the unweighted
Eurozone average are the Netherlands, followed by France and Luxembourg. The
country that has average amplitude of the business cycle closest to the unweighted
Eurozone average is Belgium, followed by Greece and Austria. Overall, we see
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that Spain ranks only fourth according to the duration and amplitude and first
according to shape, when considering the unweighted Eurozone average. Similarly,
Spain ranks fifth according to duration and shape, and third according to amplitude,
when considering the weighted Eurozone average. Overall, the analysis implies that
the Spanish business cycle is not particularly dissimilar from the business cycle of
the Eurozone as a whole. For this reason I calibrate the parameter λ in Section 3.2
to an arbitrary 0.90, i.e. I decrease the parameter values estimated by Sauer and
Strum (2007) by 10%. Alternative values are used to assess the robustness of the
results.
122
Chapter 2
text
123
Chapter 2
Figure 6: Robustness checks (solid is λ = 0.8, dashed is λ = 1, solid-dot is λ = 0.6)
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Notes: All variables are shown in deviation from the steady state. The expansionary monetary
shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 7: Robustness checks (solid is ν =?, dashed is ν =?, solid-dot is ν =?)
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Notes: All variables are shown in deviation from the steady state. The expansionary monetary
shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 8: Robustness checks (solid is 1− ψ = 0.25, dashed is 1− ψ = 0.5)
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Notes: All variables are shown in deviation from the steady state. The expansionary monetary
shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 9: Robustness checks (solid is β = 0.9979, dashed is β = 0.99
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Notes: All variables are shown in deviation from the steady state. The expansionary monetary
shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 10: Robustness checks (solid is Φ(ω¯) = 0.01, dashed is Φ(ω¯) = 0.04)
5 10 15 20
−100
−50
0
Risk free rate (Rn)
a
n
n
u
a
l b
ps
 
 
Baseline
5 10 15 20
−100
−50
0
Borrowing rate (Rb)
a
n
n
u
a
l b
ps
5 10 15 20
−0.2
−0.1
0
Spread (Rn−Rb)
a
n
n
u
a
l b
ps
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Investments (I)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Price of capital (Q)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
Return to capital (Rk)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
Labour (H)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
Rental rate (rk)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Profits (V)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
Capital (K)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Networth (N)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Output (Y)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
Price level (Pi)
a
n
n
u
a
l p
er
ce
nt
5 10 15 20
−0.04
−0.02
0
Leverage (QK/N)
pe
rc
en
t
5 10 15 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Defaults
a
n
n
u
a
l b
ps
Notes: All variables are shown in deviation from the steady state. The expansionary monetary
shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 11: Robustness checks (solid is K/N = 2, dashed is K/N = 4)
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Notes: All variables are shown in deviation from the steady state. The expansionary monetary
shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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Figure 12: Robustness checks (solid is ρ = 0.87 and one shock, dashed is ρ = 0 and
many shocks)
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Notes: All variables are shown in deviation from the steady state. The expansionary monetary
shock is calibrated so to generate a 100 basis point decrease in the nominal interest rate.
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Abstract
I study empirically the effect of an unexpected monetary expansion on the
delinquency rate on US business loans, residential mortgages and consumer
credit. I consider several identification strategies and use Granger-causality
tests to assess the exogeneity of the time series of monetary shocks to the Fed’s
forecast of defaults on loans. I then compute impulse responses using a variant
of the Local Projection method by Jorda (2005). I find that the delinquency
rates do not respond to monetary shocks in a statistically significant way. The
paper suggests that the risk-taking incentives analyzed in partial equilibrium
by several existing contributions might not be strong enough to prevail and
increase aggregate defaults, although they could explain why defaults do not
significantly decrease.
JEL Classification: E44, E52
Keywords: Monetary policy, risk taking channel, Granger causality, mon-
etary shocks, default, Vector Autoregressive models
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1 Introduction
This paper studies empirically the effect of a monetary expansion on the probability
that firms and households default on loans. On the one hand, one could expect that a
monetary expansion reduces this default probability, because it boosts revenues and
income by lowering the cost of borrowing and by increasing output. On the other
hand, several recent empirical papers have used a partial equilibrium analysis to
argue that banks take on more risk after a monetary expansion. The findings of these
papers, discussed more extensively below, suggest the opposite prediction, i.e. that a
monetary expansion could increase aggregate defaults in general equilibrium, as long
as banks’ risk-taking incentives are sufficiently strong. In this paper I show evidence
against this hypothesis. Specifically, I argue that the response of aggregate defaults
on US loans to an unexpected monetary expansion is not statistically different from
zero when one accounts for general equilibrium effects, i.e. when one allows profits,
GDP and other variables to respond to the monetary expansion. The results of the
paper are in line with Buch, Eickmeier and Prieto (2011), which, to the best of my
knowledge, is the only paper that addresses the general equilibrium impact of risk-
taking in the US. The contribution of the paper differs from Buch et al. (2011) by
not restricting the analysis to new loans, and by using a wider set of identification
strategies.
In this paper, I measure the default probability on loans using the aggregate
delinquency rate on three types of loans: business loans, residential mortgages and
consumer credit. Aggregate delinquency rates are defined as the ratio of the value
of loans whose repayment is overdue for more than a month, relative to the value
of total loans. While the use of aggregate data helps to study defaults in general
equilibrium, it also poses a key identification challenge. As is well known in the
literature, the policy rate is endogenous to the state of the economy and tends
to decrease in recessions. Since recessions are associated with higher defaults, a
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negative correlation emerges between the policy rate and the delinquency rate. The
goal of the paper is to address whether, to some extent, this negative correlation
is also driven by a reverse causality, i.e. by an increase in defaults in response to
the decrease in the policy rate. To address this endogeneity problem I follow the
literature and use monetary shocks, i.e. the variations in the policy rate not driven
by the systematic intervention of the Fed to the current and future state of the
economy.1
To analyze the effect of monetary policy on the default on loans one needs to
extract variations in the policy rate that are orthogonal to the Fed’s forecasts of
defaults on loans (see for example the discussion by Cochrane (2004)). Suppose,
in fact, that one finds that an unexpected monetary expansion is associated with a
subsequent increase in defaults. If the monetary shocks are not orthogonal to the
Fed’s forecast of defaults, then the increase in defaults could still reflect the fact that
the Fed decreased the policy rate in anticipation of the financial distress associated
with a future downturn of the business cycle. The Fed’s forecasts of defaults on
loans is not available, but there are several approaches that one can follow to tackle
the issue indirectly. For instance, Romer and Romer (2004) identify variations in
the policy rate that are exogenous to the contemporaneous rate of unemployment
and to the Fed’s forecasts of output and inflation. If these variables are sufficient
statistics for future defaults, then one can use the Romer and Romer shocks for
the analysis of defaults. Alternatively, one can start from a reduced-form time
series model and impose theoretical restrictions to identify monetary shocks. The
estimated shocks are appropriate to study defaults to the extent that the variables
1While it is generally believed that the policy rate is always set by central banks in response
to the state of the economy, the decision process within monetary policy committees is likely to
be noisy. This noise is conveniently exploited in the literature for identification purposes. A more
detailed discussion of monetary shocks is available, for instance, in Bernanke and Mihov (1998)
and Romer and Romer (2004). An analysis of the decision making process in monetary policy
committees is available for instance in Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) and Hansen, McMahon
and Velasco Rivera (2012).
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included in the model span the information set used by the Fed to forecast future
defaults. Another approach could be to use the unexpected variation of the federal
funds rate implied by financial markets, as suggested by Kuttner (2001). Each of
these methods has advantages and disadvantages in generating monetary shocks
that are appropriate for the research question of the paper.
In this paper I use an approach that departs from the methodologies outlined
above. I first collect five estimated time series of monetary shocks corresponding
to five methodologies used in the literature. The approaches considered are a VAR
in the spirit of Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002), a Medium scale Bayesian VAR by
Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010), a Factor Model by Forni and Gambetti
(2010), the Romer and Romer shocks estimated by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng
and Silvia (2012) and the shocks estimated by Barakchian and Crowe (2013) using
Futures Contracts. Developing a theoretical argument as to which approach is
more likely to deliver shocks that are exogenous to the Fed’s forecasts of defaults
is very subjective. Empirically, the first best approach would be to exploit the
time series of the Fed’s forecasts of the defaults, which is not available. In this
paper I propose an indirect approach that relies on the following idea. While the
Fed’s forecasts on defaults are not known, they are realistically some function of
variables that are likely to be informative of the future financial position of firms
and households. I take these variables as proxies of the unobserved Fed’s forecasts
of defaults and dismiss candidate time series of monetary shocks that are Granger
caused by any of these variables. The variables used are previous delinquency rates,
the aggregate leverage ratios and the aggregate debt-to-GDP ratios of firms and
households. This approach limits the analysis to the time series of monetary shocks
from only one methodology, namely the Medium Bayesian VAR. The shocks are
then used to compute impulse responses following a variant of the method by Jorda
(2005), Romer and Romer (2004) and Chang and Sakata (2007).
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The paper finds no statistically significant effect of a monetary shock on any
of the three aggregate delinquency rates considered. The results are robust to
alternative measures of monetary shocks used, as well as to alternative identification
and specification strategies. Whether this evidence supports or not the findings on
the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is subject to judgment. On the one hand
one can argue that banks’ risk taking should not be of particular concern for central
banks, given that there is no statistically significant evidence that delinquency rates
increase. For instance, this is the interpretation suggested by Buch, Eickmeier and
Prieto (2011). On the other hand, though, one could conclude that risk taking is
quantitatively quite significant. In fact, it could explain why there is no statistical
evidence that delinquency rates decrease, as could be realistically expected. Using
aggregate data from the Survey on Terms of Business Lending, Buch, Eickmeier and
Prieto (2011) show that, while risk taking does not emerge for the banking sector
as a whole, it does emerge when considering only small banks. Addressing whether
this result is robust to the use of delinquency rates was not possible, given data
availability. The question remains open for future research.
The paper relates to the literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy
that follows Rajan (2006) and Borio and Zhu (2008). This literature explores the
possibility that central banks face a trade-off between output and financial stabil-
ity, in addition to the well-known trade-off between output and inflation. I take the
probability of defaults on loans issued by banks as a proxy of the financial stability
of banks. Using microeconomic data from the credit registry on Spain, Jimenez,
Ongena, Peydro´ and Saurina (2010) find that a monetary expansion decreases the
default probability on existing loans, but increases the default probability on new
loans. Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro´ (2009) and Lopez, Tenjo and Zarate (2011)
show that the results by Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro´ and Saurina (2010) also hold for
Bolivia and Colombia. An empirical analysis for the US using microeconomic data
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is provided by Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011), Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marquez-
Ibanez (2014), Paligorova and Santos (2012), De Nicolo´, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and
Valencia (2010) and Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Suarez (2013). These authors find
that a monetary expansion leads banks to loosen credit standards, run a higher
default probability, charge lower interest rate spreads to risky borrowers relative to
safe borrowers, have a higher ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets and grant
loans classified by banks as more risky. Several theoretical contributions have mod-
eled the possibility that a monetary expansion affects the allocation of credit across
borrowers characterized by different ex ante risk profiles (see for example Challe,
Mojon and Ragot (2013), Dubecq, Mojon and Ragot (2009), Agur and Demertzis
(2012) and Fahri and Tirole (2009)). Related but different mechanisms are mod-
eled in Drees, Eckwert and Vardy (2012), Acharya and Naqvi (2012), Dell’Ariccia,
Laeven and Marquez (2010), Stein (2012), Valencia (2011), Bruno and Shin (2012),
Angeloni and Faia (2013), Cociuba, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2012) and Piffer
(2014).
Section 2 explains the key variables used in the analysis. Section 3 outlines the
empirical strategy used. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Dataset
To measure the probability of default on loans I use delinquency rates. The delin-
quency rate is the ratio of the value of delinquent loans over the value of outstanding
loans, where a borrower is “delinquent” if the loan repayment (interests or princi-
pal) is overdue for more than 30 days. I consider three delinquency rates depending
on the type of loan considered: business loans, residential mortgages and consumer
credit. The Federal Reserve Bank collects these time series from the Call Report
filed for all US-chartered commercial banks on a quarterly basis. Nevertheless, only
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certain aggregate time series are made publically available. In this paper I use delin-
quency rates on loans issued by all commercial banks.2 The series start in 1987Q1
for the delinquency rates on business loans and consumer credit, and in 1991 for
residential mortgages.3 Aggregate data from the Flow of Funds reveal that the three
types of loans considered account in total for around 40% of banks total assets. This
ratio has been relatively constant since the 1970s, but hides a progressive increase
of the volume of residential mortgages and a progressive decrease in the volume of
business loans (and, to a lesser extent, of consumer credit). Figure 7 at the end of
the paper provides further details.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the delinquency rates. The three time series are
compared to the evolution of the federal funds rate (thin line, plotted on the right-
hand side of the graphs). As explained in the introduction, the analysis of the paper
is carried out using data for the period until 2007Q2. For completeness, the figure
covers also the period after 2007Q2. The vertical shaded bands indicate the NBER
recessions covered. These correspond to the recessions following the Gulf war, the
dotcom bubble and the subprime crisis. Table 1 complements the analysis of figure
1 by reporting summary statistics on the mean, the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles,
the standard deviation and the contemporaneous correlation with real GDP. This
correlation is computed after filtering out low and seasonal frequencies using an X-
12 ARIMA algorithm from the US Census Bureau and the HP filter, respectively.
2The Federal Reserve also publishes the delinquency rate aggregated for the top 100 banks
and for the non top 100 banks, according to assets. An aggregation for small banks only is not
available. The results are robust to the use of the delinquency rates for top and non-top 100 banks,
as discussed in Section 4.
3When the borrower becomes severely delinquent (traditionally after six months from the
first omitted payment) the lender charges off from his balance sheet the amount of the loan
that is considered noncollectable. This allows the lender to book the corresponding loss in
the income statement and benefit from a tax exemption on the loss. I use delinquency in-
stead of charge-off rates since the latter are more noisy. The results are robust to the
use of charge-off rates. Further details on delinquency and charge-off rates are available on
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/about.htm. An alternative measure could be
the rate of non-performing loans by commercial banks, which nevertheless combines business and
non-business loans in a single time series.
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Figure 1: Delinquency rates on three types of loans
a) business loans
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c) consumer credit
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Notes: the shaded bands indicate NBER recessions, the thin lines show the federal
funds rate, the thick lines show the delinquency rate (top graph) and the leverage
ratio of firms (bottom graph). The period considered is 1987Q1-2011Q4. Only the
period until 2007Q2 will be included in the analysis of Sections 3 and 4.
The smoothing parameter used in the HP filter equals 1600, which is standard for
quarterly data.
Overall, figure 1 and table 1 suggest that:
1. the delinquency rates average between 3% and 3.5% for all types of loan
considered, although the average delinquency rate on residential mortgages
decreases to 2.21% when excluding the period after 2007Q2;
2. the delinquency rate on residential mortgages spiked during the subprime
crisis. The delinquency rate on the other loans increased too, but less remark-
ably;
3. the delinquency rates on business loans and residential mortgages display a
downward trend when one excludes the period after 2007Q2;
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Table 1: Summary statistics on delinquency rates
Mean Percen- Percen- Standard Correlation with
% tile (2.5) tile (97.5) deviation real GDP
Until 2011Q4
business loans 3.10 1.20 6.25 1.57 -0.76
residential mortgages 3.49 1.49 10.82 2.86 -0.75
credit loans 3.50 2.72 4.69 0.47 -0.63
Until 2007Q2
business loans 3.21 1.17 6.27 1.65 -0.60
residential mortgages 2.21 1.47 3.34 0.48 -0.19
credit loans 3.41 2.70 4.18 0.38 -0.31
Notes: The mean and percentiles are computed on the level of the corresponding variable. The
correlation with real GDP is computed after filtering out seasonal and low frequencies using
an X-12 ARIMA filter and an HP filter, respectively. The smoothing parameter used in the
HP filter equals 1600.
4. all delinquency rates are countercyclical, especially the delinquency rate on
business loans;
5. when excluding the period after 2007Q2, the delinquency rate on business
loans is largely more volatile than the delinquency rate on residential mort-
gages and consumer loans;
3 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy used in this paper consists of three steps. In the first step
I collect several candidate time series of monetary shocks. In the second step I use
Granger-causality tests to identify the time series of shocks that are less likely to
display endogeneity with respect to the Fed’s forecasts of defaults on loans. In the
third step I compute impulse responses using local projection methods.
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Table 2: List of the candidate time series of monetary shocks considered
Time series approach
1) VAR
2) Medium Bayesian VAR Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010)
3) Factor Model Forni and Gambetti (2010)
Romer and Romer approach
4) Romer and Romer shocks Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng and Silvia (2012)
Financial data approach
5) Futures contract data Barakchian and Crowe (2013)
Notes: The table lists the five candidate time series of monetary shocks used in the paper.
3.1 Step 1: collect time series of monetary shocks
The literature has proposed several methodologies to estimate monetary shocks.
I start by considering five time series of monetary shocks, which fall into three
main approaches: the “Time Series approach”, the “Romer and Romer approach”
and the “Financial Data approach”. The methodologies used are listed in table
2. In this section I discuss the ability of each of these methodologies to deliver
estimates of monetary shocks that satisfy the key requirement for the application
of this paper. Some of the time series of monetary shocks are available before
1987Q1. Only the subset of the time series after 1987Q1 will be used for the
computation of impulse responses in Section 3.3, given that the delinquency rates
are available only after 1987Q1 (1991Q1 for the delinquency rate on residential
mortgages). When necessary, monthly time series are converted to quarterly time
series using the unweighted sum within each quarter, in line with Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2002) and Romer and Romer (2004).
The first candidate time series of monetary shocks is estimated using a standard
VAR model, in the spirit of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (1999) and Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002). One option could be to include
the delinquency rates in the VAR. The limited availability of the time series for the
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delinquency rates discourages this approach, since it would imply a significant loss
of degrees of freedom in the estimation of the VAR.4 Alternatively, I use variables,
available on a longer time period, that are likely to be informative of the future
financial position of firms and households. The VAR includes the following five
variables: the log of real GDP, the log of GDP deflator, the federal funds rate,
the log of firms’ leverage ratio and the log of households’ leverage ratio. The VAR,
which is estimated using OLS, includes 4 lags, a constant, a linear trend and seasonal
dummies. The order in which variables enter the model does not matter, since I
identify the model using sign restrictions. The sign restrictions imposed are that
1) real GDP does not increase during the first two quarters, 2) interest rates do
not increase during the first two quarters, and 3) if a price puzzle is displayed, it
does not last for more than three years.5 For simplicity, I only use the estimates
of monetary shocks corresponding to the median target. Appendix A discusses the
estimation and identification of the VAR model in detail. I do not use a Cholesky
identification for the VAR model given that the model is estimated on quarterly
data.6
The VAR model outlined above includes only 5 variables. The literature has
discussed extensively the fact that central banks use a wider information set to
guide the course of the policy rate. The second and third candidate time series
of monetary shocks address this issue. The second time series of monetary shocks
is computed using the Bayesian estimation of large VARs proposed by Banbura,
Giannone and Reichlin (2010). I use the medium specification of their model, which
4Section 4 shows that the results are consistent with the use of VAR models that include
delinquency rates.
5While unconventional, the sign restriction on the behaviour of the GDP deflator is in line with
the observation that the literature typically finds a price puzzle that lasts up to around three years
For a discussion of the price puzzle see Boivin et al. (2011). For robustness, I also used a Cholesky
identification, which did not change the results and which delivered monetary shocks that did not
satisfy the Granger-causality restrictions explained in the next section.
6The recursive timing of monetary shocks is more likely to hold for monthly data, as discussed
for instance in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005).
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includes 20 variables, because they show that the predictive power of such a model
is superior to a larger VAR model. I will refer to this model as the Medium Bayesian
VAR. The paper by Banbura et al. (2010) delivers monetary shocks for the period
between 1962M1 and 2003M12. I replicate their analysis for the period between
1976M1 and 2007M6.7 The third time series of monetary shocks is taken from the
Factor Model by Forni and Gambetti (2010), which includes 112 variables. The
period covered is 1973M4-2007M12. The identification is recursive in both papers,
as suggested by the use of monthly data. The variables potentially informative of
the repayment possibilities of firms and households are personal income, indexes
of industrial production, the tightness of unemployment in different sectors, stock
price indexes and a range of interest rates.8
It is hard to judge whether a VAR with a small number of variables is more
or less successful in generating monetary shocks that are exogenous to the Fed’s
forecasts of default, compared to a larger model. In fact, the inclusion of variables
involves costs and benefits. On the one hand, adding more variables allows one
to capture a wider information set potentially used by the Fed to assess the future
course of delinquencies. On the other hand, it requires more structure to be imposed
on the model.9 The remaining candidate time series of monetary shocks account
for this consideration.
The fourth candidate time series of monetary shocks that I use follows the contri-
7Contrary to their specification, I do not add a prior on the sum of coefficients, given that the
purpose of my analysis is not to improve the forecasting power of the model. The results were not
affected by the exclusion of this prior.
8The variables included in the Medium Bayesian VAR are personal income, consumption, in-
dustrial production index, capital utilization, unemployment rate, number of employees on non
farm sector, housing starts, producer price index, the price index of personal consumption expen-
ditures, the CPI index, the trade-weighted US dollar index, hourly earnings of production, the
federal funds rate, M1, M2, total reserves, non borrowed reserves, the industrial production index,
the business loans and the loans on residential real estate. The list of the 112 variables in the
Factor Model by Forni and Gambetti (2010) can be found in the on-line supplement material of
the original paper.
9Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010) do so by estimating the model with Bayesian tech-
niques. Forni and Gambetti (2010) do so by assuming that the dynamics of the data are ultimately
generated by four structural shocks that affect 16 unobservable factors.
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bution by Romer and Romer (2004). In short, Romer and Romer identify an index
of the intended variations of the federal funds rate. They then regress this index on
the Fed’s forecasts of real output growth, the GDP deflator and the unemployment
rate. The residuals of such regressions capture the variations in the policy rate that
are orthogonal to the Fed’s expectations of the state of the economy captured by
the forecasts. To some extent it is reasonable to expect that the Romer and Romer
shocks are at least in part exogenous to the Fed’s forecast of defaults, since future
GDP is realistically informative of the future financial position of borrowers. The
original Romer and Romer shocks cover the period between 1969M3 and 1996M12. I
use the series by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng and Silvia (2012), who extend the
analysis by Romer and Romer (2004) up to 2008M12. Using the original estimates
of the Romer and Romer shocks did not change the results.
The fifth and last candidate time series of monetary shocks considered uses a
methodology suggested by Kuttner (2001). This approach exploits market data from
the prices on futures contracts on the federal funds rate and computes the variation
in the policy rate that was not expected by the markets. The main advantage of this
approach is that it does not rely on a specific structural representation of the data.
The main disadvantage is that it also captures, as monetary shocks, variations of the
federal funds rate that are potentially well intended by the Federal Reserve Bank
as the response to the state of the economy, but that had either not been expected
by the market, or that had been expected differently.10 As a measure of monetary
shocks, I use the time series by Barakchian and Crowe (2013), who build on Kuttner
(2001) and generate estimates for the period between 1988M1 and 2008M12.11,12
10This risk is partly reduced by the fact that the time window used around the policy event
lasts only 24 hours.
11Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) use a similar approach and exploit the variations in the one-
month eurodollar rate between two days before and one day after the variation in the target rate
of the federal funds rate.
12I am grateful to the authors of the above-mentioned papers for having shared estimates and
codes.
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3.2 Step 2: select time series of monetary shocks
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the five candidate time series of monetary
shocks discussed in the previous section. It shows the standard deviation of each
time series, the contemporaneous correlations across series and the autocorrelation
of each series at 4 and 8 lags. The table reports summary statistics both for the
full sample period available and for the period after 1987Q1. I do so because, as
explained above, the estimation of impulse responses uses only the time series after
1987Q1 or 1991Q1, as imposed by the availability of the delinquency rates.
Table 3: Summary statistics of the candidate time series of monetary shocks
Full sample
st.dev cross correlations autocorrelations
(4 lags) (8 lags)
1) VAR 0.93 1 .04 .02
2) Medium Bayesian VAR 0.57 .57 1 -.12∗ -.01∗∗∗
3) Factor Model 1.61 .34 .28 1 .03 .06
4) Romer and Romer shocks 0.58 .34 .55 .04 1 -.09∗ .06∗
5) Futures Contracts 0.92 .01 -.05 -.08 .10 1 -.04 -.24
After 1987Q1
st.dev cross correlations autocorrelations
(4 lags) (8 lags)
1) VAR 0.69 1 .01∗∗∗ 0∗
2) Medium Bayesian VAR 0.34 .23 1 -.12∗∗ -.16∗∗
3) Factor Model 1.52 .15 .03 1 .07∗∗∗ .07∗∗
4) Romer and Romer shocks 0.26 .45 .05 -.27 1 .14∗∗∗ -.03∗∗∗
5) Futures Contracts 1.18 .02 -.01 -.10 .29 1 -.04 -.24
Notes: The table shows the correlations across the five candidate time series of monetary
shocks and the standard deviations. The tests on autocorrelations are carried out using the
Box and Ljung statistic ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗ significant at 10%.
According to table 3, the highest volatility is displayed by the monetary shocks
from the Factor Model, while the lowest volatility is displayed by the Romer and
Romer shocks. Correlations are overall small, especially after 1987Q1, and are neg-
ative one third of the time, although very close to zero. This indicates that the
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description of the non-systematic variation of the policy rate varies considerably
among the five methodologies considered.13 As for autocorrelations, the Box and
Ljung test finds that autocorrelations differ from zero in a statistically significant
way for several series, especially after 1987Q1. This suggests some caution in in-
terpreting the candidate monetary shocks as structural shocks. It was explained
in the previous section that 4 of the 5 time series used in the paper are quarterly
transformations of monthly time series. I found that the Box and Ljung test tended
to reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelations also for the originals series (see table
6 at the end of the paper).14 Figure 2 complements table 3. It uses rolling windows
of 48 quarters to study how the standard deviations and the cross correlations vary
over time. The figure shows that the volatility of monetary shocks has steadily
decreased after the 1980s for all the five measures of monetary shocks included, a
finding consistent with Primiceri (2005). The decrease in standard deviations is
quite considerable and equals up to around 50% for the Romer and Romer shocks
and for the shocks from the VAR and the Medium Bayesian VAR. A similar down-
ward trend is displayed by cross correlations. This suggests that, in general, the
candidate estimates of monetary shocks imply a progressively less consistent pat-
tern of the non-systematic response of the policy rate. The only exception is the
positive correlation between the shocks from the VAR model and the Romer and
Romer shocks, which increases over time.
A candidate time series of monetary shocks is appropriate for the analysis of this
paper only if it does not reflect the endogenous response of the policy rate to the
Fed’s expectation of future defaults on loans. Put it differently, monetary shocks
13A relatively strong correlation is found between the Romer and Romer shocks and the shocks
generated by the VAR. This fact is also pointed out in Coibion (2012).
14The results from Section 3.3 use the series from a Medium Bayesian VAR that included
12 months as lags. I found that the Box and Ljung test failed to reject the hypothesis of no
autocorrelation only when including more than as much as 6 years of lags. i.e. 72 months.
Computational constraints did not allow to draw from the distribution of so many parameters.
For this reason I use the specification of the model with 12 lags.
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should not include the Fed’s anticipatory response to future defaults, a response
realistically implied by the Fed’s response to the business cycle. In principle, all the
available monetary shocks might still be capturing to some extent this endogenous
response. It is hard to judge whether this is the case using an a priori theoretical
argument. In fact, all the methodologies discussed in Section 3.1 have strengths
and weaknesses in capturing the Fed’s response to defaults. A direct empirical
assessment is even less viable, given that the time series of the Fed’s forecast of
defaults is not available. An indirect approach becomes necessary. In this paper, I
propose one based on the following idea. While unobserved, the Fed’s expectation
at time t of future defaults must be some (unknown) function of variables up to
time t−1 realistically informative of the future financial strength of borrowers. The
variables used in this paper are:
1. the delinquency rate on business loans;
2. the delinquency rate on residential mortgages;
3. the delinquency rate on consumer credit;
4. the leverage ratio of firms;
5. the leverage ratio of households;
6. the debt-to-GDP ratio of firms;
7. the debt-to-GDP ratio of households;
8. the ratio of banks’ reserves to total loans.
The first 7 variables measure the contemporaneous financial position of firms and
households, while the last variable captures banks’ expectations of future defaults
of firms and households on loans. One can proxy the unobserved Fed’s forecast of
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defaults with the above 8 variables and impose the restrictions that the candidate
monetary shocks are not Granger-caused by any of these variables.
More precisely, I run Granger-causality tests using the following regression:
st = γ0 + γ1vt−1 + γ2vt−2 + ...+ γmvt−m + t+s. (1)
The scalar st indicates the candidate time series of monetary shocks evaluated at
time t, the scalar vt−i indicates the variable used in the test and evaluated at time
t− i. I consider the eight variables above one at the time in order to retain degrees
of freedom in the estimation of equation (1). The White test rejects the null hy-
pothesis of heteroskedastic disturbances in equation (1) for virtually all regressions
estimated.15 I add lags of variable vt from 1 up to m = 2, ..., 12. I then use an
F-statistic to test the hypothesis that the parameters on all regressors, except the
constant, are jointly equal to zero, i.e. γ1 = γ2 = ... = γm = 0. I rule out shocks
that are Granger-caused at a type-one error of 5% by any of the seven variables
when adding any number of lags from 1 up to 12. Each of the seven variables
considered implies 12 × 5 = 60 tests, for a total of 420 tests. For robustness, I
run additional tests using a quadratic and a cubic specification of equation (1), and
using a Lagrange Multiplier test rather than an F test.
Table 4 shows the results of the F tests with a linear specification of equation
(1). This table lists the “problematic” lags, i.e. the total number of lags from 1
until m including which Granger-causality is not rejected at 5% type-one error. To
guide the reading of the table, consider first the case of the VAR shocks. Table
4 shows that Granger-causality is not rejected when including up to 8 lags of the
delinquency rate on consumer credit. This suggests that, according to the logic of
15Part of the rejection of the null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity is likely to be due to the
fact that the tests only use the part of the monetary shocks that overlap with the delinquency
rates. The variation in time of the volatility of the variance of monetary shocks shown in figure
2 suggests that the null hypothesis would be probably rejected, at least for some estimates of
monetary shocks, if one had a longer time series of the delinquency rate.
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Figure 2: Time-varying summary statistics (rolling window = 48 quarters)
a) Standard deviations
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Notes: Summary statistics at period t are computed over a window of 48 quarters.
153
Chapter 3
Table 4: Granger-causality restrictions on candidate time series of monetary shocks
1) 2) 3) 4) 5)
VAR Medium Factor Romer and Futures
Bayesian VAR model Romer contracts
Delinquency rates
Business loans 9-12 3-12
Residential mortgages 1 6-12 5-6
Consumer credit 1-8 1-12 1-12
Leverage ratios
Firms 1-4
Households 4-12 3-9
Debt/GDP ratios
Firms 10-12
Households
Reserves/Loans ratio
Banks 6, 8 3-12 2, 11
Notes: The table shows the results of Granger-causality tests on the candidate time series
of monetary shocks from Section 3.1. The table reports the number of lags m in equation
(1) including which the hypothesis of no Granger causality is rejected at 5% type-one
error. The restrictions imposed are that none of the variables considered (delinquency
rate, spread, leverage and dept-to-GDP ratios) Granger cause the candidate shocks.
the test, VAR shocks might still be affected by endogeneity with respect to expected
future defaults on consumer loans. Alternatively, consider the Romer and Romer
shocks. The tests find that these shocks are Granger-caused by several variables,
including all delinquency rates. Remember that the Romer and Romer shocks are
computed from the regression of the intended variation of the policy rate on the
unemployment rate and on the forecasts of output growth and inflation. Indeed,
unreported tests find that output, the GDP deflator and the unemployment rate
do not Granger-cause the Romer and Romer shocks, nor any of the other monetary
shocks considered. Table 4 suggests that controlling for these variables might not
be enough to detect the response of the policy rate to future defaults. The analysis
delivers only one candidate time series of monetary shocks that meet the Granger-
causality restrictions. These are the shocks corresponding to the Medium Bayesian
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VAR model. The results of the tests are the same using a quadratic and cubic
specification of equation (1) and using the Lagrange Multiplier test.16
The results from table 4 should be viewed with caution. In fact, by construction
the test mistakenly rejects the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality with 5%
probability. This implies that the four time series rejected by the tests (VAR,
Factor Model, Romer and Romer and Futures Contracts) could well be just as
exogenous to future defaults as the time series of shocks satisfying the restrictions
(i.e., from the Medium Bayesian VAR), at least according to the logic of the test.
Additionally, there is an (unknown) probability that the tests fail to reject the
absence of Granger causality where this causality is actually present in the data.
This implies that the time series of shocks satisfying the restrictions could have been
selected as the appropriate candidate time series only by mistake. For this reason I
will also discuss the impulse responses obtained from monetary shocks that do not
satisfy the Granger-causality restrictions.
Figure 3 shows some of the features of the monetary shocks estimated from
the Medium Bayesian VAR and used in the next section. By construction, these
shocks are very noisy. I follow Coibion (2012) and show in panel a the cumulative
monetary shocks, i.e. the sum at time t of all monetary shocks until time t.17 An
increase in the cumulative series of monetary shocks is associated with a positive
(contractionary) marginal monetary shock. The graph in panel a shows some fea-
tures consistent with Coibion (2012), including a period of expansionary monetary
shocks in the late 1970s and a subsequent series of contractionary shocks during the
Volcker period. Panel a only shows the dynamics of the random component of the
16With both a quadratic and a cubic specification of equation (1) the delinquency rate on
business loans does not Granger-cause anymore the shocks by the Factor Model, and it Granger-
causes the shocks estimated from Futures Contracts when adding 8 to 12 lags. The results from
the Lagrange Multiplier test were always in line with the F test.
17The cumulative series of the monetary shocks corresponding to all 5 methodologies considered
in Section 3.1 is shown in figure 6 of Appendix C. The figure also shows the cumulative shocks
from the VAR with time-varying parameters by Primiceri (2005), which is used in Section 4 to
discuss the robustness of the results.
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Figure 3: Analysis of the monetary shocks from the Medium Bayesian VAR
a) Cumulative shocks (increase = contraction)
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Notes: Panel a shows the cumulative monetary shocks between 1976M1 and
2007M6, computed for each time t as the sum of the series of monetary shocks
from t = 1 until t. Panel b shows the level of the federal funds rate and the
counter-factual level that, according to the Medium Bayesian VAR, would have
occurred, had no monetary shock been given. The counter-factual time series is
computed using the original data for the first p = 12 months, and then iterating
recursively on the variables of the model. The computation uses the posterior
means of the parameters estimated.
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federal funds rate. To compare it to the systematic component of the federal funds
rate I used the estimated Medium Bayesian VAR to generate pseudo data recur-
sively by feeding into the model all structural shocks except the monetary shocks.18
The results for the federal funds rate are shown in panel b. A level of the actual
federal funds rate above the level that would have occurred, had monetary shocks
not been given, is associated with a contractionary shock. The graph shows that, by
construction, the systematic and the random component of the federal funds rate
do not systematically point in the same direction. Other patterns emerge from fig-
ure 3. For instance, the overall contractionary monetary policy generated with the
systematic response of the federal funds rate in the period between 1975 and 1980
has been met with a mix of contractionary and expansionary monetary shocks. This
is also visible from panel a. The graph of panel b also suggests that, for instance,
the expansionary monetary policy following the dotcom bubble had been initially
combined with contractionary monetary shocks.
3.3 Step 3: compute impulse response functions
To compute the impulse responses of the delinquency rates I use variants of the
local projection method by Jorda (2005). Local projections capture the relationship
between the dependent variable and the structural shocks of interest, without relying
on a specific, inverted autoregressive representation of the data, as for instance in
VAR models. In addition, they allow to estimate impulse responses of variables not
included in the initial model, as in this paper.
There are several ways of specifying single-equation regressions to compute im-
pulse response functions. In this paper I use the one by Romer and Romer (2004).
Define xt the variable of interest and st the monetary shock. The baseline regression
18The first 12 observations of the pseudo data, lost due to the inclusion of lagged variables, are
set equal to the data.
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is
xt = α +
ps∑
i=0
βist−i +
px∑
i=1
γixt−i + t. (2)
The response of x to s is computed as IRFτ = s¯ · gτ , where s¯ is a parameter
controlling for the sign and magnitude of the shock given and gτ is defined as
g0 = β0, g1 = β1 + γ1g0, g2 = β2 + γ1g1 + γ2g0, ... . Contrary to Romer and Romer
(2004), I add the contemporaneous level of the monetary shock in order to allow
monetary shocks to affect the delinquency rates within the same period. In the
rest of the paper I use 4 lags of the shock and 4 lags of the dependent variable, a
parameter choice that was found not to affect the results particularly. The inclusion
of the lagged values of the dependent value led to reject, at a 5% type-one error,
the hypothesis that the errors are autocorrelated.19
To compute confidence intervals for the impulse response estimated from equa-
tion (2), one needs to take into account the generated regressor problem.20 In fact,
uncertainty enters the estimation of the impulse response from equation (2) both
from the error term and from the estimation of the monetary shocks used as re-
gressors. One could follow a frequentist approach and estimate equation (2) using
ordinary least squares. Accordingly, one could then compute confidence intervals
with a system of bootstraps that generates pseudo regressors st and pseudo er-
rors t. In this paper I follow a different approach and estimate equation (2) with
Bayesian techniques, given that the monetary shocks used come from a Bayesian
VAR. Write the Medium Bayesian VAR model from Section 3.1 as Y = X ·B + U ,
where the matrix Y = [y1, ..., yn] includes the variables used in the model, the ma-
trix X = [x1, ..., xT ]
′ with xt = [y′t−1, ..., y
′
t−p, 1] includes the lagged values of all
variables as well as a constant and the matrix U = [u1, ..., un] includes the reduced-
19Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) use a similar specification, except that they do not include
lagged values of the dependent variable. Similar regressions are used by Cochrane (2004), Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2002), Chang and Sakata (2007) and Me´sonnier and Stevanovic (2012).
20See for instance the discussion in Murphy and Topel (1985).
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form shocks.21 Call Ψ the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks
ut. The Normal-inverse Wishart priors for B and Ψ used in Banbura et al. (2010)
imply the following posterior distributions
Ψ ∼ iW (Σpost, dpost) , vec(B)|Ψ ∼ N
(
vec(Bpost,Ψ⊗ (X ′∗X∗)−1
)
,
where the posterior hyper-parameters and the matrix X∗ are defined extensively in
their paper. For the estimation of equation (2), instead, I use a non-informative
Normal-Gamma prior, implying a multivariate posterior t distribution for the pa-
rameters ψ = [α, β0, ..., βps , γ1, ..., γpx ]
′. This distribution is centered around the
OLS estimates of ψ, as shown for example by Koop (2013). Given this, coverage
intervals are computed running the following steps 500 times:
1. draw Ψ and vec(B) from their respective distributions;
2. compute the corresponding time series of monetary shocks, under the recur-
siveness assumption;
3. use these shocks to compute the least square estimates of ψ;
4. use ψols to extract ψ from the multivariate t;
5. compute the corresponding impulse responses.
4 Results
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the delinquency rate on business loans,
residential mortgages and consumer credit. The impulse given is the expansionary
21Call n the number of variables in the VAR model, p the number of lags included and T + p
the number of available observations. Under this notation, the matrices Y and U have dimension
T × n, the matrix X has dimensions T × np + 1, the matrix B has dimensions np + 1 × n, the
vector xt has dimensions np+ 1× 1 and the matrix Ψ has dimensions n× n.
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monetary shock that generates a 1% decrease in the federal funds rate in the Medium
Bayesian VAR. The vertical axis indicates basis points, the horizontal axis indicates
quarters. I report coverage intervals at 68% and 95%, in accordance with the
literature. The figure unequivocally shows that there is no statistically significant
variation of the aggregate delinquency rates, either at one standard deviation or at
two standard deviations. Failing to reject the null hypothesis using a two-sided test
does not imply that we would fail to reject the null hypothesis using a one-sided
test. Figures 9 and 10 at the end of the paper show that the impulse responses of
the delinquency rates remain statistically insignificant with one-sided tests.
The robustness of the results from figure 4 has been assessed along the following
dimensions: the use of monetary shocks that do not satisfy the Granger-causality
tests from Section 3.2, the use of HP residuals of the delinquency rates instead of
the level, the use of seasonally adjusted levels and HP residuals of the delinquency
rate, the use of monetary shocks estimated with a time-varying VAR model, the use
of single VAR models that include the delinquency rates and the use of delinquency
rates disaggregated at the level of top 100 and non top 100 banks in the US. The
results are consistent with figure 4 and briefly discussed in the rest of this section.
For convenience, the corresponding figures are reported at the end of the paper.
Table 5 lists the number of quarters in correspondence of which there is a sta-
tistically significant response at either one standard deviation or two standard de-
viations. The analysis reports the results corresponding to the five candidate times
series of monetary shocks commented on in Section 3.1. The impulse responses
corresponding to table 5 are reported in panels a to e of figure 11 at the end of the
paper. Overall, we see that the hypothesis of no response of the delinquency rate
to a monetary shock is not rejected in some cases when considering one standard
deviation, but we almost always fail to reject it when considering two standard devi-
ations. This supports the conclusion drawn from figure 4, which is that delinquency
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions (expansionary monetary shock)
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions of the delinquency rates in
response to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate by 1%.
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Table 5: Number of quarters displaying a statistically significant response or delin-
quency rates
Levels HP residuals
business residential consumer business residential consumer
loans mortgages credit loans mortgages credit
a) One standard deviation
VAR 5 0 3 4 0 3
Medium B. VAR 0 1 0 0 2 0
Factor M. 1 3 7 3 2 5
Romer Romer 9 5 1 9 2 1
Futures cont. 3 4 2 2 2 2
b) Two standard deviations
VAR 1 0 0 1 0 0
Medium B. VAR 0 0 0 0 0 0
Factor M. 0 0 2 1 0 2
Romer Romer 2 0 0 1 0 0
Futures cont. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: the table reports the number of quarters at which the impulse responses of the delinquency
rates were found to differ from zero with a statistical significance given by one and two standard
deviations.
rates do not respond to a monetary expansion. The analysis was also carried out for
the HP residuals of the delinquency rates instead of on their levels. The smoothing
parameter used to filter delinquency rates is 1600, but the result was found to hold
also using other values. The analysis was replicated for other values of the parame-
ters px and ps in equation (2), with no significant change in the results. When using
seasonally adjusted data, VAR shocks implied a statistically significant increase at
5% type-one error in the HP residuals of all delinquency rates four quarters from
the shock. The impulse responses are shown in panel f of figure 11 at the end of the
paper. This is the only evidence supporting the hypothesis that defaults increase
in general equilibrium following an expansionary monetary shock. The response
corresponding to the other cases, instead, remained statistically insignificant.
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The impulse responses from figure 4 were computed using estimates of monetary
shocks that assumed a time-invariant model of the economy. The literature has
discussed the fact that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has changed
over time. Primiceri (2005) addresses this issue using a VAR model with time
varying parameters and a time-varying variance-covariance matrix of the structural
shocks. He shows that the volatility of monetary shocks does change considerably
across time, although the impulse responses do not change significantly depending
on the exact point in time in which the structural shock is given. The VAR model
in his paper includes three variables (the inflation rate, the unemployment rate
and the 3-month treasury bill), is estimated for the period between 1963Q3 and
2001Q3 and is identified using the Cholesky structure. Figure 12 at the end of
the paper shows the impulse responses computed using the time series of monetary
shocks by Primiceri (2005).22 The result that delinquency rates do not respond
in a statistically significant way to a monetary shock are robust to the use of the
monetary shocks by Primiceri.23
It has been said that the delinquency rates are available only after 1987Q1
(1991Q1 for the delinquency rate on residential mortgages). Four of the five method-
ologies considered so far delivered monetary shocks estimated in a time period that
starts before 1987Q1. The robustness of the results from figure 4 was analyzed
also using VAR models that include the delinquency rates. The advantage of this
approach is that it avoids the generated regressor problem discussed in Section 3.3.
The disadvantage is that it uses a shorter time period for the estimation. I include
the three delinquency rates in the VAR one at a time in order to retain degrees
22The shocks are obtained from the updated MCMC algorithm by Del Negro and Primiceri
(2014). I am grateful to the author for having shared his estimates.
23The impulse responses are computed using equation (2) estimated with Bayesian methods, as
for figure 4. For simplicity, the coverage intervals reported in figure 12 only reflect the uncertainty
in the parameters of equation (2) and not the uncertainty related to different draws of the time
series for the structural shocks (see the discussion in Section 3.3). A full assessment of the coverage
intervals would deliver wider standard errors, hence strengthening the result of the paper.
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of freedom. In all three VAR models estimated I include, in addition to the delin-
quency rate, the log of real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator and the federal funds.
The model is identified with sign restrictions, as the VAR model from Section 3.1
(see Appendix A). Figure 13 at the end of the paper shows the impulse responses
of the delinquency rates to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate
by 1%. The error bands show 68% and 95% confidence intervals computed with
a bootstrap on the reduced form shocks in the VAR. The results are in line with
figure 4, and show that one cannot reject the hypothesis that delinquency rates do
not respond to a monetary shock.
Last, the analysis was replicated using a different aggregation of the loans cor-
responding to the delinquency rates used. The analysis so far has used data on
loans issued by all commercial banks. The Federal Reserve Bank computes these
time series from microeconomic data, which remain confidential. To the best of
my knowledge, the only disaggregated time series that is made publicly available
regards the delinquency rate on loans issued by the top 100 banks according to
assets, and on loans issued by all the other banks. Figures 14 and 15 show that the
results remain unchanged using this disaggregation.
5 Conclusions
This paper has addressed the question of whether the risk taking incentives, ana-
lyzed extensively by empirical papers including Jimenez et al. (2011) and Maddaloni
and Peydro´ (2012) in a partial equilibrium analysis, hold also in general equilibrium.
To do so, I used time series analysis on the aggregate delinquency rates on loans
issued by all commercial banks in the US. I argued that it is not possible to reject
the hypothesis that a monetary shock does not affect delinquency rates. While risk
taking incentives might not be strong enough to lead to an aggregate increase in
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defaults, as suggested in this paper and in Buch et al. (2011), they could explain
why we fail to reject the hypothesis that defaults increase in response to a monetary
expansion. One possible interpretation of the result of the paper is that, even in
the event of an increase in risk taking by individual banks, the monetary expansion
generates general equilibrium effects that increase firms’ profits and households’
income, hence pushing up their cash flow.
The analysis of the paper is consistent with the results by Buch et al. (2011).
They use a FAVAR model augmented with data on the Survey of Terms of Business
Lending and argue that the banking sector as a whole does not significantly take
on new, more risky loans after a monetary expansion, but small banks do. It would
be interesting to know if this result is also consistent with delinquency rates, since
delinquency rates include all loans and do not limit the analysis to new loans. The
availability of delinquency rates does not shed light on this point, leaving it an open
research question.
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6 Appendix A: Specification and identification of
the VAR model
The VAR model includes the log of real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator, the federal
funds rate, the log of firms’ leverage ratio and the log of households’ leverage ratio.
The inclusion of real GDP, the GDP deflator and the federal funds rate is standard
in the empirical literature on monetary policy.24 The remaining variables capture
information on the financial situation of firms and households. The model is :
Yt = αt + A(L)Yt−1 +Rt. (3)
The 5 × 1 vector αt includes a constant, a linear trend with no time breaks
and seasonal dummies. The 5× 5 matrix A(L) includes four lags.25 I estimate the
model using least square estimation with data in the period between 1965Q1 and
2007Q2. The choice of 1965Q1 as the first observation of the sample is relatively
standard in the literature and is taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999) and Uhlig (2005).26 The period after 2007Q2 is excluded from the analysis
because it corresponds to a largely exceptional period, compared to the rest of the
sample. While the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is likely to have
undergone structural breaks and variations during the sample period considered,
these variations were found by Primiceri (2005) to have a limited effect on impulse
response functions.
The contemporaneous relationships among the variables included in Yt are cap-
24One exception is Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002), who use the slope of term structure instead
of the interbank overnight interest rate.
25The inclusion of four lags in the right-hand side is standard, as for instance in Den Haan and
Sterk (2011). The Akaike, the Bayesian and the Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggested the
use of respectively six, three and three lags. The results remain unchanged. The results from the
Granger-causality tests in table 4 remain unchanged when adding up to as many as 12 lags in the
VAR.
26The sample period included in Olivei and Tenreyro (2007), Coibion (2012) and Canova and
De Nicolo´ (2002) starts in 1966Q1 1970M1 and 1973M1, respectively.
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tured by the residuals. This implies that a shock to Rt,i does not bear any structural
interpretation. I follow the literature and assume that the reduced-form shocks are
a linear combination of as many structural shocks St:
27
Rt = P · St. (4)
Since the model is partially identified, the assumption that St has dimensions 5× 1
is without loss of generality, as the 4 non-monetary shocks in St can be viewed as a
combination of all non-monetary shocks driving Yt.
Call Σ the variance-covariance matrix of Rt. The only condition imposed by the
data on the estimation of P is
Σ = P · P ′. (5)
There are infinite candidate matrices P that satisfy this condition. The literature
solves this problem by introducing a limited set of theoretically-motivated assump-
tions. I follow Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002) and identify each model using sign
restrictions. This approach allows for contemporaneous effects among the vari-
ables included in the analysis, which is consistent with Bernanke and Mihov (1998),
Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002) and Canova and Pina (1999).28 In particular, I gen-
27See Cooley and Roy (1985) for a discussion on this point.
28Bernanke and Mihov (1998) claim that one cannot rule out contemporaneous effects with
quarterly data (as in this paper), and Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002) and Canova and Pina (1999)
reject the hypothesis of no contemporaneous effects as inconsistent with a wide range of theoretical
models. While part of the literature still considers it plausible to assume that a monetary shock
affects real GDP only after one quarter (see for instance Olivei and Tenreyro (2007)), it is not
clear whether a recursive ordering of the specific variables used in this paper would be appropriate.
Including firms’ balance sheet variables after the federal funds rate would realistically allow the
monetary shock to affect firms’ financing decisions within the same quarter of the shock, but it
would unrealistically impose that the Federal Reserve Bank responds to shocks to the financing
condition of firms with at least a lag of 3 months. Including, instead, balance sheet variables before
the federal funds rate would realistically allow the Federal Reserve Bank to respond contempo-
raneously to shocks to the financial situation of firms, but would unrealistically impose that the
monetary shock has no effect on firms’ balance sheet variables within the first 3 months after the
shock. In unreported robustness checks I found that the results do not change when considering
a partially recursive structure in which the federal funds rate does not affect real GDP and the
GDP deflator contemporaneously, but affects and responds to the other variables included. This
partially recursive structure is used for instance by Eickmeier and Hofmann (2012).
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erate several orthogonal representations of the data using the following algorithm:
1. generate L = 1000 orthogonal 5 × 5 matrices Q through a combination of
reflection and rotation methods and through QR decompositions. Then gen-
erate L candidate matrices Pcand defined as Pcand = Pee ·Q; Pee stands for the
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of Σ (see Appendix B for the details);
2. use {Pcand,l}Ll=1 to compute 5 ·L sets of impulse responses, i.e. L responses to
a structural shock to each of the 5 elements in Yt, one at the time;
29
3. identify an expansionary monetary shock by ruling out models that display
either an increase in the interest rate(s) during the first two quarters, a de-
crease in output during the first two quarters or a price puzzle that lasts
more than three years. This set of restrictions is very general and broadly in
line with the existing literature;30 The algorithm generates 165 sign-restricted
representations of the data. For simplicity, I will only use the median target
29I do not impose that the monetary shock enters as the last element of St in the identification
through sign restrictions. As argued by Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002), what makes an impulse
response a plausible candidate for the true impulse response to a monetary shock is not that the
shock is given to the equation of the policy rate, but that it generates responses consistent with
what economic theory associates to a monetary shock. This distinction is relevant because, in this
application, generating models by only giving a shock to the third element of St would significantly
reduce the set of impulse responses, despite the wide range of orthogonal matrices Q considered.
The median target representation happens to correspond to a shock to the third element of Yt,
which is the equation of the federal funds rate. In other specifications of the model the median
target did not correspond to a shock to the third element of Rt.
30The restrictions on real GDP and the GDP deflator reduce the risk of mistakenly capturing
aggregate supply shocks as monetary shocks, while the restriction on the federal funds rate reduces
the risk of capturing real demand shocks and ensures that the monetary shock is expansionary.
In principle, the identified reduced-form shock could be driven by a negative money demand
shock instead of an expansionary monetary shock. Unreported robustness checks found that the
results hold when including the monetary aggregate M1, restricted to decrease for the first two
quarters. Compared to the literature, the set of restrictions imposed is very general. Uhlig (2005)
uses monthly data and identifies a monetary contraction by restricting the impact effect and the
effect on the first 5 lags to display a decrease in prices, a decrease in non-borrowed reserves and an
increase in the federal funds rate. Eickmeier and Hofmann (2012) identifies a monetary contraction
by restricting both the impact effect and the effect on the first lag to display an increase in the
federal funds rate, a decrease in real GDP, a decrease in the GDP deflator and a decrease in the M1
monetary aggregate. Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002) base their restrictions on pairwise correlations
across variables instead of the sign of the impulse response, and impose restrictions up to the lag
that ensures the identification of only one structural representation of the data.
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sign-restricted representation a´ la Fry and Pagan (2011).31
7 Appendix B: algorithm to generate orthogonal
matrices
The matrix Pee used to generate 5000 matrices Pcand in Appendix A is computed
by first decomposing the matrix Σ into a matrix A of its eigenvectors and a matrix
B listing its eigenvalues along the diagonal. The matrix Pee is then defined as
A ∗ B0.5 and it satisfies the condition PeeP ′ee = Σ by construction. Given Pee, the
computation of L candidate matrices Pcand that satisfy condition 5 from Section 3.1
requires the generation of L 5× 5 matrices Q satisfying condition QQ′ = I, where
5 is the number of variables included in Yt of equation (3). Since there are infinite
possible representations of the data, the richer the set of Qs considered, the more
likely it is that the true matrix P ∗ that has generated the data is actually replicated
in the model.
I start by generating 3 ·M 2 × 2 orthogonal matrices. Rubio-Ramirez, Wag-
goner and Zha (2005) generate orthogonal matrices using the QR decomposition,
while Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002) use Givens rotation.32 In this paper I use
both approaches. QR orthogonal matrices Rqr are generated using the orthogonal-
triangular decomposition of a matrix. This operation decomposes a matrix A˜ into
an orthogonal q˜ matrix and an upper triangular r matrix such that A˜ = q˜r˜. To
generate M QR orthogonal matrices I extract M 2 × 2 random matrices from a
standard normal distribution. To each of them I apply the QR decomposition and
31The main difference between the median model and the median target model is that the
former potentially switches from one representation to another. To avoid this, the median target
is defined as the single representation that is closest to the median, after accounting for the
appropriate normalization. See Fry and Pagan (2011) for a discussion.
32Fry and Pagan (2011) give an introduction to orthogonal matrices in sign-restricted mod-
els. See Paustian (2007) and Castelnuovo (2012) for an application of sign restrictions to New
Keynesian models in a Monte Carlo experiment.
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save the generated orthogonal matrices q˜ in the set of Rqr. Rotation matrices Rrot
are instead defined as
Rrot(θ) =
 cos(θ) −sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
 ,
with θ ∈ [0, 2pi].33 The orthogonality of Rrot follows from the fact that cos(θ)2 +
sin(θ)2 = 1 for ∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. To generate M rotation matrices I construct a grid of
M points for the parameter θ in the space [0, 2pi] and then compute Rrot(θ) for each
grid point. I extend Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002) and compute also M reflection
matrices, which are defined as
Rrefl(θ) =
 cos(θ) sin(θ)
sin(θ) −cos(θ)
 .
Rotation matrices generate a vector y = x ·Rrot such that the vector x is rotated
clockwise (or a vector y = Rrot·x such that the vector x is rotated counter-clockwise)
by an angle of θ about the origin of the Cartesian coordinate system. Reflection
matrices, instead, generate a vector y = x ·Rrefl such that the vector x is reflected
around the line that goes through the origin of the Cartesian coordinate system
with slope θ/2. While for some special cases the vectors coincide, the set of vectors
generated through rotations does not fully overlap with the set of vectors generated
by reflection matrices, as illustrated intuitively with the exercise in figure 5. It
hence improves the analysis to account for both rotations and reflections in order
to extend the set of structural representations replicated by the model.
Last, the 3 · M 2 × 2 R = {Rqr, Rrot, Rrefl} orthogonal matrices generated
through rotations, reflections and QR decompositions need to be combined into
6 × 6 orthogonal matrices. This is achieved using a multiplication similar in spirit
33Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002) construct the grid on θ ∈ (0, pi/2).
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Figure 5: Rotation vs. reflection matrices
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Notes: The left graph shows that the reflection around the 22.5 degree line of the vector between
point (0,0) and point (1,0) (blue dashed line) gives the vector between point (0,0) and (0.7071,
0.7071) (red solid line). The same vector, though, is generated by a counter-clockwise rotation
of the original vector of 45 degrees, or a clockwise rotation of the original vector of 315 degrees
(black dotted line). The right graph, instead, shows the same case for the vector between (1,0)
and (1.5,1). Reflection around the 22.5 degree line gives the vector between point (0.7071, 0.7071)
and point (1.7678, 0.3536). No rotation can generate the same transformation achieved by the
reflection.
to Canova and De Nicolo´ (2002). For each of the L 5 × 5 orthogonal matrices
Q(i) that needs to be generated, extract 5 2 × 2 matrices R. Generate then a
5 × 5 identity matrix E. Select two of its columns a and b randomly and rewrite
4 of the elements of E as E(a, a) = R(1, 1), E(a, b) = R(1, 2), E(b, a) = R(2, 1)
and E(b, b) = R(2, 2). The matrix Q is obtained by multiplying the 5 matrices E
obtained. By construction Q is an orthogonal matrix and can be used to generate
alternative structural representations of the data. Unreported robustness checks
found that the results are not affected by the exact value of M as long as it is not
too small. In the paper, M is set equal to 500.
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Figure 6: Cumulative monetary shocks
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Notes: The figure shows the cumulative monetary shocks for the five method-
ologies discussed in Section 3.1, as well as for the methodology by Primiceri
(2005) commented on in Section 4.
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Figure 7: Ratio of loans relative to banks’ total assets
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Notes: The figure shows the ratio of the three types of loans considered relative
to the size of banks’ assets. The variables are computed using data from the
Flow of Funds.
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Figure 8: Monthly monetary shocks corresponding to table 6
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Notes: The table shows the 6 time series of the monthly monetary shocks whose autocorrela-
tions are analyzed in table 6.
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Figure 9: Same as figure 4 but one sided coverage interval
a) delinquency rate on business loans
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions of the delinquency rates in
response to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate by 1%.
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Figure 10: Same as figure 4 but one sided coverage interval
a) delinquency rate on business loans
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions of the delinquency rates in
response to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate by 1%.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses corresponding to table 5
a) on VAR shocks
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b) on Medium Bayesian VAR shocks
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c) on shocks from Factor Model
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d) on Romer and Romer shocks
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e) on shocks from Futures Contracts
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f) same as panel a) but with seasonally adjusted data
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Figure 12: Impulse responses using monetary shocks from Primiceri (2005)
a) delinquency rate on business loans
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions of the delinquency rates in
response to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate by 1%.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses from small VARs with delinquency rates
a) delinquency rate on business loans
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions of the delinquency rates in
response to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate by 1%.
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Figure 14: Impulse responses of delinquency on loans by top 100 banks
a) delinquency rate on business loans
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions of the delinquency rates in
response to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate by 1%.
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Figure 15: Impulse responses of delinquency on loans by non top 100 banks
a) delinquency rate on business loans
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Notes: The figure shows the impulse response functions of the delinquency rates in
response to a monetary shock that decreases the federal funds rate by 1%.
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Table 6: Analysis of autocorrelations
Full sample After 1987
monthly quarterly monthly quarterly
k = 4 k = 8 k = 4 k = 8 k = 4 k = 8 k = 4 k = 8
1) Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010), 1962M2-2002M12
ρ(k) -0.082 0.001 -0.109 0.047 0.185 -0.063 -0.313 0.127
pvalue 0.007 0.000 0.084 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2) Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2010), replicated in this paper, 1976M1-2007M6
ρ(k) -0.062 -0.018 -0.124 -0.009 0.138 -0.069 -0.123 -0.164
pvalue 0.001 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.013
3) Forni and Gambetti (2010), 1973M6-2007M11
ρ(k) 0.028 0.043 0.029 0.058 0.071 0.040 0.073 0.072
pvalue 0.743 0.641 0.128 0.384 0.601 0.352 0.009 0.047
4) Romer and Romer (2004), 1969M4-1996M12
ρ(k) 0.007 0.117 -0.130 0.055 -0.054 0.009 0.212 -0.0372
pvalue 0.373 0.005 0.046 0.093 0.199 0.420 0.516 0.3520
5) Romer and Romer, extended by Coibion et al. (2012), 1969M4-2008M12
ρ(k) 0.014 0.118 -0.090 0.055 0.087 0.070 0.149 -0.026
pvalue 0.130 0.000 0.082 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6) Barakchian and Crowe (2013), 1988M1-2008M12
ρ(k) 0.027 0.080 -0.037 -0.245 0.027 0.080 -0.037 -0.2453
pvalue 0.245 0.407 0.654 0.107 0.245 0.407 0.654 0.1075
Notes: the autocorrelation ρ(k) is reported for 4 lags and for 8 lags. The pvalue reported
corresponds to the Box and Ljung test of no autocorrelation. The statistics are reported
both for the original monthly series and for the transformation into quarterly data as
from Section 3.1. The monthly monetary shocks corresponding to this table are shown
in figure 8.
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